PhD Candidate Cem Tuna Aksu

For most of the post-Cold War era, one thing in the Middle East never changed: whatever happened, Washington was the final guarantor of order. That is no longer true. American power has not collapsed — but the way the US uses it has changed. Instead of managing every crisis itself, Washington now expects its partners to handle more of their own security, while it focuses on the bigger, longer game with China in the Indo-Pacific.

This is not a withdrawal. It is a shift in responsibility. The US still offers weapons, support, and alliances — but it picks its moments more carefully. For countries in the region, the question is no longer if America will show up. It is how to stand on your own feet in a world where American backing is no longer guaranteed.

The growing tension between Türkiye and Israel makes much more sense against this backdrop. It is easy to describe it as an ideological clash or a diplomatic quarrel. But underneath, something bigger is happening: both countries are trying to become the region’s most essential player, at exactly the moment the US is stepping back and leaving room for someone to fill it.

From Domination to Indispensability

Regional power used to mean domination — the strongest army, the most territory, the loudest ideology. That idea is losing its grip. What matters more today is indispensability: being the country nobody can build a stable order without.

Neither Türkiye nor Israel is strong enough to dominate the region outright. But both have something the other players need. That single fact — not any one dispute — is what will shape the next ten years.

Türkiye’s strength is its location, in the fullest sense. The Black Sea, the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and the Middle East are usually treated as separate regions. For Ankara, they are one connected space. Türkiye talks to countries that barely talk to each other — NATO members, Gulf states, Ukraine, Russia. It kept the Turkish Straits open and stayed in touch with both Kyiv and Moscow during the war in Ukraine. It remains central to Syria’s future. After the Second Karabakh War, it became a key player in the Caucasus too. No single one of these roles makes Türkiye essential — but taken together, they do, in a way few other countries can match.

This geographic weight is now backed by an industrial one. Türkiye’s defense exports are no longer just business. They are political tools, used to build lasting ties from Eastern Europe to Africa to the Gulf. A drone sale, seen this way, is rarely just a sale — it’s a first step toward a longer relationship.

Israel’s strength has never come from geography. It comes from technology, intelligence, and an unusually close bond with Washington. But that alone is no longer enough, so Israel has built something else: a growing web of partnerships — with Greece and Cyprus, through the Abraham Accords, and increasingly with countries stretching to the Gulf and Central Asia. The goal is not classic Cold War-style containment. It is to make sure Israel has a seat at every table that matters. If Türkiye’s model is a bridge, Israel’s is more like a switchboard.

Seen this way, Türkiye and Israel are not really squaring off militarily. They are competing through overlapping networks — Türkiye through infrastructure and diplomacy, Israel through intelligence and technology partnerships. Both want the same outcome by different means: not to dominate the region, but to become impossible to leave out of it.

NATO 3.0: A New Kind of Alliance

This rivalry is now playing out inside NATO itself. The Alliance is no longer just about defending territory. It has to manage deterrence, maritime security, cyber threats, and industrial supply chains all at once — and that favors countries that can contribute across many fronts, not just guard their own borders.

Germany shows this shift clearly. For decades, Berlin led through its economy and its restraint, not its military. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed that. The Zeitenwende was not only about Russia — it was Germany recognizing that political weight in Europe now requires military weight too.

Türkiye’s path looks similar, but it starts from a different place. Ankara doesn’t need to build a military from scratch — it already has one of NATO’s largest standing armies. Its real task is turning that strength, plus a fast-growing defense industry — drones, precision weapons, warships — into lasting political influence, not just useful capability. Recent wars have shown that staying power in production matters as much as having the best weapon — and that is exactly where Turkish industry has quietly built an edge. Capability opens the door. Only political trust lets you walk through it.

Israel is not a NATO member, but it is deeply woven into Western security through missile defense, cyber tools, and intelligence sharing. Its limit is different: winning on the battlefield doesn’t automatically win political acceptance in the region. That is why Greece and Cyprus matter so much to Israel — not as friendly gestures, but as an anchor into Europe’s institutions. Ankara sees this as an attempt to box Türkiye in. Jerusalem sees it as reducing its own exposure. Both are right at the same time — which tells you this contest runs through networks, not blocs.

The old-style alliances of the last century were rigid — you belonged to one camp or the other. Today’s alliances are looser and can overlap. Türkiye’s ties reach Azerbaijan, Qatar, Pakistan, Somalia, and Central Asia. Israel’s reach Greece, Cyprus, India, and the Abraham Accords states. Neither side wants a direct fight. Neither can dominate the region alone. Both are betting that whatever order comes next simply cannot be built without them.

The Bottom Line

The real question for the next decade isn’t which country is stronger. It’s which one becomes too important to work around — as the region rebuilds its security around an America that shows up less often. That is a contest Türkiye and Israel can both win. But it is not one either can settle by force alone.