Gulshan Y. Saglam

Academic and Researcher

On 23 September 2026, on the margins of the UN General Assembly, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi agreed that Turkish forces would gradually hand the Bashiqa-Zilkan camp near Mosul to the federal government. Most headlines treated this as a troop movement, which is too small a reading. Bases rarely become diplomatic problems because of their size; they do so because of what they symbolize. Bashiqa was established in December 2015 with roughly 600 Turkish personnel, officially to train local forces against ISIS, and for most of a decade it has been a sore point in Baghdad’s claim to sovereignty. Why it moves now, and what that signals, matters more than the logistics. I see three dimensions to the answer, and then a fourth that may matter most.

The first dimension is Iraqi. Governments of very different persuasions have insisted that decisions about force on Iraqi soil belong to state institutions alone. What distinguishes Prime Minister al-Zaidi’s approach is that the demand has been paired with delivery. The joint statement ties Turkey’s withdrawal explicitly to security measures Iraq has taken, including a pledge to remove armed groups that Ankara regards as threats from Sinjar. Sovereignty here is built through capacity, not proclaimed through protest, and other fragile states in the region will notice.

The second dimension is Turkish. Türkiye appears to have returned to a policy of zero problems with its neighbors, a principle that once collided with the Arab uprisings but is now applied more guardedly: avoid friction unless Turkish security is directly threatened. The peace process with the PKK, presented in Ankara as a terror-free Türkiye, goes to the heart of this change, because forward deployment was always justified by the threat. If disarmament holds, that justification weakens; if it falters, withdrawal will probably slow. Turkey also keeps other bases in northern Iraq, so this is the handover of one camp, not an exit.

The third dimension is regional. Iraq is entering a period of reduced foreign military presence, including the American one under the announced path, which places a heavier burden on Baghdad to arrange its own security relations with every neighbor. Buzan and Wæver (2003) argued that security interdependence is felt first and most intensely at the regional level, and Bashiqa fits that pattern. States of the region are increasingly writing the terms of their own arrangements, protecting their interests and, in doing so, changing the political shape of the neighborhood. Washington’s envoy welcomed the deal rather than brokering it.

All three dimensions concern security, yet the fourth, the developmental one, is what follows security. If Iraq’s stabilization continues, and its recent steps have been both rapid and orderly, the relationship can widen into economic, industrial and commercial partnership. The two leaders pointed that way themselves, calling for urgent implementation of signed agreements and acceleration of strategic projects, above all the Development Road. Trade is the natural starting point, since Türkiye is already among Iraq’s largest trading partners. Industry is the less obvious and more valuable field. Türkiye spent decades building export-oriented manufacturing, a large contracting sector and a dense base of small firms (Altunışık & Tür, 2006), and an Iraq seeking to diversify beyond oil has more to learn from that experience than at any earlier moment. Sustainable development then raises the hardest test, which is cooperation over water and energy. A relationship that handles those well will not need a military camp to anchor it.

This is why Iraq may become something of a model, and Lebanon is arguably where that matters most. If a neighbor with long-standing forward positions can transfer one of them through a sequenced, negotiated, institution-to-institution process, and attach an economic horizon to it, other states where the authority of the state is still contested may find the method worth studying: Lebanon first, then Yemen, and any country facing a similar question. I would not overstate this, because every case carries its own history and none can simply copy another. But the method is instructive: reciprocity, phased steps, and shared interests.

The caution is practical. No public timetable has been announced, and an Iraqi commander has suggested completion by the end of this year, a figure Ankara has not confirmed. Announcements are cheap; implementation is the test.

In the end, Bashiqa may be remembered less as a camp that changed hands than as a signal about direction. Three things will decide that: Baghdad’s ability to extend the authority of the state, the durability of the PKK disarmament process, and the willingness of both capitals to turn security understandings into economic and political partnership. If they manage it, the handover will mark the point where Iraqi–Turkish relations stopped being managed through a military presence and began to be built through shared interests.

References

Altunışık, M. B., & Tür, Ö. (2006). Turkey: Challenges of continuity and change. Routledge.

Associated Press. (2026, September 24). Turkey will hand over key base in Iraq in a gradual troop withdrawal deal. ABC News. https://abcnews.com/International/wireStory/turkey-hand-key-base-iraq-gradual-troop-withdrawal-136710723

Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). Regions and powers: The structure of international security. Cambridge University Press.

The Defense Post. (2026, September 24). Turkey cements Bashiqa-Zilkan military camp handover to Iraq. https://thedefensepost.com/2026/09/24/iraq-turkey-bashiqa-zilkan/

The National. (2026, September 24). Turkey agrees to hand over Bashiqa military camp to Iraq. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/09/24/turkey-agrees-to-hand-over-bashiqa-military-camp-to-iraq/

Reuters. (2026, September 23). Turkey and Iraq agree Turkey will turn over military camp in northern Iraq. The Star. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/world/2026/09/24/turkey-and-iraq-agree-turkey-will-turn-over-military-camp-in-northern-iraq