Effects of the End of the Cold War

on Turkey’s International Position

Hüseyin Bağcı

The system established in Yalta has ended and Europe has entered into a search for a “new system.” The end of Cold War and the Gulf War bring about  debates of a new order. Turkey also has entered into new searches in this new order and as a result has experienced some deviations from its traditional policies.

Europe has experienced the longest period of peace after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 between 1945 and 1989.[i] The “New World Order” emerged after Second World War has been a bipolar world and, as powers produced by the war, United States (US) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) marked every development in the world. This New World Order, which has been perceived ideologically in essence, has ended with the political transformations evolved in Central and East Europe in 1989 and Europe became a continent fluctuating between new hopes and old fears.[ii] In other words, the system established in Yalta has ended and Europe entered into a search for a “new system.”

Actually, for the last thirty years Europe has experienced a stable state system. There is a system study in Europe after the collapse of this system. The essence of this system is the concept of “United States of Europe.”[iii] This concept, which targets for Europe to be a factor of political and economic balance in a multi-polar world, has continuously been set on the agenda and emphasized by European scholars. Europe begins to think about getting rid of the effects of two superpowers produced by the post-Second World War order and to isolate these two superpowers as a “whole Europe.”[iv] However, its realization is not as easy as it is thought. The recent debates demonstrate its difficulty. Especially, during and after the Gulf War, the difficulty that Europe has encountered in developing a common foreign policy added a new dimension to these debates and brings about the fact that it should not be expected from Europe to play a significant role in the near future.[v]

The effort for the isolation of the US and the USSR from Europe seems to be less likely for various reasons. The most significant reason is that Europe still needs the US as a power of balance against the USSR. The stable states system had to survive many storms, such as the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. However, this basic structure has not changed because of the comfort and trust provided by the nuclear umbrella of the United States. As the former Foreign Minister of the USSR, Eduard Shevardnadze said, “Europe, divided by blocs and military alliances, is a region having realized the strongest political integration of the world.”[vi]

This political integration was realized with the European Community. However, this process of integration has not been completed yet. Indeed the targets for the unification of Europe in political, military, economic and cultural terms were determined in the Governmental Program declared on 30 January 1991 as such:

1. Until 31 December 1992, a European Common Internal Market, from which 340 millions of people could benefit, should be established.
2. A Europe having no borders from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains should be created.
3. Instead of a centralized Europe a pluralistic Europe should be created.
4. A European Parliament whose competences have been enlarged should be established.
5. European Common Foreign and Security Policy should be developed and this policy should include common defense of Europe.
6. European Economic and Monetary Union should be established.
7. Social security should be provided in Europe.
8. A United States of Europe should be established.[vii]

As it can be seen the security problem of Europe preserves its significance. The leadership of the US in this respect has been accepted by Europe. The maintenance of NATO is the most important phenomenon for the maintenance of the US in Europe. In the eighteenth century America emerged as an independent state from Europe. On the eve of the twenty-first century, the question of the emergence of Europe as an independent political entity from the US is on the agenda. In other words, the child of Europe turned out to be the father of Europe and although sometimes the authority of the father has been challenged, the maintenance of its presence has been perceived as inevitable.[viii]

The US is necessary for the security of Europe as a power of balance against the Soviet Union. What is more, the US is also necessary for preserving a United Germany within the NATO alliance. Indeed, the collapse of bipolar system is not beneficial for Europeans, because the disintegration of the USSR will produce a world with many uncertainties. In this case, the USSR continues to be the nightmare of the European states. At one point, the political and military position of Europe has been experiencing a process of transformation. During the Cold War, Europe played a central role in the East-West contention. However, today, Europe has become a space used by the US soldiers for extra-territorial crises. This transformation brings Europe “from a crossroad of security to a garage of security.” The current reality is that Europe has to engage in a rivalry with the hierarchy of interests of the US in the Middle East and Asia in order not to lose its “central position.” While attempting to develop its own security identity, Europe has been trapped into a dilemma. If the realization of the idea of “More Europe” is necessary, then following less American policy in Europe is inevitable. This dilemma can be resolved with the re-determination of the “Europe policies” of the US and the USSR.[ix]

The Position of Europe in the New World Order and New Fears

We are in the beginning of a new era in the European history. As mentioned above briefly, this new period includes the differences between the official reorganization of the world and the realities of power and does not involve the similarities in any international system experienced in the past. This new period brings some contradictions and difficulties. “The New World Order” can be defined as Pax Americana and can be used to define the US’s desire to rule the world.[x]

The world order has multiple meanings. For example, there is an order of posts including a certain hierarchy. There is also an order (both material and moral) for self-discipline. An order emerged for completion of a process (like seasons) can be mentioned. There is an order in the chain of command. The money and the numbers had an order. In the simplest sense, order is the antonym of disorder.[xi]

The end of Cold War and the Gulf War brings about these debates of new order. Turkey has had to enter into new searches in this order and has experienced some deviations from its traditional policies.[xii]

This New World Order shows no similarity with any of the past world orders. In terms of distribution of capabilities, the most significant aspect of the New World Order is its multi-polarity. However, these poles include different aspects of power. It can be argued that in military terms the USSR, in financial and economic terms, Japan and the united Germany, in demographic terms China and India, and in military and economic terms, the US will form these poles. The “destiny” of this New World will be dependent on these poles’ capability of making enough cooperation to prevent and balance the contentions with each other. Besides, the relations of these poles will be shaped within the framework of domestic political developments, which are difficult to predict right now.[xiii]

Within this context, the mentioning about a “new world ethics” by the Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, is quite appropriate. Because, the “ism”s produced during the nineteenth century, their ethical values and patterns of behavior have been transformed considerably. In the last century, the intentions might have changed from situation to situation, from region to region, from year to year. The famous statesman, Otto von Bismark’s concept of “Realpolitik” demonstrates this understanding and variability.[xiv] Besides, the British statesman, Lord Palmerston defined his perspective in 1848, which influenced Bismarck and became a principle of international relations, as such: “We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”[xv]

The US President, George Bush understands from the New World Order the new rules of international behavior and the mutual recognition of security as everyone’s concern and responsibility. In his speech delivered to the US Congress on 5 March 1991, President Bush emphasized that the Gulf War is the first test of the emerging “New World Order” and the post-War order would be a new world order. President Bush, who argued that unlike the last century, the US would not refrain from playing the sacred role of preservation of freedom, justice and peace in the coming century, repeated in a way, John F. Kennedy’s view in the 1960s about “the necessity of making any sacrifices and carrying the responsibility for freedom.” President Bush said in the speech that he delivered on the day of declaration of his candidacy: “We saved Europe, we cured poliomyelitis, we conquered the moon, and we enlightened the entire world. Now, we are at the beginning of a new century and which country’s name will this century carry? I say that this century will be marked by the US.”[xvi]

When the European statesmen are dealing with the concept of United States of Europe they are making declarations about the New World Order full of ambiguities. For example, when the Foreign Minister of the UK, Douglas Hurd, says that “We and the US have no future plans,”[xvii] the eminent German statesman Willy Brandt mentions that the West will be accuse by the Islamic world of determination of the Gulf Region as a region where the Western world aims to realize their intentions to establish their sovereignty and the US seems to be perceived as the “police of the world”, and emphasizes that the European community should pursue an active policy as soon as possible.[xviii]

The US and the Soviet Union had new position and interest in the post-war new order. Especially, new debates began concerning what would be national interests of the Soviet Union.[xix] Although the objectives of the President of the Soviet Union Mihael Gorbachev broke up with those of the US and realization of them necessitated a competition with the US, in essence they were not against the interests of the US. This situation should be the characteristic of Soviet-American interests in the post-Cold War era. In other words, Lenin, Stalin, Khruschev and Brezhnev identified Soviet interest as the interest aiming at forfeiture of the Western, particularly the US interests. Whereas, since coming to power in March 1985, Gorbachev was seeking for ways for achieving compromise with the US. This can be defined as new Soviet “Palmerstonism”. Thereby the tensions of the Cold War decreases and the possibility of wider cooperation emerges.[xx]

The “New Thinking” in the Soviet foreign policy is a policy which supports obviously this cooperation. Because of this, in order to understand the meaning of “New Thinking”, it is better to make an abstract definition of the concept.

“New Thinking can be defined as set of measures which aim to prevent the Soviet Union to make the same mistakes once again in the economical, social, political and foreign and defence policy areas”.[xxi]

Today, it is impossible to isolate the crisis Soviet Union faced from ineffectiveness of Soviet policies in its international relations, its strategic mistakes and delay of the necessary domestic economic, social and political reforms. Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” does not indicate the abandonment of the Soviet Union’s status of being one of the super powers in the world, on the contrary it aims to redefine the Soviet Union’s status of super power. According to this, the role of the Soviet Union in the international area is as such: it displays a foreign policy which does not only rely on military force, but attaches less importance to the item of conflict and attaches high importance to cooperation and normalcy in foreign relations.[xxii]

The concept of New Thinking is not enough to wipe out traditional European “Russian phobia”. When we add the reunification of two Germanies, the fear of Europeans concentrated on these two countries. Europeans consider the Soviet Union or Russia as a potential threat to their security in the case of its break up, because of uncertainties in the Soviet Union. Reforms implemented within the framework of Glasnost and Perestroika, rise of Russian nationalism, the will of some republics to secede from the federation, power vacuum emerged following the abolishment of the Warsaw Pact, and the possibility of Soviet military operation towards this region constitutes factors which creates insecurity.

Concerning the United Germany, various opinions are put forward.[xxiii] Some put forward that pre-1914 and pre-1939 conditions come back. They claim that this results in fears because of superior Germany’s security fear due to its lack of nuclear weapons, Germany’s possible ambition to fill the power vacuum in  Central and Eastern Europe or to regain regions it lost after the Second World War. In addition to that, some fear that possible relations between new and powerful Germany and economically weak Soviet Union would result in the weakening of the military side of NATO and shifting of Germany’s foreign policy to the East. It is known that the main aim of the Soviet Union’s concept of “Common European House” is to create neutral Europe and to make US to withdraw from Europe in the future.[xxiv] Moreover, the survival of NATO is regarded as a buffer against German threat.

The logic of most European’s fear of the Soviet Union and Germany necessitates a cooperation among Central and Eastern European nations against German revanchism and re-emergence of Soviet aggression under Western (US) guarantee. In fact, there is a necessity to protect these countries from another Hitler-Stalin Pact. However, there is no suggestion for enlarging borders of NATO to the East. Because such an enlargement would be both not welcomed by the Soviet Union and prevented by France because of known reasons.

In addition to that, there are two important issues widely debated and feared of in Europe. First one is the fear of re-emergence of anarchic order in Eastern Europe. By the fear, we mean the re-emergence of the conditions of interwar period in this region and balkanization of the countries in the region. That is to say, unrest emerged in relations between states of the region which is created by nationalist movements, secessionist movements (Romania-Hungary, Yugoslavia-Czechoslovakia) prevents the emergence of democratic political systems and stabilization of economic structures in the region.[xxv]

As famous British specialist on Eastern Europe, Timothy Garton Ash argues “Transition from communist social value system to pluralist democratic system would not be easy”. The reason behind this is that most of basic elements of capitalist society lacked in these societies, which had been kept under pressure by totalitarian communist regime. Because of this, there is a danger of coming to power of authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes like the ones  observed once in Poland and Hungary. If democratic policies generally cannot meet the expectations of society and solve the discontent and the necessity of implementing tight economic policies emerges, this threat will further increase. However, nowadays it is obvious that Western Europe are taking intensive measures for political and economic integration with Central and Eastern European countries and trying not to repeat the past mistakes.[xxvi]

Secondly, there is a different fear. The fear of invasion by the foreigners, which is penetrating the whole European countries,  which is related with migration. Besides France and Germany, the situation of people migrating from Albania to Italy and measures taken to prevent such a migration constitutes first sign of a new social explosion. A new dimension of security emerges as a result of Islamic radicalists, terrorists, hungery Africans, the plight of less developed countries, people escaping from political conflicts and instability, the mass migration of Eastern Europeans to Western Europe in search for a job and social security.

Wealthy Europe is considered by most of West Europeans as a “Treasure Island” which is tried to be conquered and looted by pirates. Indeed, the demographic situation of Europe reinforces such a fear. Recently, in the expectation of mass migration from Eastern Europe, West Europe prefers to provide material assistance to these countries and try to postpone the membership of pro-Western countries such as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to the EC.

Besides the US and the Soviet Union, the United Germany is also one of the powers which will determine the developments in Europe.

Especially, after the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990, Germany is a candidate to play a prominent role in a multi-polar world. Therefore, it is necessary to look at German foreign and security policies.

West Germany’s foreign and security policy will  originates from policies implemented by Federal Germany. However, these new policies will differentiate from previous ones. The reason for that is the change of East European geopolitical situation. As a result of this change, Poland became neighbour of Germany. Soviet Union enters into a close economical, political and technological cooperation with the United Germany. The United Germany’s responsibility in the process of modernization of Eastern Europe would increase due to its economic superiority and its position in the EC. In the same way, the problems caused by the economic integration of former Democratic Germany would bring various pressures on the United Germany.[xxvii]

The unchanging principle of  United Germany’s foreign policy is West European integration. This policy is based on the realization of interregional harmonization through various policies, amelioration of mechanisms of interregional coordination and orientation – this includes loyalty to World politics and economics – and protection against threat to external security provided by NATO’s joint position. These constitute a stable basis for the United Germany’s policy of Europe. This is valid for both political and economic integration process in Europe and cooperation going beyond borders of Europe.

There will be a need for rearrangement in German security policy. This arrangement is for finding solutions for the near future. However, necessary process for this kind of short-term solutions, such as the integration of the United Germany to NATO and special situation of old Democratic Germany’s land and withdrawal of Soviet troops, should not be perceived as a very simple event, because these are such events which will be happened within next 4 or 10 years. [xxviii]

Foreign policies which will be pursued are in essence the same as those of Federal Germany, the emergence of new problem areas will be expected. By saying that, we acknowledge that the United Germany has not yet developed new foreign and security policy definitions. In other words, new problem areas may lead to new conflicts and tensions in international arena for the United Germany. Problems which may gain priority are listed as:

1. The persistence of dependence on the US security policy
2. The status discrepancy created by the United Germany’s inability to use its military force despite its economic impact.
3. The fear of the “4^th Reich” resulted from the United Germany’s achievement of domination in foreign policy.

The dependence of West European countries on the US in the area of security differs from those of the United Germany. France and the UK have their own nuclear arsenal. Despite France and the UK’s such advantage, Federal Germany and Italy remained dependent on the US’ policies of deterrence and disarmament. Especially Federal Germany as a “front state” has experienced different dimensions of ideological confrontation between East and West for 45 years.

The United Germany seems not to discard this security policy dependence in the near future. The most important reason for this is the Soviet Union’s failure to pursue a policy of getting rid of its nuclear weapons. Under this condition, the only power in Europe which is able to counterbalance this nuclear power is the US, the only country leading NATO, and its nuclear potential. Under this condition, new post-Cold War disputes began to emerge, because it becomes necessary to maintain US’ such “deterrence service” for Western Europe in the post-Cold War era. This condition necessitates the pursuance of competitive policies by the US and Western Europe against the Soviet Union despite CSCE process.

The Balkans and the Role of Turkey

In Turkey’s relations with Europe, the Balkans is one of the focal points. As one of the regions in which impacts of the Cold War has been most felt, Balkan Peninsula is defined as Europe’s “powder barrel”, because it is filled with unrest. Balkan Peninsula, which harbors various minority problems, ethnic and religious disputes and adventurist policies of some countries, remains as a politically and economically unstable region.

Power loss of the Soviet Union and other communist regimes in the region lays the ground for the creation of a dangerous environment in which both independence struggles of countries in the region are reinforced and the parochial nationalism and authoritarian trends emerge and prevail.

To cooperate with Balkan countries and thereby securing the borders in the region has been one of the aims of Turkish foreign policy since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Beginning from the 1920s Turkey tried to establish “Chain of Security” and participate in all of the conferences related to solution of regional problems. Under the leadership of Turkey, Balkan Entente was established in 1934 with the participation of the Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia. Bulgaria participated in this Entente just before the Second World War in 1938.

Within the framework of the new order and state system emerging after end of the Second World War, Turkey took initiatives to revive the Balkan Entente especially during the Adnan Menderes era (1950-1960). However, Turkey’s initiatives failed due to the polarization of the Cold War era and the involvement of Balkan counties into these polarization during the 1945-1954 period. In 1954, the Balkan Alliance was signed between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia in Bled, but this alliance did not progress due to the failure to solve disputes among the participating countries. The Cold War was another factor that contributed to the failure of this alliance.[xxix]

After the end of the Cold War, Balkan countries gave up their ideological obsessions and entered into the democratization process and were closely interested in European integration, because Europe, with all its institutions, became attractive for the Balkan countries. Especially, it seems difficult to establish sustainable security framework without taking into account of the Balkan countries. For this reason, cooperation among Balkan countries should be analyzed within the framework of the new European order. This cooperation’s aim of providing security for Europe is obvious in these countries’ state leaders’ statements and steps towards this end. Just like in the previous eras, Turkey has the opportunity of playing a constructive role for the realization of the cooperation among Balkan countries. The major factors that create this opportunity can be stated as follows:

1. Turkey’s Ottoman heritage in this region
2. Multi-ethnic structure of the region
3. The presence of transit roads that links Turkey to Europe
4. Common economical and security problems shared by Turkey with other countries of the region.[xxx]

The Balkan Conference which was held with the proposal of Yugoslavia in 1988 was very important in the sense that it brought all Balkan countries together for the first time after the end of the Cold War. This conference emphasized inevitability of the political and economical cooperation despite problems among the Balkan countries. Beside Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Turkey, Albania also participated in this conference unexpectedly. In negotiations, the ethnic problems among Balkan countries were left outside meticulously and cooperation in the fields of agriculture, industry, commerce, energy, tourism, the protection of environment and health was discussed and important forward looking decisions were taken.[xxxi]

The leading role Turkey played by proposing the Black Sea Cooperation scheme can be seen as the implementation of the decisions taken at the Belgrade Conference. In recent times, increasing diplomatic visits prove firm political will of Balkan States for realizing this cooperation. Turkey’s political aim was to improve economic cooperation among Balkan countries and to provide stability to this part of Europe that was conventionally characterized by unstable political and economic structures.[xxxii] This region not only in physical terms but also in cultural terms constitutes the bridge and the transit road from Turkey to Central and Western Europe.[xxxiii]

In coming years, Turkey as a prominent country in terms of politics, economics and military has the opportunity to shape developments in the region with the use of both bilateral and multilateral cooperation methods. Thus, it can be considered that the statements of the Balkan delegations visiting Turkey that their aim is to make use of Turkey’s experience prove that this opportunity is feasible.

Conclusion

• The nature of political change in Turkey and the world
• The political party in power
• The position of the international economic relations which will be shaped by the desire and interest of the Turkish economy
• Kurdish separatism[xxxiv]

Despite from the fact that Turkey will play an effective role in European security in the future, it can be stated that Turkey may play an important role in the European integration. Furthermore, the integrated Europe will have to develop strategies for Turkey and take into account of Turkey more than ever. In other words, Europe cannot disregard Turkey within the framework of the new world order. The important issue is not Turkey’s attempt to explain this just like it has done until now, but Europe’s imperative to understand this. Former Secretary of Defence Ercan Vuralhan emphasized this as such:

“Always we should give this message to the West. Yes, important changes took place in East-West line. In line with these changes, arms reductions took place in the West. However, most of the countries in the West have a threat perception of one bloc. Turkey is under multi-dimensional threat. For this reason, the relegation of Turkey’s demands in the field of defence in parallel with reductions in the West means leaving Turkey by itself in the region where the West has vital interests. Turkey always declares that it was not a guardian of Western interest in this region. Turkey proved this. Turkey’s policy towards the Gulf War was the most concrete example of this. However, the West should not forget that Turkey is the representative of stability and democracy in this region. Turkey has been an effective country with a leadership position in the region. The West should bear in mind that a threat towards Turkey should be taken into account by the West.”[xxxv]

Thus, after the end of the Gulf War, Turkey’s increasing importance was started to be emphasized and the ideas suggesting that Turkey would become one of the countries that would provide stability in integrated Europe gained prominence. Europe is no more the only alternative for Turkey. There have been always problems in Turkey’s relations with Europe and smooth relationship cannot be expected. However, Turkey is an important alternative for Europe. Europe is aware of this fact and thus shapes its policies on the basis of this awareness.[xxxvi]

End Notes

(1)   1815 sonrası Avrupa’da çıkan “Yeni Düzen” ve
güçlerin konumu ile ilgili olarak bkz;Henry Kissinger,
Das Gleichgewich der Machte, Metternich, Castlereagh
und die Neuordnung Europas 1821-1822 Zürich,1986

(2)  İki kutuplu dünya ve değişimler için bkz; Paul Kennedy,
Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş ve Çöküşleri, İş bankası Yayınları,
Ankara 1980 Aynı şekilde ideolojik çöküş için bkz; ZibignievBrzezinski, Büyük çöküş, İş Bankası Yayınları, Ankara 1990 ve Francis Fukuyama; The End of History;in  National Interest Summer 1990 ve Uwe Nechrlich; Europa zwischen alten Angsten und neunen Hoffnungen, in: Europa Archiv Nummer 16,25.5.1990,3.481-493

• İstikrarlı devletler sistemi için bkz. Kari Dietrich Bracher, Europa in der Krise, Frankfurt Yeni kon-sept arayışlar için bkz. Dieter Senghaas, Europa 2000-Ein Friedensplan-Frankfurt am Main 1990 ve Stanley Hoffmann; Abschied von der Vergangenheit, Politik und Sicherheit im Künftigen Europa, Europa Archiv, Nummer 20 25.10.1990, S.595-607
• Peter Glotz, Gesamteuropa, Skizze für einen schwierigen Weg, Europa Archiv, 1.1990 ve Hüseyin Bağcı, Avrupa Tarihinde Yeni bir Dönem, Dış Politika Bülteni, Mart-Nisan-Mayıs 1990, Ankara
• William Pfaff; Don’t expect a Big European Role Anytime Soon, International Herald Tribune, January, 21, 1991.R6
• Uwe Nehrlich a.g.e.S.481
• Programın tamalanması için bkz. Europa Archiv, Num­mer 5,30 January 1991, S.126-140
• NATO Genei sekreteri Manfred Wörner ile yapılan röportaj; “We Need Each Other Badly”, 77me,25.2,11991 ve Dominique Moisi;”The US’s Role is Central”, Time, 4.1991
• Dominique Moisi, A.G.E. Avrupa Güvenlik kişiliği ile ilgili olarak bkz. Interview with Jacques Delors; Towards a working Model, Time, 22.4.1991. Ayrıca ABD’nin Avrupa politikası için Manfred Stinnes; Die Amerikannische Europe-politik und die Ost-West Beziehungen, in: Aus politik und Zeitgeschichte, 8 4589, 3 November 1989. S.14-24

• Bu tanımlardan bir kaçı için bkz. Flora Lewis; “A more orderly World, Not a New World Order”, IHT, 18 February 1991.P.6, Noam Chumsky, The weak shall inherit nothing, in : Guardian Weekly, April 7.1991, R8 ve Stanley Hoffman;A New World and Its Troubles, in; Foreign Affairs, Fall 1990, Richard Brookhiser; Two Centuries of New World Orders, Time May 6, 1991
• Flora Lewis, A more Orderly World,
• Geleneksel politikalardan sapma ile ilgili olarak bkz. Hüseyin Bağcı; Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası, Ankara 1990 ve Ali Karaosmanoğlu; Die Türkei, die europaische Sicherheit und Wandel der internationalen Beziehungen, in; Europa Archiv, Nummer 5, 10.3.1991. 143-153 ve Towards a New World Order? in; Briefing April 29.1991, Issue 835 S.6-8 Ankara
• Stanley Hoffmann The new World and Its troubles ve Paul Kennedy, Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş ve Çöküşleri
• Otto von Bismark ve onun politikası için bkz. Lothar Gali, Bismarck, der weisse Revolutionar, Frankfurt 1983
• Strobe Talbott, “No its not a New Cold War”, Time, March 4, 1991
• James Walsh, Global Beat, Time, April 1, 1991

17)  James Walsh Global Beat, Time, April 1, 1991

• Willy Brant, Eine neue Friedensordnung für den Nanen Osten, Europa Archiv, 3.1991, Nummer 5.
• Suzanne Crow; The Gulf Conflict and debate over Soviet “National Interests”, in; Report on the USSR, 3, Number 6, February 1991

20) Strobe Talbott, No its not a New Cold War

21)  Ailen Lynch; Gorbachev Synthesis Elements of the
“New Thinking” East-West Security Studies, Occasional
Paper Series, New York, 1989, P.29

• David Holloway; Gorbachev’s New Thinking , in: Foreign Affairs America and the World (1988-89), 71 ve Time “Gorbachev Interview” June 1990, P.13-20 ve Hüseyin Bağcı; Sovyet Dış Politikasında Yeni Düşünce, Dış Politika Bülteni, Haziran-Temmuz-Ağustos, Dış Politika Enstitüsü yayınları, Ankara , 1990,S.34-39
• Bu görüşler için bkz. Stanley Hoffmann, dip not 3, Uwe Nehrlich dipnot 2 ve Kari Kaiser; Deutschlands Vereinigung, Die internationalen aspekte, Bergisch Gladbach, Mai 1991
• Ortak Avrupa Evi (Common European House) kon-septine üç değişik yaklaşım için bkz. Wladimir B. Lomej-ko; “Das Haus Europa” aus sowjetischer Sicht, Wichard Woyke; “Das Haus Europa” aus westeuropatischer Sicht ve Paul E.Zinner; “Das gemeinsame Haus Europa” aus amerikanischer Sicht. in: Prespektiven für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Herausgegeben von Hans-D. Jacobsen, Heinrich Machoski, Dirk Sager, Bundes-zentrale für politische Bildung, Band 268, Bonn 1988
• Bu görüşü oluştururken TIME dergisi tarafından or­ganize edilen ve Avrupa’nın siyasi ve ekonomik gelişmeleri konusunda uzman 5 bilim adamının Brüksel’de bir araya geldikleri ve Doğu Avrupa’da istikrarsızlıkların beklenmesi gerektiği ve Almanya’ların birleşmesinin kaçınılmaz olduğunu vurguladıkları “What the Future Holds” konulu konferans notları baz olarak alınmıştır. Geniş bilgi için bkz. Frederick Painton, What the future Holds, Time, 18 December 1988
• Stanley Hoffmann, dipnot 3 ve Timoty Garton Ash; Mitteleuropa; in: Daedalus, Winter 1990
• Frederick Swyle, Die erhöhte Verantwortung der Deutschen, in: Europa Archiv, Nummer 24, 25,12.1990, Günter Van Well, Zur Europa Politik eines vereinigten Deutschland, in: Europa Archiv, Nummer 9, 10.5.1990, Bernd von Staden, Das vereinigte Deutschland in Europa, Europa Archiv, Nummer 23, 10.12.1990.
• Detaylı bir araştırma için bkz Kari Kaiser; Germany’s unification, in: Foreign Affairs Winter 1990-91, No: 1 P.197

• Bu konuda bkz. Hüseyin Bağcı, Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası.
• Seyfi Taşhan; Some Factors Influencing Turkey’s Foreign and Security Policy. in: Beyond East-West Confrontation, searching for a New Security Structure in Europe, Edt. by Armand Clesse and Lothar Rühl P.351-356. Bonn 1991.

31)Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu , dipnot 12 ve Ali Arsın; Das neue Ost-west-Verhalthis, Ein Blink aus Ankara in: NATO Brief, Nr. 61990-NovemberDecember S.16-20.

32)Bkz. Seyfi Taşhan, Dipnot 30 ve Türkkaya Ataöv, Balkan Initiatives, Turkish Daily News, 13-14 April 1991, P.7.

33)Konferans hakkında geniş bilgi için bkz. The Military Balance 1987-1988 Londra, 1988.

34)   Duygu Sezer, Turkish Foreign Policy in the year
2000, in: Association Ankara 1989, R61,113

35)  “Savunmada Modernleşme “, Güneş, 25.12.1989.

36)     Edward Mortimer, “Problem awaiting a solution”
Financial Times, 8.5.1991, Chistopher Ogden “How
Does Turkey Fit?,Tıme, October 22,1990, Robert T.Zintl;
“Missing Dividend” Time, May 13,1991 ve Yunanistan
Başbakanı Miçotakis’in demeci “Türkiye İslamın Et­
kisinde Kalmamalı” Zaman, 27 Mayıs 1991. Türkiye Av-­
rupa ilişkilerini eleştirel açıdan değerlendiren üç görüş
için bkz. İsmail Cem “Bizi Kim Savunacak” Sabah 13
Mayıs 1991, Ahmet Cemal “Avrupa Düşüncesi ve
Türkiye” Cumhuriyet 26 Nisan 1991 ve Hüseyin Bağcı,
The Spread of Democracy has reached epidemic
proportions in Europe, Turkish Daily News, 3.4.1990.

(*) Translation of the article which appeared in the fpi publication in Turkish “Dış Politika Bülteni”,  July-August-September 1991  issue

[i] For the “New Order” in post-1815 Europe and the positioning of Great Powers see Henry Kissinger, Das Gleichgewich der Machte, Metternich, Castlereagh und die Neuordnung Europas 1821-1822, Zürich, 1986.

[ii] For the bipolar world and transformations see Paul Kennedy, Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş ve Çöküşleri, İş Bankası Yayınları, Ankara, 1980. For the ideological collapse see Zbigniev Brzezinski, Büyük Çöküş, İş Bankası Yayınları, Ankara, 1990 and Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History”, National Interest, Summer 1990, and Uwe Nechrlich, “Europa zwichsen alten Angsten und neuen Hoffnungen,” Europa Archiv, No. 16, 25 May 1990, pp. 481-493.

[iii] For stable state system see Karl Dietrich Bracher, Europa in der Krise, Frankfurt, 1979. For the search of new concepts see Dieter Senghaas, Europa 2000 – Ein Friedendsplan, Frankfurt am Main, 1990, and Stanley Hoffman, “Abschied von der Vergangenheit, Politik und Sicherheit im Künftigen Europa,” Europa Archiv, No. 20, 25 October 1990, pp. 595-607.

[iv] Peter Glotz, “Gesamteuropa, Skizze für einen schwierigen Weg,” Europa Archiv, 25 January 1990, and Hüseyin Bağcı, “Avrupa Tarihinde Yeni Bir Dönem, Dış Politika Bülteni, March-April-May 1990, Ankara.

[v] William Pfaff, “Don’t Expect a Big European Role Anytime Soon,” International Herald Tribune, 21 January 1991, p. 6.

[vi] Uwe Nehlich, p. 481.

[vii] For the full text of the program, see Europa Archiv, No. 5, 30 January 1991, pp. 126-140.

[viii] The interview made by NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, “We Need Each Other Badly,” Time, 25 February 1991, and Dominique Moisi, “The US’s Role is Central,” Time, 22 April 1991.

[ix] See, Dominique Moisi, a.g.e. Fort he European security personality see the interview with Jacques Delors, “Towards a Working Model,” Time, 22 April 1991. For the US’ Europe policy see Manfred Stinnes, “Die Amerikannische Europe-politik und die Ost-West Beziehungen,” in Aus politik und Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 8, No. 45/89, 3 November 1989, pp. 14-24.

[x] For some of these definitions see Flora Lewis, “A More Orderly World, Not A New World Order,” International Herald Tribune, 18 February 1991, p. 6; Noam Chomsky, “The Weak Shall Inherit Nothing,” Guardian Weekly, 7 April 1991, p. 8 and Stanley Hoffman, “A New World and Its Troubles,” Foreign Affairs Fall 1990, Richard Brookhiser, “Two Centuries of New World Orders,” Time, 6 May 1991.

[xi] Flora Lewis, “A More Orderly World, Not A New World Order.”

[xii] Fort he deviations from traditional policies, see Hüseyin Bağcı, Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası, Ankara, 1990 ve Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “Die Türkei, die europaische Sciherheit und Wandel der internationalen Beziehungen,” Europa Archiv, No. 5, 10 March 1991, pp. 143-153 and “Towards a New World Order?,” Briefing, 29 April 1991, No. 835, pp. 6-8.

[xiii] Stanley Hoffman, A New World and Its Troubles ve Paul Kennedy, Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş ve Çöküşleri.

[xiv] For Otto von Bismark and his policies, see Lothar Gall, Bismarck, der weisse Revolutionar, Frankfurt, 1983.

[xv] Strobe Talbott, “Not It is Not A New Cold War,” Time, 4 March 1991.

[xvi] James Walsh, “Global Beat,” Time, 1 April 1991.

[xvii] James Walsh, “Global Beat,” Time, 1 April 1991.

[xviii] Willy Brandt, “Eine neue Friedensordnung für den Nahen Osten,”, Europe Archiv, 10 March 1991, No. 5

[xix] Suzanne Crow, “The Gulf Conflict and Debate over Soviet ‘National Interests’,” in Report on  the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 6, February 1991.

[xx] Strobe Talbott, “Not It is Not A New Cold War,” Time, 4 March 1991.

[xxi] Allen Lynch, “Gorbachev Synthesis Elements of the ‘New Thinking’,” East-West Security Studies, Occasional Paper Series, New York, 1989, p. 29.

[xxii] David Holloway, “Gorbachev’s New Thinking,” in Foreign Affairs America and the World (1988-1989), p. 71 and Time, Gorbachev Interview,” June 1990, pp. 13-20 and Hüseyin Bağcı, “Sovyet Dış Politikasında Yeni Düşünce,” Dış Politika Bülteni, Haziran Temmuz Ağustos 1991, pp. 34-39.

[xxiii] Fort his opinions see Stanley Hoffman, footnote 3, Uwe Nehrlich, footnote 2, and Karl Kaiser, Deutschlands Vereinigung, Die Internationalen Aspekte, Bergisch Gladbach, May 1991.

[xxiv] For three different approaches to the concept of Common European House see, Vladimir B. Lomejko, “Das Haus Europa” aus sowjetischer Sicht, Wichard Woyke, “Das Haus Europa” aus amerikanischer Sicht in Perspektiven für Sicherheir und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Herausgegeben von Hans D. Jacobson, Heinrich Machoski, Dirk Sager, Bundeszentraie für politische Bildung, Band 268, Bonn, 1988.

[xxv] In constructing this opinion, the notes of the conference organized by Time Magazine and  entitled “What the Future Holds” in which 5 scholars, being experts on the issues of European political and economic developments emphasized that in Eastern Europe there would be insatibilities and the unification of Germany is inevitable. For a detailed information, see Frederick Painton, “What the Future Holds,” Time, 18 December 1988.

[xxvi] Stanley Hoffman, footnote 3, and Timothy Garton Ash, “Mitteleuropa,” Daedalus, Winter 1990.

[xxvii] Frederick S. Wyle, “Die erhmhte Verantwortung der Deutschen,” Europa Archiv, No. 24, 25 December 1990; Günter Van Well, “Zur Europa Politik eines vereinigten Deutschland,” Europa Archiv, No. 9, 10 May 1990; Bernd von Staden, “Das vereinigte Deutschland in Europa,” Europa Archiv, No. 23, 10 December 1990;

[xxviii] For a detailed survey, see Karl Kaiser, “Germany’s Unification,” in Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990-91, No. 1, p. 197.

[xxix] See Hüseyin Bağcı, Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası

[xxx] See Seyfi Taşhan, “Some Factors Influencing Turkey’s Foreign and Security Policy, in Armand Classie and Lothar Rühl (eds.), Beyond East-West Confrontation: Searching for a New Security Structure in Europe, Bonn, 1991, pp. 351-356.

[xxxi] For a detailed review of this conference see, The Military Balance 1987-1988, London, 1988.

[xxxii] Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, footnote 12 ve Ali Arsın, “Das Neue Ost-West Verhathis, Ein Blink aus Ankara,” in NATO Brief No. 6/1990, November/December, pp. 16-20.

[xxxiii] See Seyfi Taşhan, footnote 30, and Türkkaya Ataöv, “Balkan Initiatives,” Turkish Daily News, 13-14 April 1991, p. 7.

[xxxiv] Duygu Sezer, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000,” Association Ankara, 1989, p. 61, 113.

[xxxv] “Savunmada Modernleşme,” Güneş, 25 December 1990.

[xxxvi] Edward Mortimer, “Problem Awaiting a Solution,” Financial Times 8 May 1991; Christopher Ogden, “How Does Turkey Fit,” Time, 22 October 1990; Robert T. Zinti, “Missing Dividend”, Time, 13 May 1991. For the speech of Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis, see “Türkiye İslamın Etkisinde Kalmamalı, Zaman, 27 May 1991. For three opinions critically evaluating Turkish-European Relations, see İsmail Cem, “Bizi Kim Savunacak,” Sabah, 13 May 1991; Ahmet Cemal, “Avrupa Düşüncesi ve Türkiye”, Cumhuriyet, 26 April 1991 and Hüseyin Bağcı, “The Spread of Democracy Has Reached Epidemic Proportions in Europe,” Turkish Daily News, 3 April 1990.