Shifting Power Dynamics in the Caucasus and Great Power Competition

By Prof. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu

Recent developments in the Caucasus have demonstrated the emergence of new foreign policy and security dynamics in the region. The dynamics that have been in place since the end of the Cold War are changing rapidly. Azerbaijan’s recapture of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which had been under Armenian occupation for many years, following its military victory over Armenia in late 2020; Russia’s shift in focus towards the region amid the stalemate and strategic deadlocks it has faced in the Ukraine war since February 2022; Armenia’s search for new options in the face of its strategic defeat against Azerbaijan and its failure to receive the support it had hoped for from Russia; the current Georgian government’s apparent distancing from the West and rapprochement with Russia through its domestic policy steps; Turkey’s strong support for Azerbaijan and its increased strategic investments in the Organization of Turcic States; Iran’s growing inclination towards the Russia-China axis due to its strategic tensions with the West and Israel; and the Global West’s accelerated efforts to undermine Russia’s influence in the region, particularly in Georgia and Armenia – all these factors not only draw attention back to the Caucasus but also indicate that the waters in the region are unlikely to calm down in the near future.

Additionally, the great power competition between the United States, Russia, and China is poised to make the Caucasus the new front of a second Cold War. In this competitive relationship, the United States and its European allies are not only trying to undermine Russia’s influence in Ukraine but also in Moldova and the states of the Caucasus. Armenia’s withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, its ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and its criticism of Russia’s Ukraine policy have strained relations between Armenia and Russia. The questioning of the Russian military presence in Armenia and Armenia’s feeling of being stabbed in the back by Russia in the face of Azerbaijan has created a situation unprecedented in the region. The Global West’s support for Armenia’s EU membership process, its increased involvement in achieving a lasting Armenia-Azerbaijan peace, and its support for anti-Putin regimes in the region, especially Georgia, are transforming the Caucasus into an arena of new Cold War between the Global West and Russia.

Conversely, Russia appears to be rethinking its traditional approach to the Caucasus. With the Ukraine War draining its resources, Russia is keen to prevent the Caucasus from falling under the influence of its global competitors. The most effective way to achieve this is to strengthen ties with countries like Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran, with whom it shares good relations and can easily conduct strategic dialogue. This does not signify a decline in Russia’s interest in the region. Instead, Russia aims to neutralize hostile global actors and their regional allies while drawing closer to countries that it sees as rivals. Clearly, while Russia can engage with Azerbaijan and Turkey, neither country intends to take sides in the strategic rivalry between the West and Russia.

Ankara and Baku are cognizant of the opportunities arising from the ongoing rivalry between the Global West and the Global East. Azerbaijan, in particular, has been the most adept at capitalizing on these opportunities. Situated at the crossroads of the transit route between Russia and Iran and the crucial logistics corridor connecting China to Europe, Azerbaijan leverages the competition among global actors to enhance its regional influence by adopting a non-aligned foreign policy. Under the prevailing circumstances, neither Russia, China, nor the Global West can afford to alienate Azerbaijan.

Armenia’s strategic defeat by Azerbaijan has prompted it to reorient towards the West, leading to a strengthening of ties between Russia and Azerbaijan. Russia is seeking to procure the economic and military support it needs for the Ukraine war through countries such as Iran. For such aid to reach Russia seamlessly and uninterruptedly, it is imperative for Russia to maintain good relations with Azerbaijan.

Within this framework, the opening of the Zangezur corridor connecting Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhchivan will not only ease Russia’s access to Iran but also solidify its relationship with Azerbaijan through its support for this initiative. Furthermore, preventing the Global West from positioning Azerbaijan as an alternative energy supplier to challenge Russia is another reason for Russia’s interest in Azerbaijan. By maintaining close ties with Azerbaijan, Russia may be calculating that it can restrict the West’s influence in the country.

Additionally, the Pashinyan administration’s criticism of Russia’s Ukraine policy and its pursuit of closer relations with the United States and the European Union for Armenia’s future appear to have irritated Russia. Moscow’s failure to provide the anticipated support to Yerevan in its confrontation with Baku, coupled with the recent intensification of the Russo-Azerbaijani strategic dialogue, has compelled Armenia to explore new avenues.

Arguably, the most novel and unexpected development in the region is the Pashinyan administration’s endeavor to establish a lasting peace with Azerbaijan and Turkey, a departure from the approaches of previous Armenian governments. Contrary to the ideological and romantic views prevalent among the Armenian diaspora, the Pashinyan administration, grounded in the realities on the ground, seeks a strategic reconciliation with Azerbaijan and Turkey, traditionally perceived as Armenia’s arch-enemies. This is a highly significant development that warrants greater support from Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Turkey finds itself in a similar situation. Its foreign policy, characterized by penchant for strategic autonomy and the growing salience of Ankara-centric mentality, provides Turkey with substantial opportunities in the emerging post-American world order. Seeking to maximize gains from the great power competition, Turkey needs to maintain good relations with both the Global West, which does not have the luxury of losing Turkey to the Global East, and Russia, which has come under serious geopolitical pressure over the last decade. What more could Ankara hope for?

The most crucial prerequisite for lasting peace and stability in the region is for external global actors to refrain from viewing it as a battleground for their geopolitical rivalry. However, this seems improbable. The Global West’s efforts to strengthen ties with Armenia and diminish Russian influence in the region are prompting Russia to adopt a more tactical approach towards Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, seeking to exploit divisions between these countries and the Global West. Given the close Russia-Iran relations, this dynamic heightens the risk of the Caucasus becoming a battleground between the Global West and the Global East.

Considering the current developments, regional states appear to be capitalizing on the great power competition to maximize their national interests. This is understandable. Rather than aligning too closely with any external great power and becoming entangled in global polarizations, it would be more advantageous for them to play great powers off against each others, avoid global bloc alignments, and resolve regional issues within a regional framework. Such an approach could foster lasting peace and stability among Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan in the medium to long term. Provided, of course, that regional states recognize this and resist the machinations of global powers