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Introduction

As Turkey is looking forward for the general elections to be held on June 7, 2015, the focus of the political parties are mainly on domestic issues. However, while certain aspects of Turkey's current foreign policy is critically handled in the programs of the opposition parties, Turkey's European vocation and furthering of its relations with the EU is not a point of dispute.

Therefore, in this issue of our journal we have concentrated on our relations with Europe with articles on how developments in Europe are perceived from Turkish perspective and how its relations with the EU are envisaged to develop. Mr. Seyfi Taşhan, President of the Foreign Policy Institute, has an essay on Europe with its successes and failures. He points out that while sharing norms of democracy and human rights, countries in Europe still have problems of handling a unified approach towards its security institutions and even in the economic field frequent crisis occur. Furthermore, relations with Russia remain ambivalent.

Moreover, at a time when Turkey and EU have initiated the start of negotiations for updating of the Customs Union agreement in force since 1996 and broaden it to cover additional sectors such as the services and agriculture and also to overcome shortcomings arising from free trade agreements concluded by the EU which reflect negatively on Turkey's economy, we have an article by Ambassador Rauf Engin Soysal, Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs, on Turkey's new EU strategy.

We have another article by Ms. Belgin Akçay, President of the European Union and Global Research Association, focusing on the problems arising from the implementation of the Customs Union Agreement and how improvements could be realized in the Customs Union and in our relations with the EU in general.

Human rights issues have also been an important element in our relations with Europe. Turkey as a founding member of the Council of Europe has always aspired to uphold the universal standards in the human rights field advocated and concretized by the Council, since it considers this as an important aspect of its European identity. In its relations with the EU

this has also assumed an important part in the negotiations for eventual membership in the Union. Ambassador (Ret.) Numan Hazar, who had earlier served as Turkish Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, has an article on diplomacy of human rights and where Turkey stands.

Despite the fact that relations with Europe and the West assume an important place in Turkey's international relations, developments in its neighborhood, particularly in its unstable Southern neighborhood cannot be overlooked. An article by Ambassador (Ret.) Ayhan Kamel is a critique of Turkey's relations with the Arab countries.

Furthermore, Turkey's relations with other parts of the world are increasing every day. Our relations with Africa have been handled often in our back issues. This time Mr. Ufuk Tepebaşı, an advisor at the Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies, has an article on achievements and challenges of Turkey pursuing a more active policy in Africa.

We are also happy to inform our readers that Mr. Seyfi Taşhan, President of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, was presented on April 9, 2015 a shield by the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, in recognition of his contributions to the Turkish foreign policy.

In this connection, we thought that it would be appropriate to remember the pioneering role undertaken by Mr. Seyfi Taşhan, President of the Foreign Policy Institute, for the development of the think tank culture in Turkey and the services he has assumed focusing on its foreign policy. Therefore, we have an extract from the chapter co-authored by Professors Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Ersin Onulduran which appeared in the book entitled "Contemporary Issues in International Politics".

Oktay Aksoy

Editor

Some Thoughts on Europe

Seyfi Taşhan

Notwithstanding conventional wisdom, the global economy continues to progress in spite of rapid population growth. The predictions of the Club of Rome have been called into question by ever increasing global agricultural production and economic growth.¹ Yet, we still see that pessimism and dissatisfaction prevails. There remain famine and poverty stricken regions as a result not only of insufficiencies in production, but also because of egregious disparities in income distribution in most parts of the world.

Even in those areas that are considered most wealthy, income distribution is highly distorted to favour the richest echelons of society. Some countries have attempted to assuage this situation by reviving the welfare resources of the state and providing a reasonable subsistence to the most disenfranchised of citizens. The problem, however, is very acute not only in developing countries who lack the resources to carry out such programs for vast populations, but also increasingly so in developed countries. This is even true for some European countries today, which had implemented such programs as part of a social democracy agenda since the end of the Second World War. Citizens are increasingly under threat as austerity measures are unravelling states within the EU.

End of the Second World War

At the end of the Second World War the primary attention of statesmen around the world was to prevent the recurrence of such a global conflict. Peace, it was believed, would be achieved through liberty, equality and as the French Revolution prioritized, fraternity. Such a dream would be achieved only through wellbeing and respect for human rights of the people in the world. Hence institutions were created within the framework

¹ William W. Behrens, Jorgen Randers, Dennis Meadows, Donella Meadows, *The Limits to Growth* (New York, NY: Universe Books, 1973).

of the United Nations. Nevertheless, arms race persists in Asia and other continents. Population increase in the developing world is continuing to fuel migration problems in the developed countries and politically unsettled parts of the world. This issue has become especially severe with the so called “Arab Spring” uprisings and domestic wars in the Middle East.

Emergence of the European Union

It took years for the leaders of the divided Europe to come together to tear down what Churchill once called the “Iron Curtain,” and to develop a reasonable *modus vivendi*. Western European leaders entered into a process that would help the creation of a democratic and United Europe that would enshrine the principles of Universal Human Rights and other values that would stave off war and promote welfare. The first institution they created was the Council of Europe, which attempted to implement the desire for greater unity in Europe through the creation of the Human Rights Court. It was intended to guarantee human rights for Europeans, and to encourage greater harmony in the legislations of member countries in almost all conceivable areas of life by means of treaties. A decade later, the six countries of Western Europe (Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries) signed in 1957 the Treaty of Rome that founded an open-ended economic community. Through ever growing social and economic linkages, this community expanded and coalesced in the form of the European Union.

There are several factors that make the future political and economic status of Europe in global politics still unclear. A united Europe could indeed be established by the creation of a common institution that could speak on behalf of all of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, as a former President of France, General De Gaulle, had envisioned. However, while the Eurozone of the EU constitutes the richest part of Europe under the leadership of Germany, this does not include even all members of EU in some of its structures such as the Eurozone and Schengen visa free travel zone.

Missing Security Aspect

Another important element missing in the European Project is the unified approach towards its security. Europe had initially created its own security

and defence frameworks, but these seem to be stillborn. NATO to which the US participated as the leader and continues to undertake heavy responsibilities to ensure security and prevent recurrence of a war in Europe is still the backbone of the basic structure to maintain peace in the region and harmony in security issues.

Shared Norms of Democracy and Human Rights

It is difficult to maintain an economic harmony within a group of countries that are widely different from each other by national aspirations, geography and popular traditions, bound together only through their shared norms of democracy, rule of law and human rights. Yet, even in the economic field frequent crises occur when lesser developed economies want to live under the prevailing social standards within the richest parts of Europe. We saw the major crisis that occurred around 2010, when Southern European economies could no longer sustain borrowed high standards of living in contrast to the economically stronger North.

Most of these countries were forced to adopt tight austerity measures and tight jacket economic programmes to pay back their debts that accumulated for the artificial high borrowed welfare they enjoyed earlier. Only Greece which has no major industry except tourism is in a defiant mood and challenges the austerity measures. In the economic field Europe seemed to have adopted a *Pax Germania* model as Germany is the largest contributor to EU and the major money lender.

EU's Enlargement Vision

The European Union's enlargement vision is complex and highly debatable. One of the major woes of Europe is the difficulty to look to the future with greater confidence and hopes to play the role of super power in the world.

Aside from economic difficulties, social problems continue to plague the European Union. Slowing, and in some cases declining, population growth rates in most European countries constitutes a burden on the welfare state. This situation could be remedied only through ensuring a steady growth in the younger population that could contribute to significant economic growth. Yet, Europe has been unable to find a formula, nor desire a common immigration policy. Under these conditions they are to content

themselves with what we may call a gate-crushing immigration policy that provides cheap, productive labour in the medium term. It is no wonder that thousands and thousands of people try to get into Europe through illegal means, while the official discourse in Europe is against immigration and creates difficulties even for genuine travellers.

Enlargement with Turkey

The European Council position taken at its meeting in Madrid in 1995 to exclude Russia, Ukraine and Turkey in its future enlargement was moderately revised in 1999 at its Helsinki Summit when EU accepted Turkey as a candidate for membership. The terms and conditions of candidacy and later of the negotiation processes were so complex and so open-ended that it led many observers to continue to wonder whether the 1995 vision was genuine as if candidacy process and Customs Union was a sham to keep Turkey only as a profitable trading partner.

Turkey is a *sui generis* case for EU enlargement. If admitted, Turkey would be the largest country in EU, physically and demographically, while being one of the poorest in terms of per capita income and human rights. Nevertheless, the real obstacle to Turkey is the challenge it presents to the established members. Turkey would wield as much power and influence in the decision-making bodies of the European Union and would therefore present an insurmountable obstacle to its privileged members.

The Case of Russia

Russia, on the other hand, with its huge size could not fit in to the strait-jacket norms of Western Europe. Yet it would be highly profitable for both sides to become economic partners. From the energy point of view Russia is still the main supplier of Europe. However, Russian political structure that contains a huge Eurasian land, many ethnic groups and nations under the leadership of Moscow live under fairly different conditions from Western Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union that left so many Russian people outside the boundaries of the Russian Federation remain to hinder closer cooperation with the rest of Europe.

In certain cases the Russian state cannot resist the temptation of embracing once again, by the use of force and intrigue, to bring Russians

and some other separated groups again into the Russian Federation. This is in contradiction with the norms enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act that prevents changes of boundaries, Russia employs diplomacy and hard power instruments including its military forces to annex territories. The annexation of the Georgian parts of Abkhazia and Ossetia did not draw huge protests from the world; but the annexation of Crimea and the Russian supported uprising in Eastern Ukraine signalled a beginning once more of a Cold War climate. Europe rushed to assist Ukraine, while continuing to attempt to find a diplomatic solution with Russia. Economic embargoes from Europe and the US together with the major decline in oil prices have begun to seriously hurt the Russian economy. How long this situation will continue is unclear. One is tempted to recall the final days of the Cold War when the Reagan Administration increased American military expenditure to compel the economically weaker Russia to do likewise. One could think that the current economic measures against Russia may be intended to halt the adventurous aggressive policies of the current Russian regime; more precisely that of President Putin.

Conclusion

A truly United Europe could only be based on the principles of the French Revolution. So far liberty is partially ensured, fraternity is ensured only among EU countries and equality is still a dream. These could only be established by a common European government. This is still a mirage as nation states and national interests dominate all European institutions while closing Europe's doors in an increasing measure to non-Europeans.

Turkey's New EU Strategy: Strengthening The European Project¹

Ambassador Rauf Engin Soysal²

In the 1980s when I was at the College of Europe in Bruges, European integration was also going through some important changes that I was going to study in the “Dominante Administrative”. The “Southern wave” of enlargement as Spain and Portugal joined the EEC in 1986 following Greece in 1981, the Single European Act and preparations for the Internal Market were among those important developments.

Today I am here as Turkey's Undersecretary of the Ministry for EU Affairs and I will mainly focus on Turkey's New EU Strategy and the importance of reinforcing Turkey's accession process at a critical time for the European Project.

Reinforcing European Values

The construction of Europe requires a constant contextualization of the European Project (justification/finality debate). The year 2015, unfortunately, started with the abhorrent terror attacks in Paris. We have all expressed our solidarity with the French people. In such moments, you will agree that we need first to reflect on these tragic events, which has shocked us all.

We need more than ever to enhance this spirit of Bruges and Natolin in today's Europe. We need more than ever to reinforce our values. The tragic events in France earlier this year are strong reminders of the importance to uphold European values. Terrorism has no religion, no geography and cannot have any justification. We should enhance the spirit of “working and

1 Compiled from a lecture delivered on January 27, 2015 at College of Europe in Bruges

2 Undersecretary of the Ministry for EU Affairs of Turkey

living together”, which lies at the very bottom of the European Project. We need strong leadership in reacting rapidly to multiple changes and challenges we face today in Europe, which make our societies vulnerable to a number of serious threats, including extremism.

Addressing the Rise of Extremism

I would like to underline three essential points that might guide our focus on the role of the European institutions and especially the role of the Council of Europe (CoE) in addressing the rise of extremism in evolving societies.

First of all, when we debate about extremism we should acknowledge *its intrinsic nature*.

Extremism may unfold in direct or disguised forms. It is difficult to pin down a constant and precise definition of extremism. Consequences of extremist acts, on the other hand, point to undeniable commonalities and indicate clear patterns. All extremist groups act upon the idea of an absolute enemy which must be struck immediately and with full force. Extremist rhetoric may seek reference from various ideologies or belief systems; but we should keep in mind that extremism resorts to stigmatization, stereotyping and scapegoating. There is also ample evidence that certain segments of our societies are particularly vulnerable to extremist threats. Extremist groups commonly use anti-Roma and anti-migrant discourse, Islamophobic attitudes, anti-Muslim, anti-Semitic and xenophobic propaganda. We should be aware of the effects of such rhetoric and hate speech on mass media and populist political leaders. Another characteristic of extremism is the readiness to make use of any means in order to achieve prescribed goals. In that respect, as suggested by Political philosopher Robert Nozick, the “most pronounced manifestation of such extremism is terrorism”. Thus, in addressing a phenomenon with such a wide span of repercussions, we should maintain a firm stance against extremist attitudes and also pay particular attention so as not to undermine the severity of human rights violations caused by extremism.

The second point I would like to underline is the relevance of *participatory democracy* in dealing with the rise of extremism. The importance of maintaining pluralism and diversity in decision-making mechanisms by

keeping democratic channels open should be highlighted. Facing the challenges of so-called “dépossession démocratique” calls for concrete action: non-discrimination in the provision of social government services; establishing genuine dialogue channels with civil society; and guaranteeing a rich and sustainable civil society network, arise as crucial elements for democratic mechanisms to answer today's needs. At this juncture, the unique role and expertise of the CoE in providing valuable guidance in the fields of education, youth, intercultural dialogue and democratic citizenship are much sought after. Most significantly, CoE democratic standards should be incorporated at the local level. In order to be able to cope with these challenges, we should maintain and further strengthen the wide spectrum of activities of this organization. EU-CoE cooperation is important.

Thirdly, we need to keep in mind that while taking in hand the rise of extremism, we are still operating at the *tip of an iceberg*.

Numerous reports and research prove that the veil of secrecy on extremist acts prevails. This is partly because the victims are afraid or unable to make their voices heard. But we should be bold enough to acknowledge deficiencies on the part of our national mechanisms in identifying and promptly acting upon extremist threats. Our response to extremist threats (or rather lack of it) itself, bears the risk of leading to more human rights violations. We should remember: the loss of lives cannot be reversed even with the most diligent report that introduces brave suggestions on how to overcome deeply rooted prejudices and lack of diversity among civil servants, especially among public prosecutors, law enforcement agents and security forces. We should end legal limbo and focus on taking concrete steps at the national level ahead of any incidents. The European Court of Human Rights is a particularly efficient tool in fighting against extremist views and protecting the victims. But we cannot confine the task of addressing the rise of extremism solely to the Court or to a number of monitoring mechanisms.

Turkey's New EU Strategy

Re-energizing the European Project is among Turkey's top priorities.

The period ahead is critical for the European Project. After going through nearly ten years of multiple crises as President Barroso depicted in his

farewell speech at the General Assembly of the European Parliament, it is high time for all of us to show a fresh enthusiasm in discussing the future of “Our Europe”.

I should underline that EU membership is and has always been a strategic objective for Turkey.

The “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-2015” Document published by the European Commission on 8 October 2014, underlines also strongly this point. “...given its unrivalled scope and depth, the accession process, which no alternative can replace, promotes EU related reforms” and “...active and credible accession negotiations provide the most suitable framework for exploiting the full potential of EU-Turkey relations”.

Our vision is to pursue this strategic objective with even more determination regardless of the political obstacles we face. With this understanding, Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator, Ambassador Volkan Bozkır announced “Turkey’s New EU Strategy” in Brussels on 18th of September 2014.

This Strategy is based on three pillars: “Determination in the Political Reform Process”, “Continuity in Socio-Economic Transformation” and “Effectiveness in Communication”. This strategy has become operational with the “National Action Plan for the EU Accession” and the “European Union Communication Strategy”.

Our goal is well summarized in “Turkey’s New EU Strategy” in the following sentence: “Turkey will make further progress and determinedly move towards its membership objective that confirms our “Strong EU, Strong Turkey” perspective”.

Synchronizing Efforts for European Project

Since 1963, despite ups and downs, we have never lost sight of that final objective of full membership. The world has changed. So did the EU and Turkey. But we have become also closer to each other. Our level of integration has already reached an extensive state. Each enlargement of the EU has had its own paradigm and Turkey’s accession will be no exception. It will also be realized through a process where we are going to better see and appreciate its own paradigm.

Since the very beginning of European integration, Turkey has accompanied the construction of Europe. Looking at the chronology of Turkey-EU relations, one can identify the synchronization between our path to join the EU and the EU's path towards an ever-closer union. In that respect, 1963, 1987, 1992, 1995, 1999 and 2005 can be seen as significant dates. In many respects, 2014 could also be seen as a year, which has given in a sense a new opportunity to synchronize efforts in order to embolden the European Project. This is why setting a strong Turkey-EU agenda and reinforcing the accession process in 2015 is of utmost importance.

Relevance of Turkey's Accession Process for Europe

What can Turkey's accession process really mean in the actual phase of European integration? What is its relevance for Europe? How does it fit into the "European moment"?

Here comes the importance of considering Turkey's accession to the EU, not within an anachronistic framework of thoughts, but in a manner taking into account the challenges the EU faces in the period ahead.

"Europe as a stronger global actor" and "A Union of democratic change" are among the ten priorities of Juncker's policy guidelines. If we analyze one by one the ten priorities of the Juncker Commission and try incorporating the added value Turkey could provide to each of these priorities, we will better see the window of opportunity ahead of us in ensuring a win-win situation. We would like to see a successful achievement of these priorities.

The EU cannot only confine its role to be a "normative power" (Galtung). As Karoline Postel-Vinay rightly pointed out, the construction of Europe, because it constitutes by far the most ambitious and extensive of all regional projects, is a unique political phenomenon with regard to the dynamics of the international scene as a whole. Thus, it is essential to examine to what extent the European experience can be a model for international relations.

European Identity and Forging a Common Destiny

The answer is, on the one hand, closely related to the question of how we define the European identity and, on the other hand, how we define the political finality of European integration.

Both have to do with the approach one will adopt vis-à-vis the accession of Turkey to the EU.

It matters for the future of European integration whether European identity is constructed in an open and inclusive manner or in a restrictive manner.

A “European identity” is one of a multiplicity of identities held by individuals - what we call unity in diversity. The EU integration process is about forging a common destiny.

Turkey’s accession process to the EU is becoming an important element, which can contribute to the finality of the European integration and to the perceptions of the EU in regions “en attente d’Europe” (waiting for Europe).

It is essential that the European dynamic is not and must not become a frustration dynamic. The success of Turkey’s accession process -with all its political, economic and cultural dimensions- will have a major impact in the “géopolitique du sens” in a wide region, extending from the Balkans to the Caucasus, from the Black Sea Region to the Mediterranean and from the Middle East to Eurasia.

The process of Turkish membership to the European Union is a project of a societal transformation. Our bid to be member of the European Union is an integration process, which has to do with all the aspects of the dynamics of Turkey.

Re-energizing the European Project would also provide a new impetus to the transatlantic partnership. EU-US relations remain important for the future of the European Project. The cross fertilization process between the two sides of the Atlantic will continue to provide an added value in these challenging times.

A Sisyphaen Turkey or Convergence with Membership

I remember having read an article where Reginald Dale, with reference to one perceptive official putting it privately, wrote in his article entitled “European Union, Properly Construed ” (published in Policy Review, January 2004), that “U.S. interests were until now best served by a Europe always proceeding towards closer union but never actually getting there.”

Maybe this observation is still valid with regard to the perception existing in some EU countries as far as Turkey's integration is concerned. Indeed, in that case, a Turkey always proceeding towards accession but never actually getting there would best serve EU and its member states' interests. This reminds us of Albert Camus' famous short essay "The myth of Sisyphus".

I would like to refer to Nathalie Tocci's wonderful phrase where she says "Turkey and the EU are in the same metaphorical boat, the boat is on a journey whose destination is unknown".

Uncertainty is an integral part of the construction of Europe (Andreani). One can only hope, that during this journey soon we will enter a period of time, during which, as seen from the United States, the image of a Sisyphean Europe forever rolling the boulder of integration will begin to disappear and, as seen from the EU, the myth of a Sisyphean Turkey comes also to an end.

We need a fresh impetus to reinforce the European Project. My preferred scenario – and this will be no surprise for you – is the "convergence scenario" ending with membership.

My professor at the College of Europe in Bruges, Prof. Wolfgang Wessels, in one of his articles written after the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, stated that "debating controversial views on the nature, legitimacy and prospects of the EU, one sensation might become more and more dominating: we are confronted with realities and challenges which might be outside our traditional categories".

I believe that this diagnosis is still largely valid today. Turkey's experience of more than 50 years in this process can also be considered as a valuable asset in trying to better grasp the importance of the European Project. In face of key challenges, all the actors of the European Project should ensure that the spirit of working and living together –prevail and we should all try to bring a fresh impetus to our common goal of a "Strong Europe" to which Turkey has always contributed.

The Future of Turkey – EU Relations

Belgin Akçay¹

When we look at the development of the relations between Turkey and EU, we see that, so far, these relations have been far from consistent and productive, at times even coming to a complete standstill.

Today, even though Turkey has an Association Agreement with the EU, effectively it still maintains many of its initial problems. On the other hand, there is an ongoing negotiation process, through which both parties are struggling to move ahead. And, this process is to be viewed from the prospect of not only the Customs Union, but also of Turkey's long time expectation for membership. Notwithstanding, the suspension of the several chapters by the European Commission or the Council, the process of accession is still being kept alive by the parties.

When we compare the duration of membership proceedings of the member states, we reach a generalisation as follows: We see that the accession process of Turkey is displaying a sui-generis quality on various levels, especially, after the establishment of the EU, and particularly, after 2004. As of today, we can say that the Customs Union, which has been in effect between the EU and Turkey for 18 years is not a proper customs union by international standards. Also, Turkey's accession proceedings do not bear any resemblance to those carried out by the EU in its earlier attempts at enlargement. When we consider the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU we see that Turkey is the only candidate country that holds a functioning customs union with the EU. However, it is inconsistent with the standards of WTO. A Customs Union is expected to cover almost all trade between parties. However, the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU includes the free circulation of only industrial goods and processed agricultural products.

¹ President, European Union and Global Research Association (ABKAD)

On the other hand, the Turkish goods under the Customs Union, also do not have real free circulation. The 'invisible barriers to trade' put forth by the EU member states (eg. the visa policy towards businessmen, and issues faced in road transportation) prevent Turkish goods from being freely circulated as they should be in a CU area. Honestly, there are also some deficiencies coming from the Turkish side (eg. the very broad scope of the Turkish excise duty yielding inequalities against EU imports).

It will not be necessary to get into the details of the problems arising out of the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey.

When we look at the accession process we can see some other significant problems. The negotiation process between Turkey and the EU, which involved the review of 35 chapters soon after its start in 2005, have begun to face grave inconsistencies. Most of such inconsistencies are not usually observed in the enlargement process.

Even at the beginning of the accession procedure, an issue which should not have any place between Turkey and the EU connection started to play a major role, and, as a matter of fact, became the biggest barrier to the enhancement of Turkey's accession process. I am talking about the Cyprus issue, which relates to events which have occurred totally outside of the realm of the EU, and long before Cyprus caught opportunity to enter the EU as a full member. And again, this issue is a very special one, related to the narrow scope of several multilateral and bilateral international agreements signed between the Cypriot Greek Community and Cypriot Turkish Community, also by the participation of Turkey, the UK and Greece. Such issues should not have been brought before the EU after one of the parties to this highly political, but narrow scope conflict has become a member state.

The reading of the Ankara Agreement, also does not allow us to take such issues, arising from the issues related to an earlier period than the EU membership of one of the parties, to the decision making mechanism of the Union against the interests and expectations of the other party (namely Turkey).

So, it is very hard for us to understand how Cyprus could successfully block many chapters of negotiation framework and thereby become the most significant cause for the crippling of Turkey's accession process.

Actually, the accession process to the EU has a very specific roadmap. And that roadmap does not admit the intervention of external issues to that very specific procedure. It is first while following its own course, in the history of the EU enlargement that an accession proceeding has been afterwards brought to a breaking point, on the initiative of a member state tracing its own egocentric interests.

So, we can say that TR-EU relations are a sort of problem in itself. Certainly, one of the main reasons of this peculiar problem is the approaches of both sides, i.e. Turkey and the EU. In reality, maybe Turkey has not decided yet definitely to be a part of Europe. Turkey's reluctance to implement the political criteria of EU membership (e.g. the establishment of an effective judicial mechanism or to provide transparency in public administration etc.) is a sign of Turkey's hesitation on the way of becoming a party in full.

However, when we look at the EU front, we see that both the political business cycle within the Union and the developments in international markets have a big influence over EU's stance toward Turkey. Indeed, the EU also is somewhat reluctant to see Turkey as a full European country. The EU has kept its position towards Turkey's accession ambiguous. While the decision to start negotiations has been made; the statement 'Negotiations with Turkey is an open ended process' is being articulated repeatedly.

In fact, one can claim that the attitude of both Turkey and the EU towards their mutual relationship has started to take on a similar character. Today, both sides see this relationship as material for daily politics. One could also very well argue that Turkey's attitude has been this all along. In terms of the EU, however, we see that such an attitude became dominant during the previous decade (especially within the core countries of the EU)

The outcome is, of course, a mutual loss of trust by the decision makers. More importantly, a negative attitude towards these relations is becoming widespread among the peoples of both sides (this fact is confirmed both by the Eurobarometer and the surveys made in Turkey) It is a known fact that, 'as long as the majority of the people of a country is against the accession to the EU, it is not possible for that country to become a member.' In other words, if the peoples of two sides involved in a process of integration have suspicions or negative feelings against each other or about integration, an integration can never be successful between these countries.

So, given the current state of affairs, what will be the future of the relations between Turkey and the EU? There are two prospects: either the relations will gradually weaken or they will be resumed.

We believe that Turkey should not divert from its vocation to remain a European country. Actually, the focus of Turkish economy has always been directed towards Europe. As a matter of fact, although lately Turkey has been doing business with a growing number of countries; the biggest share of its foreign trade still belongs to the EU countries.

As of the end of 2013, about 40 % of its foreign trade had been with EU countries. 72% of Turkey's foreign capital stock belongs to EU countries. Also, more than half of the capital flowing out of Turkey goes to the EU (54%). The share of tourists coming to Turkey from the EU is 20 %. The number of Turkish enterprises in Europe is almost 140.000. The number of Turkish people living in Western Europe is about five million. We can give many more examples.

Both the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey have always steered towards the West. The Ottoman Empire was perhaps the only Turkish State that managed to settle in Europe without losing its identity.

In the words of Atatürk: 'Turks are friends of all civilized nations. Countries may be varied but civilization is one and in order for a nation to advance, it needs to participate in this unique civilization.' And, we all know that what Atatürk called "unique civilization" was the civilization originated from Europe, including European secular, rational values related with the politics, economy, and law.

As a matter of fact, the findings of World Bank's report confirm that 'the Customs Union and further economic integration is for the benefit of both sides.' If we are to summarize the recommendation set forth in the report: 'The Customs Union relations should be furthered and the integration of the two sides should be advanced.' In terms of the maintenance of relations there are two options: a speedy progress towards full membership or deepening and widening of the CU. By widening of the Customs Union, the Turkey-EU Association relationship, shall develop into a very special sort of economic integration. For example, a special kind of common market or something like European Economic Area can be established similar to that made with some Nordic countries. Of course, as far as we are concerned

the first option is the best option: Full membership. However at present the likelihood of Turkey becoming a full member to the EU appears to be weak.

So, what can we do? We think that for deepening the Customs Union we need to devise national measures. We are able to observe that, recently, Turkish policy-makers have been taking steps towards the achievement of these measures: In our opinion, a new Association Council Decision should be passed in order for the service and agricultural sectors to be included in the Customs Union; however Turkey needs to be granted legal warranty. (In terms of solving conflicts within the Association framework, its participation in decision making mechanisms concerning foreign trade, presently free movement of goods and later, services. These are not found in the current Ankara Agreement.) For this reason, the Ankara Agreement needs to be revised and negotiations for its expansion should be initiated.

Lastly, we believe that it is crucial to give support and momentum to the development and deepening of the Turkish-European relationship for the future. Positive steps taken to this end would bring Turkey closer to full membership.

In fact, the idea that Turkey should give up all its ambitions for joining the EU and conversely, enhance its relations with Middle Eastern and Asian countries is quite widespread in Turkey; it is held strongly by a fraction of the Turkish society that is gaining more power everyday. We believe that Turkey should further its relations with Europe, rather than turning its face to the East.

However, the idea that Turkey should direct its way towards the East is an important argument worth discussing. The existence of a large group supporting the idea of going towards the East, however, is another barrier to Turkey's extended efforts to meet the criterion for Turkey's integration capacity. But, as long as Europe is reluctant to accept Turkey into the "club", such adverse ideas or inspirations will certainly always find ways to hinder Turkey's big walk to the contemporary civilization and the ideal of forming a qualified community based on fundamental values of humanity.

Diplomacy of Human Rights and Turkey

Numan Hazar¹

Human rights and fundamental freedoms attained, after a long process, their present level consisting of highly developed norms. There is no doubt, it was not an easy progress.

When we look at the present status of human rights, we can observe that a comprehensive categorization of human rights and fundamental freedoms has already been made, thanks to international efforts for more than a century now. Various agreements, treaties and conventions assured the codification of human rights and fundamental freedoms also providing protection mechanisms. It means that human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed by the international law.

Countries criticized or accused of human rights violations, can not refer anymore to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, one of the basic tenets of the international law due to the fact that they acceded to politically and/or legally binding international agreements, treaties or conventions as Member States of the United Nations.

Historical Evolution

Human Rights' concept was developed in the West and had a long process of evolution. Magna Carta Libertatum in 1215, English Bill of Human Rights in 1689, Various Human Rights Declarations in the 13 crown colonies in the United States, including Virginia Declaration of Bill of Rights adopted in 1776 which was incorporated later into the US Constitution in 1791 as amendments, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of the French Revolution in 1789 as well as Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 by the United Nations Organization represent this evolution.

1 Ambassador (Ret).

Real progress in the field of human rights was made in the aftermath of the Second World War in order to prevent the recurrence of very inhumane and genocidal acts experienced as well as serious crimes committed against civilian populations during the war.

Nevertheless, serious damages and inhumane effects caused by hostilities against belligerents and civilians had led the international community, in the past just after the Napoleonic wars to adopt a host of measures through various conventions to render the armed conflicts more humane with the aim of alleviating the suffering of human beings. As a matter of fact various international conventions concluded in the Hague or in Geneva at the end of 19th century and in early 20th Century aimed at reducing adverse effects of the armed conflicts. Disarmament efforts and the ban on certain weapons or ammunition also served the same purpose. Thus a Humanitarian Law was established taking also into consideration the case of prisoners of wars as well as wounded and dead persons. An international humanitarian institution Red Cross/Red Crescent was created. The humanitarian law is considered at the present within the context of human rights or it is defined as human rights component of the Law of the War ².

The League of Nations created after the First World War did not have general provisions related to human rights since, at that time, the concept of the protection of human rights had not been generally accepted. Nevertheless, the League of Nations provided some human rights concepts as regards to the Mandates system as well as labor standards referring to fair and humane conditions of labor. On the other hand, the League of Nations played an important role in developing an international system for the protection of minorities.

As mentioned earlier, the real progress in the field of the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms was materialized after the Second World War within the context of the UN system. The UN Charter confers powers to the Security Council to take actions in case of large-scale violations of human rights by authorizing enforcement measures. Such actions were taken by the UN Security Council by its decisions related to Kurds

² Thomas Buergenthal , *International Human Rights in a Nutshell*, 1995, West Publishing Co. St.Paul.MN,p.17.

in Iraq, to former Yugoslavia, to Haiti, etc. Security Council also created International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in order to punish those responsible for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes.

This can be seen as a modern form of collective humanitarian intervention for dealing with the massive human rights violations.³

Developments within the UN System

Following the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly, the UN adopted some major human rights Conventions such as:

- Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966, entry into force 1976),
- Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966, entry into force 1976),
- The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948, entry into force 1951),
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965, entry into force 1969),
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979, entry into force 1981),
- Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (1984, entry into force 1987).

The UN system continued the codification of human rights within a few decades after the Universal Declaration in order to complete the list of the human rights and fundamental freedoms and also established control mechanisms for their implementation such as UN Human Rights Commission (transformed later into a Human Rights Council) and various Committees created for the supervision of the implementation of the Conventions through annual reports to be submitted by the member states as well as individual petitions or applications.

³ Buergenthal, op.cit. p.5

Situation at Other International Organizations

Various Regional Organizations also issued Human Rights Declarations and created enforcement mechanisms.

Members of the Council of Europe which was created after the Second World War agreed in Rome (4 November 1950) on the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The enforcement mechanism was European Court for Human Rights. The Convention has been strengthened with additional Protocols. The jurisdiction of the Court was made mandatory. The right of individual applications to the Court was also recognized by member states after the exhaustion of domestic remedies. As compared to the UN system European Declaration of Human Rights did not refer to economic and social rights. This void was later filled with the adoption of the European Social Charter.

Organization of American States (OAS) also adopted the American Declaration of Human Rights and Duties of Man and created enforcement mechanisms such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

On the other hand, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which was transformed later into the African Union adopted in 1981 the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights establishing a system for the protection and promotion of human rights. African Charter which proclaims rights and duties refers also to individual and peoples' rights. It permits, however, state parties to impose very extensive restrictions and limitations as regards the rights solemnly proclaimed. The Charter created as enforcement mechanism the African Commission of Human Rights. Nevertheless, in 1998, the Court for Human and Peoples' Rights was established. The Commission was made a component of the Court.

Among the enforcement mechanisms mentioned above the European system is a fully functioning mechanism. The others, however, faced various political difficulties to become full-fledged systems for the protection of human rights.

In the light of developments mentioned above, which are related to the protection and promotion of human rights through their historical context, it can be easily said that individuals have thus become subjects of international law. As is known, until a recent past only states were considered as subjects of the international law.

Prerequisites for Development of Human Rights Concept

The prerequisite for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is undoubtedly the existence of a fully functioning democratic system and the rule of law. On the other hand, there is no denial that for democracy a secular system is required. A secular approach is also necessary for the freedom of expression and scientific development.

In this context, it should be clarified the fact that development of human rights has nothing to do with religion, in particular Christianity.

Human rights concept as it was developed in the West has been an end product of major historical developments witnessed in the West, in particular in Europe, namely Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution and Scientific Revolution. Although all monotheist religions attach importance to the protection of human beings because of the Creator, there is now a new concept of inalienable and inherent rights of human beings born free and equal in dignity and rights without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth and other status.

We should also keep in mind that Roman Law also has a pagan origin.

We should underline these aspects of the idea of human rights and democracy since in various Moslem countries there is sensitivity when human rights and democracy concepts are mentioned. It is considered as a Western approach to divide and destabilize Moslem States.

It should be underlined that separation of the state and the religion was an idea also originated within the Moslem World. As a matter of fact Ibn Rushd known as Averoes in the West is recognized as a Moslem Philosopher who influenced the development of secular ideas and Renaissance process in Europe.⁴

A host of Moslem philosophers also put forth the view that Islam as a religion has not been hostile to a secular government system.

The reasons of distrust of some Moslem countries against the West have its roots in the history including colonial era.

4 Sophie Bessis, *l'Occident et les Autres*, Editions la Découverte, Paris, 2012, p.18.

Situation within the Islamic World

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is composed of 57 member states representing over one-fourth of the UN membership. It is the world's second largest international organization. While the populations of most OIC countries are mainly Muslims in terms of their mainstream religious and cultural character, they hold different attitudes to religion in the sense that not all of them consider Islam as their official religion.⁵

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that 29 countries, out of 57 member states of the OIC, have secular constitutions. The OIC member countries with secular constitutions are as follows:

- Turkey and Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union,
- Black African countries,
- Two members from South America (Guyana and Suriname) which have sizable Christian populations,
- Malaysia and Indonesia,
- Albania because of the traditional influence of a liberal Islam (Bektashis) as well as its ties with European institutions,
- Some member countries are Islamic States or Islamic Republics such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan etc.

Arab countries however have no secular constitutions with the sole exception of Lebanon which has particular characteristics as regards its population. As a matter of fact, the constitutions of Arab countries recognized Islam as the official religion of the state. Even some countries accepted the Sharia as the main source of the legislation. This state of affairs is a clear indication that Islam is considered as part of the Arab culture and civilization despite the fact that there exists many secular practices in various Arab countries.

As mentioned earlier, secular system is sine qua non condition of democracy and the rule of law.

5 Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, *The Islamic World in the New Century*, The Organisation of Islamic Conference, 1969-2009, Hurst&Company, London, 2010, p. 25.

The Turkish Case

Turkey has, indeed a different historical experience as compared to other Moslem nations. Turks as immediate neighbors have always been in contact with European countries and followed developments occurring in Europe. When the Ottoman Empire felt the need to carry out reforms following military defeats against European powers, the reform process started with reforms in military structure. Later it was extended, early 19th century, to all areas including the administration, political life, education, laws, justice, culture, etc. In this context 1839 Tanzimat (the Reorganization) process, as well as 1856 Rescript for Reforms brought about many changes in the country.

The proclamation of a constitutional system of government in 1876 and adoption of a constitution have been significant developments. It is noteworthy that at this time parliamentary elections were held in the country, as the first ever in a Moslem nation. Within this context equal rights of all Ottoman citizens, Moslems and Non-Moslems alike, were recognized.

The suspension of the Constitution in 1877 and 30 years of authoritarian regime in the Ottoman empire led to the restoration of the Constitution in 1908 in the aftermath of various internal and external developments. At the end of the last decades of the Ottoman Empire there was indeed a period of Ottoman Enlightenment. ⁶

Following the Turkish National Liberation war under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk a second stage of Turkish enlightenment was witnessed due to reforms carried out in the early years of the Turkish Republic. French political scientist Maurice Duverger emphasizes that in Turkey the actions of Mustafa Kemal have not been totalitarian, rather they reflected with their substance, philosophy and ideology a democratic movement and they aimed at the modernization of the country.⁷

In 1946 there was a transition in Turkey to a multiparty system.

6 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, London, Oxford, Newyork, 1976, pp.175-209.

7 Maurice Duverger, *Les Partis Politiques*, Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1964, pp. 308-310.

As Prof. Bernard Lewis underlines, "democracy is difficult - perhaps the most difficult to operate and preserve of all known forms of governments. It arose in a limited region, among the peoples of western and northwestern peoples of Europe and was transplanted by them to their colonies overseas." As regards Turkey he says the following:

"Only in one country of the Islamic World has democracy continued despite many difficulties and setbacks, to function and even to flourish - Turkey. In Turkey democracy was neither bequeathed by imperial rulers, nor imposed by victorious enemies. It was the free choice of the Turks themselves. The path of democracy for Turkey has been long and hard and beset with obstacles. But the Turks have shown that with goodwill, determination, courage and, above all, perseverance, it is possible to overcome these obstacles and advance on the path of freedom... Turks have shown that it can be done, and others may yet find themselves able to do the same.

One of the lessons of Turkey's success and others' failures is that a major prerequisite for the working of any kind of free institutions is the level of social and economic development needed to support it.. The Turkish example might suggest that some degree of separation of religion from the state is also a prerequisite." ⁸

What is very clear from the views expressed by Prof Lewis is the fact that it is not possible to import democracy or impose it on a country which has no maturity yet in the sense of social awareness and political institutions.

Imposition not a Success

As indicated earlier when democracy and human rights are put on the agenda by the West, in most of the developing or Moslem countries there is always a strong reaction. They consider these efforts of the West as initiatives to destabilise their countries. British historian Eric Hobsbawm calls this policy of the West as the imperialism of human rights. Hobsbawm also says, inter alia, the following: "The diffusion of values and institutions can hardly ever be brought by a sudden imposition from outside force, unless conditions are present locally which make them adaptable and their introduction acceptable. Democracy and Western values and human rights

⁸ Bernard Lewis, "Rethinking the Middle East", *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1992, pp.99-119.

are not technological importations whose benefits are immediately obvious and will be adopted in the same manner by all who can use them and afford them.”⁹

The US President Barack Obama also expressed a similar view when he said that one should be sceptical of those who believe that the US can single-handedly liberate the countries from the tyranny, since, he added, democracy is a result of local awakening.¹⁰

Effects of National Interest

Western countries including the United States have been stressing human rights issues in their dealings with other countries. Some US Presidents in particular Jimmy Carter gave priority to human rights issues in their foreign policy agendas. China has also been a target for its alleged human rights violations. This US policy was criticized in the country due to its damaging effects as far as national interests are concerned.

When criticized for its economic and trade relations with those non-democratic countries which have record of serious human rights violations, China responds to these criticisms that the West is also dealing with the most strict conservative and totalitarian regimes taking into consideration its national interests in the field of energy supplies.

Western democratic countries are also criticized because of their positions on terrorism, racism and xenophobia (in particular Islamophobia) which are also human rights related issues. Developed countries consider as violations of human rights of individuals when these rights are violated only by governments. Nevertheless, acts of terrorism, racism and xenophobia (in particular Islamophobia) perpetrated by individuals also constitute serious human rights violations. Governments are, undoubtedly, in a position to prevent all kinds of violations through specific measures. Islamic countries have also criticized Western countries because of their indifference with the pretext of freedom of expression in the case of the publication of humiliating cartoons depicting Muhammad the Prophet of

9 Eric Hobsbawm, *Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism*, Abacus, London, 2011, pp.10-11.

10 Barack Obama, *the Audacity of Hope, Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream*, Vintage Books, New York 2006, p.374.

Islam as terrorist. Moslem countries reacted strongly to this development. On the other hand, as a double standard of some of the Western countries, it is indicated that on the Armenian allegations related to the so-called genocide, they did not take into consideration the sacred principle of the freedom of expression.

Turkey's European Identity

As far as Turkey is concerned, we can say that it is very peculiar case: a Moslem nation which adopted political values and human rights norms developed in the West. It is a member of the North Atlantic Alliance which refers to the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law in the Preamble of its founding Treaty of Washington of 4 April 1949.

Turkey is a founding member of the Council of Europe and member of other European Institutions. It ratified the European Convention of Human Rights. Turkey also accepted the individual applications of Turkish citizens to the European Court of Human Rights in 1987 and recognized the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court in 1990.

Turkish legal system is modelled on the continental Europe's legal structure developed on the basis of Roman Law which has a secular substance. This process was initiated by the Ottoman Empire.

Turkey is not a party to the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam adopted at Cairo on 5 August 1990 by the Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference due to the fact that it is not compatible with the Turkish Constitution as well as the principles of her foreign policy. As a matter of fact, this Declaration prescribes, in its last two articles, that all the rights and freedoms stipulated in the Declaration are subject to Islamic Shari'ah and that Islamic Shari'ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of the Declaration.¹¹

Turkey fulfilled Copenhagen Criteria which are also related to democracy and human rights for full membership in the European Union.

Several Islamic countries have ratified several Conventions of the United Nations on Human Rights with reservations, including the Convention on

¹¹ Human Rights, A Compilation of International Instruments, Volume II, Regional Instruments, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1997, p. 484.

the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on the grounds that some provisions of the Conventions are in contradiction with their national legislations or the Sharia, in particular on the status of women as well as the free right of women to choose a spouse and enter into marriage.

Obviously, Turkey has no such reservations.

As it can be clearly perceived from the preceding details, Turkey is indeed a unique case. This state of affairs is a reflection of Turkey's European identity.

A Critique of Turkey's Arab Policy

Ayhan Kamel¹

The Arabs had been under the rule of the Ottomans about four centuries. Due to the fact that a great majority of these people were Muslim sharing common culture and traditions, there was no serious dissent against the throne and the ruling class until 19. century although conflicts erupted at times between the local people of different sects, especially between shiites and sunnies. Moreover, the Caliphate institution acted as a unifying force in these lands. Although most arabs do not admit it, a big part of the Ottoman treasury was spent for the capitals such as Bagdad, Cairo, Damascus at the expense of the Anatolian people, especially those living in eastern part. So, I conclude that they could not have serious reasons for complaint.

During the First World War, with the instigation of the then world powers, the arabs in some lands revolted against the Sultan expecting to gain their independence. In fact, during the period between the two World Wars, four Arab countries achieved their independence, namely Saudi Arabia (1926), Iraq(1932), North Yemen(1934) and Egypt(1936), although this connivance between Muslim Arabs and Christian powers had left a bitter legacy in the minds and hearts of the Turks.

Yet, Turkey tried to develop friendly ties with them, but without much success. Indeed, the radical reforms such as secular character of the new regime in Ankara, abolition of the Caliphate, replacement of the sharia by the Western legislation, adoption of Latin alphabet in education, etc. had been

interpreted by the Arab people as a sign of Turkey's breaking away from them. So, the relations between Turkey and Arab States were distanced, cool and marginal.

¹ Ambassador (Ret.)

After the Second World War, the Soviet Union took important steps to expand communism all over the world, starting with Eastern Europe, where democratic governments were replaced by communist regimes.

The emergence of Israel as a sovereign state has led to an everlasting confrontation between Israel and the Arab states (1948, 1967 and 1973 wars) and gave the Soviet Union the opportunity to expand its influence also in the Arab world. Egypt, Iraq and Syria became client states enjoying political and material support from the Soviet Union. Turkey's stand vis-a-vis this conflict was bound to be influenced by the rivalry between the two superpowers to increase their weight in this region and by Turkey's relations and interests with the countries of the Middle-East as well.

Before the end of the Second World War, Soviet Union abrogated the Friendship Treaty signed with Turkey in 1925 while claiming three provinces in eastern Turkey and demanding joint control over the Straits. This was rejected by Turkey. Thus, Ankara faced with an open threat from the North. Moreover, strong military presence of the Soviet Union in the revolutionary regimes in our South created also a proxy threat. Therefore, the relations between these regimes and Turkey were strained. Under these conditions, Ankara sought membership in NATO, a collective security pact, and became member in other western institutions such as the Council of Europe, OECD, etc.

Moreover, Turkey also joined the Baghdad Pact, another collective security system, established with the participation of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, United Kingdom and Turkey, as well as the USA as an associate member, to encircle the Soviet Union from the South and to contain its influence.

Earlier, Turkey was considered eligible to benefit from the Marshall Aid Program of the US. Thus, being highly gratified to the USA for its crucial role in Turkey's admission in NATO in spite of the objections from some European countries, Ankara rather took the line of the West on Arab-Israeli dispute in the 1950's and 1960's. Indeed Turkey had been amongst the countries having recognized Israel soon after she joined the community of nations as a sovereign state although Ankara had initially voted together with the Arabs against the UN Resolution designed to partition Palestine between Arabs and Israel. While Turkey's stand on UN voting was welcomed by the Arabs, early recognition extended to Israel however

generated strong reaction in the Arab world. Afterward, it served in the armistice commission together with the British and French, something which again did not please the Arabs at all.

During the Cold War, as many others, Turkey did not have a room large enough to manoeuvre in its foreign policy. Turkey's voting pattern in the UN was more or less the same as that of the Western countries till the end of 1960's. However, the US President Johnson's letter of 1964 warning Turkey over the use of American arms if need be in Cyprus had been an eye-opener. Also taking into account the Soviet and Arab positions, Turkey gradually adjusted its stand on Arab-Israeli dispute to make it more balanced.

The change in the position of Turkey on this issue took place at a time when Al Aqsa Mosque, an important shrine for Muslims was burned down in 1969, causing a very strong reaction in the Islamic World. Condemning this ignoble incident, Ankara reviewed its relations with the Arab world and decided to participate in the Summit convened to discuss the incident and to approve as well the resolutions adopted, although its participation was at a lower level of Foreign Minister and adoption of the resolutions was subject to reservation on their conformity with Turkish constitution and laws. After 1980, Turkey raised its participation in the summit meetings to the level of head of state or government, and in the case of ministerial meetings to the level of Foreign Ministers. However, Turkey until today continued to decline to approve the Constitution of the Organization of Islamic States.

In subsequent years, Turkey became a member more active while debating the issues before the organisation. Meanwhile, a bureau of the PLO was opened in Ankara. Afterward this bureau was converted into a diplomatic mission. Turkey raised its voice to defend the just cause of the Palestinians and their legitimate and national rights in other international bodies. Turkey also severely criticized the brutal practices of the Israeli authorities in the occupied territories and the siege of Gaza, increasing the sufferings of the Palestinians.

The US, chastising Saddam whose army had occupied the oil fields in Kuwait in 1991 swept the Iraqi forces from that country. While the Iraqi army was in Kuwait, allegedly there were disturbances among the Kurds

in the North. The Kurds, pursued by the Iraqi forces till the border areas with Turkey and Iran, suffered much under severe winter conditions. To protect the Kurds, the US obtained from the Security Council a resolution forbidding the Iraqi army to cross to the north of the line alongside 36th parallel, also establishing a no-fly zone over the airspace of the Kurdish region in the North. This was a prelude to the occupation of Iraq in 2003, which helped create an autonomous region in the area for the Kurds.

Indeed, in the year 2003 allied forces mainly consisted of American troops occupied the whole country with the accusation that Saddam was developing the arms of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons although this excuse was not substantiated by the facts after the invasion. So, this development made the USA a neighbor to the Arab countries of the region with all its consequences, changing the balance of power in the Middle-East in its favor. Certainly this pleased Israel.

In line with the motto "peace at home, peace in the world", Turkey had developed in 1970's certain principles guiding her foreign policy. These principles mentioned herebelow became today even more relevant especially in connection with the Middle-East:

- To give support to the Arab views to obtain a fair solution: Turkey believes that any solution of this conflict must take into account national and legitimate rights of the Palestine people; Turkey is against the policy of fait accompli and rejects any change in the status of Jerusalem
- Turkey must maintain its neutrality vis-a vis diverging views in the Arab world. It has always been careful not to take sides with any of the parties to a conflict and not to get involved in the problems among the Arab countries.
- To consider changes of regime in Arab countries as purely domestic developments
- Turkey's ties with the West in political, economic and military fields should not create adverse effects on the interests of Arab countries. To dispel the preoccupations in the minds of some Arab countries, Turkey gave them assurances that facilities offered by Turkey under NATO would not be used against them.

- While developing its relations with the Arab world, Turkey can also deepen its cooperation with Israel especially in political, military and scientific fields with a low key approach without big fanfare. As a matter of fact, during the period of 1990 and 2006, the cooperation between the two countries went off smoothly. Several visits took place from both sides. However, the visit made to Turkey in 2006 by Khalid Meshal, a Palestinian hardliner, who won the elections in Gaza, created quite a big reaction in Israel. Three years later, at the Davos conference of 2009, in the course of a panel discussion on TV, in which Turkish Prime Minister and Israeli President were taking part, the former used quite an offending language against the latter while accusing his country with brutality. The following year while the relations were already strained, the Blue Marmara incident took place. In fact, the boat was carrying humanitarian assistance to the people of the besieged city Gaza. Israeli authorities persisted in the delivery of the cargo of the boat to themselves to transmit it to Palestinians. When the boat crew could not accept this proposal, the Israeli patrol opened fire, killing nine people on the boat. The Turkish government and public demonstrated a very strong reaction to the incident. The Turkish Government requested from Israel a formal apology and indemnity to the families of those who lost their lives in the shooting. After several months, an apology was extended through the intermediary efforts of US President Obama.

Turkey and Israel are the only two democratic countries in the region. The US can not afford to lose any of them. In fact, the US Government and public is fully committed to the security of Israel. On the other hand, geostrategic position of Turkey is extremely important for the US to reach the military targets even those in Central Asia in a state of war with Russia involving their airforces. Therefore, whenever a crisis erupts in Turkish- Israeli relations, the US comes forward to try to settle the issue between them. Likewise, whenever Turkey needs the support of the US, it goes through strong Jewish lobby in the US Congress. In view of these considerations, both countries, I assume, badly need each other. I believe, in most cases it is rather Israeli side who, with its uncompromising stand and fait-accomplis, provocative statements and brutalities, invites reactions. If Israel wants to live forever in peace in this area, then she must understand the problems of the Palestinians and negotiate a peace plan with them.

In order to demonstrate that Islam can be reconciled with democracy, the US launched in 2009 a movement called "Arab Spring". In several Arab countries, hundred thousands people went out to the streets to protest antidemocratic practises of their governments. In the Gulf countries it faded away in a few days. The sole success was achieved in Tunisia. In Libya Kaddafi was killed. Someone with totalitarian behavior has taken over the ruling of the country. In Egypt, the people continued their demonstrations for several weeks. In the elections organised for presidency the candidate of the Islamic Brotherhood won the elections. However, the chief of the Army General Sisi took the power. So Arab Spring was a big failure also in Egypt.

Iraq was under the American influence and had problems with Autonomous Kurdish Administration in the North. Consequently, for Iraq one can hardly talk about the spring.

The most tragic story took place in Syria. Demonstrations continued several months. President Esad ordered his airforce to pour down hundreds of bombs over his own people to suppress the demonstrations. In three years, about hundred thousand civilians got killed and two hundred thousand people took refuge in neighboring countries, namely Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan.

Soon after the start of the demonstrations, Ankara made several high level demarches in Damascus to advise the Syrian authorities to act with moderation to demonstrators. President Esad did not heed these words. As Esad continued his killings, Ankara publicly invited Esad to step down from his high office while also touring Western capitals, especially Washington, to convince them to start a military intervention against Syria. This was a radical deviation from the traditional line of the Turkish foreign policy not to interfere in the internal affairs of any country as mentioned above.

The Western Governments were hesitant and indeed very reluctant to take such a step for the following reasons:

- First of all, Russia and China, who supported Damascus, would certainly veto such a proposal in the UN Security Council. To go around this difficulty, a multinational force outside the UN could be considered, like in the case of the invasion of Iraq. But without a Security Council resolution, even a greater number of countries were expected to decline to take part in such a force.

- The chances of a military intervention were quite feeble unless it also covered a land operation. However, a land operation could be highly costly in terms of the number of losses from the Western troops. Moreover, the army of Syrian opposition, lacking proper training, could not contribute much to the land operation.
- If President Esad would be killed or forced to step down, there would be no one in the opposition to replace him with strong leadership. Then, terrorist groups such as El Kaide, ISIS, Syrian Kurds, etc. might occupy the ground to make the things even worse. ISIS was already active in the area to set up a Sunni State. In final analysis, to keep a weakened Esad in power was preferable for Israel.

The then Prime Minister Erdoğan, deeply disappointed with the approach of the western countries to the Arab Spring, especially in Egypt and Syria, severely criticized them. He publicly accused the Western leaders of supporting the coup d'état of General Sisi in Egypt while counselling democracy in other instances as if democracy apostles, revealing the double standard in their policies.

Erdoğan also criticized the malfunctioning of the Security Council due to veto power of five members, preventing its efficiency. Prime Minister Erdoğan was perhaps right in criticizing the policies of Western countries and the veto powers of five members of the Security Council. There are practices of double and even triple standards. However, we are not living in a world made of Crystal Ball. He championed a military operation against Syria but could not convince allied countries in spite of his persistent efforts. The outcome was a blow for Turkey's foreign policies. It has also shaken credibility of those policies. Indeed, only six months before the start of demonstrations, the relations between the two countries were so intimate and brotherly as to convene even joint cabinet meetings. By making a big volte-face six months later, Turkey created an impression not only in Syria but also all over the world that it was an unreliable country betraying its friends and violating its own foreign policy principles.

The position taken by the Prime Minister regarding the Syrian crisis also goes against his claims to become the leader of the Middle-East. Indeed, if someone aspiring for the leadership of the region wants to contribute as a mediator to the solution of the problems of his region, then he should not

take sides with any of the parties to the dispute and keep communication channels always open with both parties and decline as well for interfering in their internal affairs, all these being the principles mentioned above. Whereas, Turkey itself became a party to the Syrian problem. One should also keep in mind that while Arab masses might be pleased to hear the rhetoric of the Prime Minister against Israel, they, however, historically consider Egypt as the natural leader of the region. This is also the evaluation of most countries in the West.

Turkey in Africa: Achievements and Challenges

Ufuk Tepebaşı¹

Abstract

Turkey is considered as an emerging economy in the global context and also a strategic partner for Africa in the regional context. Turkey's political and economic relations with Africa have been marginal until 2005, but are rising fast and expected to grow further. The success of Turkey in Africa can be measured with traditional partnership summits, the new diplomatic missions, high – level visits, rising trade and investment, development assistance, transportation network especially in air services. However, the lack of coordination among the national actors in Turkey, sustainability question, poor knowledge about each other and mental distance are seen as the main challenges for both sides. Especially, universities and the media fail to make any tangible contribution to Turkey – Africa relations. For this reason, Turkey needs to develop a cooperation model among the national actors and should follow sustainable policies for a real strategic partnership with the African continent.

Keywords

Turkey; Africa; partnership; trade and investment; transportation; development assistance; security; non-governmental organizations

Introduction

For over a decade, the African continent, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, has been undergoing a dramatic transformation in its structure. In 2000, The Economist referred to Africa as the "hopeless continent" due to its poverty and diseases, cycles of conflict, military and dictatorial one – party

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states.² In 2011, The Economist referred to Africa as the “rising continent”³ and in 2013, the magazine contained a special report referring to Africa as the “hopeful continent”.⁴ This performance has been fuelled by rapidly growing population, increased urbanization, strong domestic demand, export of its natural resources, and implementation of economic and structural reforms.

This positive view of Africa is justified that Sub – Saharan Africa is the host of some of the fastest growing economies in the world. According to International Monetary Fund and the Economist, 7 out of 10 are of the fast growing economies. However, most unequal countries are also in Africa. A World Bank report said that “Africa could be on the brink of an economic takeoff, much like China was 30 years ago and India 20 years ago.”⁵ With the world’s largest youth population, Africa’s working - age population is expected to double to 1 billion in the next 25 years, surpassing both China and India. Today, the continent is called as a “golden opportunity” for foreign investment.

Just like itself, the relations of Africa with the rest of the world also go through a very fast process of transformation. Africa has been becoming an increasingly important trading partner for emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, South Korea and Turkey. The success of Turkey in the continent was included in the research conducted in 2011 jointly by AfDB, OECD, UNDP and UNECA with the special theme of “Africa and its Emerging Partners”.⁶ Turkey, along with China, India, Brazil and South Korea, is mentioned to be among the five emerging partners of Africa in various analyses, annual reports published by AfDB and also in organized forums.

2 The Economist, “Hopeless Africa”, May 11th 2000, <http://www.economist.com/node/333429>

3 The Economist, “Africa rising”, December 3rd 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/21541015>

4 The Economist, “A hopeful continent”, March 2nd 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august>

5 The World Bank, “Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support It”, March 2011, p.4

6 African Development Bank Group, Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Economic Outlook 2011

Turkey's "Action Plan for Opening up to Africa", adopted in 1998, constitutes the basis of today's policies. During the same period, countries such as China, India, Brazil and South Korea also clearly endeavoured for institutionalization of their relations with Africa. On the other hand, the BRIC Group, established by Brazil, Russia, India and China, has enlarged with the inclusion of the Republic of South Africa and became an emerging partner of Africa. During the same period, existing cooperation between Africa and its traditional partners were re-defined and strengthened.

In this context, Forum on China–African Cooperation (FOCAC), Africa-India Forum Summit, Korea-Africa Partnership Forum, Africa-European Union Summit, African-South American Summit, Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), the U.S. – Africa Leaders Summit, African-Arab Summit and Turkey-Africa Collaboration Summit are the primary examples of institutionalizing relations. These are called as strategic partnerships by the African Union.

Turkey's outreach to Africa

Turkey has long – standing historical and cultural connections with the African continent, dating back centuries. Until the First World War, the Ottoman Empire virtually ruled most of North Africa, Somalia and Sudan. The Ottoman Empire had also good relations with South Africa, Zanzibar, and the Kanem – Bornu Empire that once occupied the territories of today's Niger, Chad, North Nigeria and North Cameroon. Likewise, relations were established with the Kingdom of Timbuktu which was located around today's Mali.

Using a combination of investment and soft power – diplomatic expansion and development aid – Turkey has become more involved in the continent since the end of the 1990s in order to strengthen multilateral relations with the African continent.

Turkey's comprehensive policy of the opening up to Africa dates back to the Action Plan adopted in 1998. The main idea steering Turkish officials to make this kind of plan stemmed from the conviction that the relations between Turkey and Africa did not seem satisfactory considering the great

potential.⁷ At that time Turkey had seven Embassies in Sub – Saharan Africa and only South Africa had an Embassy in Ankara. Thus, it was necessary to develop comprehensive relations with the African continent. In June 1998, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey convened a series of meetings with interested parties, including government officials and Turkish ambassadors in Africa, representatives of the private sector and honorary consuls of African countries in Turkey.

In the light of consultations and suggestions expressed in these meetings, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey prepared an Action Plan in order to develop relations between Turkey and the African countries. The elaborated Action Plan consisted of comprehensive measures pertaining to political, economic and cultural relations.

The main goals of the Action Plan may be summarized as follows:

- Increasing high – level contacts between the parties;
- Opening of new Embassies in Africa;
- Strengthening the cooperation within international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC);
- Providing technical and humanitarian assistance to the African countries;
- Strengthening economic and commercial relations;
- Cooperation in the field of defense industry;
- The development of cultural relations and cooperation between Turkish and African universities.

Despite all the good intentions to implement the Action Plan, Turkey's outreach to Africa was postponed due to two devastating earthquakes, one on August 17 and the other on 12 November, 1999 and economic crisis in November 2000 and February 2001. The IMF was involved in the management of the Turkish economy prior to and after the crisis and provided financial and technical assistance. In this period, Turkey refocused on Africa after forming a new government in 2002.

⁷ Numan Hazar, Turkey in Africa: The Implementation of the Action Plan and an evaluation after fifteen years, Ankara: ORSAM Report No. 124, July 2012, p.25

Strategy for Enhancing the Economic and Commercial Relations with Africa

Turkey, with its advanced economy, skilled labor force and experience in international markets is committed to further increase its existing trade and investment relations with the African countries. The first concrete step taken after the Action Plan has been the “Strategy for Enhancing the Economic and Commercial Relations with Africa” developed in 2003 by the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade of the Republic of Turkey.

The main objectives of the Strategy can be summarized as follows:

- to increase the share of Turkey in the total trade volume of African countries up to 3% in three years;
- to encourage Turkish small and medium sized enterprises to penetrate into African market;
- to make either joint investments or direct Turkish investments in African countries in order to increase the competitive power of Turkey in certain sectors;
- to transfer technology from Turkey to African countries;
- to raise the share of Turkish construction, consultancy and engineering firms in the African market;
- to diminish poverty by investing in the African countries and increasing the economic activities by creating more added value in African economies.⁸

The key instruments of the Strategy have been designed as follows:

- to initiate the regular dialogue by creating Joint Economic Commissions (JEC) or high level economic negotiation and decision-making mechanisms;
- to conclude rapidly the basic agreements that will constitute the legal framework of relations between Turkey and African countries;

8 Attila G. Kızılarşlan, “Economic relations between Turkey and African countries” in *Turkish and African Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): Cooperation and Development*, (p. 19 – 27), Ed. Ufuk Tepebas, Istanbul: Tasam Publications, 2009

- to conclude preferential trade arrangements and Free Trade Agreements with the African countries in line with Turkey's obligations towards the EU and other international liabilities;
- to provide the African countries with the technical assistance in the preparation and implementation of the laws regarding the trade policy instruments in parallel with the international practices;
- to create favourable conditions for holding regular introductory activities such as fairs, exhibitions, buyers' missions and trade missions;
- to establish new Commercial Counsellor's offices in African countries;
- to help Turkish technical consultancy firms structuring themselves in the target countries and to promote the creation of new projects in African countries via donations and credits offered under favourable;
- to strengthen the activities of Turkish banks in African countries;
- to provide African countries with the technical assistance and educational support in the fields where Turkey is well experienced.⁹

Under this strategy, Turkey has been implementing country and region based programs in Africa structured according to the political stability, economic outlook, foreign trade structured, and regional integration process of each country or region.¹⁰

Institutionalization of Turkey - Africa Relations

Turkey declared 2005 as "Africa Year". Following this step, the African Union granted Turkey "observer status" and the Turkish Ambassador to Addis Ababa became at the same time permanent representative to the African Union. Then, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Ethiopia and South Africa in March 2005. These were the first official visits ever paid by any Turkish Prime Minister to Sub – Saharan Africa. In addition to that, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TICA) opened its first office in Africa on March 2nd 2005. At present, TICA

9 Ibid.

10 Ahmet Mahir Yener, "The Trade Relations between Turkey and Sub – Saharan Africa and the role of Development Aid", in *Sub – Saharan Africa*, (p.555 – 561), Eds. Ahmet Kavas & Ufuk Tepebaş, Istanbul: Tasam Publications, 2006

has fourteen coordination offices in the continent.¹¹ With the assistance of these offices, TIKA currently implements development projects in more than forty African countries. These projects cover mainly the areas of education, health and humanitarian assistance.

In addition to TIKA, the Ministry of Health, Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) have also made significant contributions through development assistance and health projects. For instance, Turkish – Sudanese Research and Training Hospital in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur province, provides medical treatment and operations free of charge. Similarly, a modern drug store in Chad has also been servicing for patients free of charge since 2008. A short time ago, Turkey built the biggest hospital in Mogadishu and it has been opened on 25 January 2015 during President Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia.

2008, the 10th anniversary of Turkey’s opening up to Africa, has been a significant milestone from the perspective of Turkey’s relations with Africa. At first, Turkey was declared as a “strategic partner” by the African Union during the 10th African Union Summit held in January 2008. When considered that such a relationship was enjoyed up to the present only by China, Japan, South Korea, India, South America as a continent, and the European Union as a regional organisation, the value and meaning of such a tie being conferred to Turkey becomes more apparent.¹²

Then, bilateral relations have gained a substantial momentum. In addition to that, Turkey’s application for the membership to the African Development Bank Group was accepted during the Governors Meeting held on 14–15 May 2008. However, there has been a delay of five years caused by slow implementation of legal procedures. Finally, a declaration issued by the Bank Group’s President Donald Kaberuka, on 29 October 2013 formalized Turkey’s membership in the Bank Group and Turkey was represented for the first time in the Assembly meeting on 3 December 2013. The membership of Turkey will provide more extensive opportunities for Turkish contractors

11 TIKA opened coordination offices in Ethiopia, Sudan, Senegal, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Namibia, Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria. For more information on the TIKA, please see <http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/overseasoffices>

12 Kenan Tepedelen, “The Turkish Policy of Opening up to Africa”, *Foreign Policy - Dış Politika* (p.72 – 73), Nos. 3 – 4 / 2008

and investors in the countries of the continent, especially in the field of construction. Likewise, special importance has been given to contracting and consultancy services in the African Strategy renewed in 2010. While the total value of projects undertaken by Turkish contractors in the African countries was only \$9,6 billion in 2002, it exceeded \$46,4 billion in 2012.¹³

“The First Turkey–Africa Cooperation Summit” was organized in Istanbul between 18 and 21 August 2008 with the purpose of evaluation of the current status of Turkey’s relations with the African countries and determination of a common road map for the future. 49 African Heads of State and Government or their representatives attended the Summit.¹⁴ At the end of the Conference, “The Istanbul Declaration”¹⁵ was adopted as well as a document establishing guidelines for the implementation of the plan “The Framework of Cooperation for Africa - Turkey Partnership”.¹⁶ In order to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Istanbul Declaration, the establishment of a follow – up mechanism was also agreed upon. Accordingly, it was decided that a Turkey – Africa Summit would be organized every five years in Turkey and in Africa respectively.

In parallel to the Turkey–Africa Cooperation Summit, side events such as “Turkey–Africa Business Forum” and “Turkish – African CSOs Forum” were held in Istanbul. As a result of the Business Forum, a Turkish – African Chamber was established between the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) and African Commercial, Industrial, Agricultural and Professional Chambers Union (UACCIAP). Meanwhile, the Turkish – African CSOs Forum led to the constitution of an International Development and Cooperation Platform of NGOs, known as USTKIP.¹⁷

Within the scope of all these positive developments, Turkey was elected as a non-permanent member to the UN Security Council for the period

13 Hakan Karabalık, “Yükselen Yeni Afrika ve Türkiye”, Timreport, Turkish Exporters Assembly, 15 June 2013 – 15 July 2013, No: 101

14 11 delegates also attended to the Summit from international and regional organizations including the African Union.

15 <http://afrika.mfa.gov.tr/istanbul-declaration-adopted-on-19-august-2008-at-the-turkey-africa-cooperation-summit-in-istanbul.en.mfa>

16 <http://afrika.mfa.gov.tr/framework-of-cooperation-adopted-on-19-august-2008-at-the-turkey-africa-cooperation-summit-in-istanbul.en.mfa>

17 <http://www.ustkip.org/>

2009-2010, for the first time since 1961, 50 out of Africa's 53 states having supported Turkey's membership. Turkey announced once again its candidacy for a non – permanent member seat at the UN Security Council for the period 2015-2016, but this time without success.¹⁸ Particularly, the troubled relationship between Turkey and Egypt adversely affected approaches of some African and Arab states. As is known, Egypt and Turkey mutually downgraded the level of their diplomatic relations after the military coup in Egypt.

As a follow-up of the Cooperation Summit, Turkey – Africa relations gained momentum through a new strategy. In this context, an "African Strategy" was adopted on 26 March 2010 by the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey. This strategy aimed to strengthen partnership with the African Union and its members.

In addition, within the framework of the follow – up mechanism adopted at the Cooperation Summit, the First Turkey – Africa Cooperation High Level Officials Meeting was held on 15 December 2010 in Istanbul and the "Joint Implementation Plan of Africa – Turkey Partnership for the period 2010 – 2014" was agreed upon at the meeting. In this plan, nine areas of cooperation were identified such as:

- Institutional cooperation;
- Trade and investment;
- Agriculture, agribusiness, rural development, water resources management, and small and medium scale enterprises;
- Health;
- Peace and security;
- Infrastructure, energy and transport;
- Culture, tourism and education;
- Media, information and communication technologies;
- Environment.

¹⁸ In 2008, when Turkey was elected to the UN Security Council, it had 151 votes in the first round of the elections. In 2014, Turkey got 109 votes in the first round, 73 votes in the second round and only 51 votes in the third round.

Besides, the parties agree to hold a Ministerial Review Conference in 2011, the Second High Level Officials Meeting in 2012 and the Second Turkey–Africa Cooperation Summit in 2013.

As planned, the First Ministerial Review Conference was held on 16 December 2011 in Istanbul, but the Second High Level Officials Meeting and Cooperation Summit were postponed due to the busy agenda of Turkey and the African Union. While the Second High Level Officials Meeting was held on 19 June 2013 in Addis Ababa, the Second Turkey – Africa Partnership Summit was held in Malabo – Equatorial Guinea on 19 – 21 November 2014. In accordance with Banjul Formula, only fifteen African countries were invited to the Summit by the African Union.¹⁹ At the end of the Summit, the parties adopted the Malabo Declaration and Joint Implementation Plan for the period 2015 – 2019.²⁰ The Parties also agreed to hold the Third Turkey – Africa Partnership Summit in 2019 in Turkey.

Table – 1: Official Events between Turkey and Africa

Year	Place	Events	Outcomes
2008	Istanbul	The First Turkey – Africa Cooperation Summit	Istanbul Declaration, Framework of Cooperation for Africa – Turkey Partnership
2010	Istanbul	The First Turkey – Africa Cooperation High Level Officials Meeting	Joint Implementation Plan of Africa – Turkey Partnership (2010 – 2014)
2011	Istanbul	Africa – Turkey Partnership Ministerial Review Conference	Final Communiqué
2013	Addis Ababa	The Second Turkey – Africa High Level Officials Meeting	Review of the preparations for the Second Turkey – Africa Partnership Summit
2014	Malabo	The Second Turkey–Africa Partnership Summit	Malabo Declaration, Joint Implementation Plan of Africa – Turkey Partnership (2015 – 2019)

Source: compiled by author

19 Banjul Formula was adopted by the African Union in 2006 at its Summit in Banjul – Gambia. According to this formula, AU chooses 15 participants for the Summit.

20 For the official documents, please see <http://afrika.mfa.gov.tr/data/21-november-2014-summit-declaration.pdf> <http://afrika.mfa.gov.tr/data/turkey-africa-joint-implementation-plan-2015-2019.pdf>

It is a fact that there has been between Turkey and African countries a significant increase in the number of mutual visits since 2008 at the level of Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers. Especially, the most important characteristic of the official visits paid to the Sub - Saharan African countries is the fact that they were the first visits ever made to these countries at that level. The geographical location of African countries visited by Turkish officials shows that the African policy of Turkey is not confined to a certain region or a few countries but is spread to a wide area.

The increasing number of diplomatic missions between Turkey and African countries is indeed a substantial indicator of institutionalization of relations. Hence, each newly opened mission presents multidirectional opportunities for strengthening bilateral relations. Today, Turkey has 39 resident Embassies in Africa while 31 African countries have Embassies in Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, former Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, announced in a statement prior to his visits to Gabon, Nigeria and Senegal in January 2013 that Turkey intended to open Embassies in all African countries. Besides, Turkey has accredited some of its ambassadors to the Regional Economic Communities in the continent since 2005. Turkish Embassies to Abuja, Darussalam, Addis Ababa, Lusaka and Libreville are respectively accredited to the ECOWAS, EAC, IGAD, COMESA and ECCAS. In this context, Turkish Embassy to Gabone should also be accredited to the SADC.

Although the increasing number of diplomatic missions of Turkey in Africa is a positive development, it is yet too early to conclude that newly opened Embassies are fully operational. In fact, most of these missions are at the present understaffed. Similarly, a frequent update of web pages of Turkish Embassies in Africa remains as a significant need.

Communication between Turkey and Africa has considerably developed over the last years. In fact, transportation has become easier and costs have decreased, following the inauguration of direct flights. Turkish Airlines is planning further growth in Africa in 2015 with new destinations. Turkish Airlines has already the largest network in Africa among foreign carriers; overtaking Air France and Emirates Airlines, it has added a staggering 25 African destinations to its network over the last three years. By

the end of 2015, Turkish Airlines will have at least 45 destination lines in Africa.²¹ While North Africa continues to be predominant, Turkish Airlines has also established a large presence in Sub - Saharan Africa.

In addition to bilateral contacts, Turkey also hosts or co-chairs numerous international conferences which also concern African countries. For example, "The 5th World Water Forum", which was attended by 33,000 persons from 192 countries, was organized in Istanbul on 16-22 March 2009.²² Turkey also hosted "the 4th UN Least Developed Countries (LDCs) Conference" on 9-13 May 2011.²³ During that conference, Turkey pledged to spend \$200 million annually for the world's LDCs.²⁴

In addition to these events, Turkey co - chaired with Egypt the "International Donor Conference for Reconstruction and Development of Darfur" in Cairo on 21 March 2010 and hosted the Istanbul Conferences on Somalia in 2010 and 2012. Turkey also hosted direct talks between the leaders of Somalia and autonomous Somaliland on 13 April 2013, as a result of which the leaders signed a memorandum of understanding and engaged in future talks. In this regard, Turkey has been solicited as a mediator between Somalia and autonomous Somaliland. Last year, Turkey also brought together the representatives of Somalia diaspora, holding the Global Somalia Diaspora Conference in Istanbul on 21 - 22 June 2014.

Turkey has been exerting great emphasis to the Somalian question, which guaranteed the country a lot of prestige in the African continent.²⁵ Turkey has unilaterally taken a nation - building approach. It decided to rebuild infrastructure, provide financial infusion into local economies, improve

21 CAPA Centre for Aviation, "Turkish Airlines will add six new destinations for Africa in 2015, for a total of 48 cities", 24th December 2014, <http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/turkish-airlines-will-add-six-new-destinations-for-2015-in-africa-for-a-total-of-48-cities-202922>

22 <http://www.worldwaterforum5.org/>

23 <http://ldc4istanbul.org/>

24 Ufuk Tepebaş, *Dönüşüm Sürecindeki Sahra altı Afrika: Kalkınma, Güvenlik & Ortaklık*, Istanbul: Tasam Publications, 2013, p. 339

25 Paulo Fagundes Visentini, "Africa and the Emerging Powers: the South and the Unholy Cooperation", *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations*, (p. 41 - 67), v.3, n.5, Jan / Jun. 2014

housing and healthcare, produce jobs for local, and build capacity for sustainable growth by providing scholarships.²⁶

Somalia receives more assistance from Turkey than other African nations. However, Somalia has greater expectations from Turkey and this constitutes a risk for Turkey. If the Somalia high expectations are not moderated and if Turkish government is unable to expand its relief and development assistance to peaceful regions, the Turkey–Somalia partnership could be strained.²⁷ Somalia’s clan structure and its complicated political dynamics pose other risks for Turkey.

Peace and Security

Peace and security are sine qua non conditions for cooperation between Turkey and Africa. Especially, terrorism, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, illegal migration, human trafficking and money laundering have been identified as common security threats.

Turkey is currently providing police personnel and contributing financially to six UN peacekeeping missions in the continent such as MINUSMA (Mali), MONUSCO (DR Congo), UNAMID (Darfur), UNMIL (Liberia), UNMISS (South Sudan), and UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire).²⁸ Turkey is also contributing financially to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Turkish navy has been participating in counter - piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia for the last five years.

NATO member Turkey’s rising role in Somalia and its support to the AMISOM draw attention. Al Shabaab terrorist organization targeted Turkish officials in Somalia by carrying out several suicide attacks against Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu on 27 July 2013, Turkish Airlines team on 27 May 2014, and

26 Abubakar Arman, “Will Turkey Help Somalia Scratch its 21 – Year Itch?”, Think Africa Press, 29 May 2012, <http://thinkafricapress.com/somalia/turkey-somalia-21-year-itch-istanbul-conference>

27 International Crisis Group, Assessing Turkey’s Role in Somalia, Africa Briefing No:92, 8 October 2012

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/b092-assessing-turkeys-role-in-somalia.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/b092-assessing-turkeys-role-in-somalia.pdf)

28 For more detailed about the United Nations peacekeeping operations, please see <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>

a Turkish delegation at a hotel in Mogadishu on 22 January 2015. After the attacks, Turkish government emphasized that there will be no change in its policy towards Somalia.

Turkey is on a major migration route and illegal migration forms an integral part of bilateral relations with Africa. The world cannot expect people to sit patiently in condition of poverty, oppression, insecurity and lack of opportunity, especially now that the global media have made them so aware that a better life is available in other countries.²⁹

From this fact, every passing year, more African citizens have been migrating to Turkey. Generally the final aim is to arrive in Europe via Turkey, but a part of immigrants see Turkey as final destination. Particularly Istanbul hosts a community of African refugees, with the majority comprising Somali natives.³⁰ In this regard, local governments should put it on the agenda, because they have not yet any information or statistics about immigrants. From the local governments' perspectives, it is possible to cooperate with non-governmental organizations and international specialized agencies such as IOM and UNHCR.

Commercial and Economic Relations

While the opportunities provided by Africa address wider masses every passing day, they also encourage entrepreneurs in search of new markets. Turkey, with its dynamic economy, foreign trade experience and knowledge, displays complementary features for African economies.

Although Africa is especially among target markets for small and medium sized Turkish enterprises, it now transformed into a market that also attracts large-scale enterprises. Furthermore, in addition to being a lively export market for Turkey, Africa also provides cheap raw materials for Turkish industry.

29 Tom Wheeler & Donna Wyckoff – Wheeler, "What can Turkey and Turkish Civil Society do to support Civil Society in Africa?" in *Turkish and African Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): Cooperation and Development*, (p.285-293), Ed. Ufuk Tepebaş, Istanbul: Tasam Publications, 2009

30 Hannah Tayson, "Somali Refugees Find an Unlikely Home in Istanbul", *Inter Press Service News Agency*, 29 July 2014, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/07/somali-refugees-find-an-unlikely-home-in-istanbul/>

In this respect, efforts made during the last decade were successful and gave hope for the future. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the fact that there is still a long way that Turkey should undertake in Africa should not be neglected. As a matter of fact, Turkey has, as of today, Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with only four countries in the continent. These countries are Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritius. On the other hand, negotiations with Ghana, Sudan, Seychelles, Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon are continuing.

African countries wishing to establish local industries and produce basic food and consumption goods do not have a favourable opinion of FTA's with the thought that they may have an adverse effect on national development efforts. For this reason, FTA negotiations should rather be conducted with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS and SADC.³¹

On the other hand, Joint Economic Commissions were set up by the means of signing "Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreements" with 37 African countries until today. In addition to that, "Agreements on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments" as well as "Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreements" were concluded by Turkey with 12 and 7 African countries respectively. Details are indicated in the tables here below.

Table – 2: Agreements on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments

Algeria	Egypt
Ethiopia	Nigeria
Morocco	Senegal
Republic of South Africa	Sudan
Cameroon	Tanzania
Libya	Tunisia

Source: Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Turkey

31 Kenan Tepedelen, "Cooperation possibilities among Turkish Official Institutions and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and specialized institutes" in *Regional Organizations in Africa: Institutionalization and Cooperation*, (p. 101 – 103), Ed. Ufuk Tepebaş, Istanbul: Tasam Publications, 2009

Table – 3: Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreements

Tunisia
Algeria
Egypt
Sudan
Morocco
Republic of South Africa
Ethiopia

Source: Revenue Administration

Business umbrella organizations or associations such as Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) and Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM) organize each year business events and aim to draw attention to existing opportunities in the African continent. In addition, there are twenty bilateral business councils within the framework of DEIK.³² While TUSKON³³ organizes business events under the title of Trade Bridge, South African Turkish Business Association (SATBA), affiliated to TUSKON, aims to enhance business relations between South Africa and Turkey.³⁴

As mentioned above, Turkey has been trying to improve its communication network with the whole of African continent. The increasing number of direct flights between Turkey and African countries provides easy, cheap and fast transportation and enhances business relationships, in addition to the opportunities for tourism. Today Turkish Airlines is one of the major foreign carriers for tourism industry in Africa. A similar approach should be developed in maritime transport services, because it accounts for 92 – 97% of Africa’s international trade.³⁵ Thirty – eight African countries are either coastal or island states while fifty – four of its over 100 port facilities handle containers and various forms of cargo.

32 For more detailed information, please see <http://en.deik.org.tr/#>

33 <http://www.tuskon.org/?lang=en>

34 <http://satba.org/>

35 Economic Commission for Africa, *Accelerating Regional Integration in Africa*, 2004

As of today, Egypt is the country which attracts Turkish investments most. Other North African countries such as Morocco and Tunisia have also a big share in Turkish investments. On the other hand, countries such as Ethiopia, South Africa and Sudan rank high in Turkish investments in Sub – Saharan Africa.

Although Egypt is the first example in Africa of Free Zones established and operated by Turkish investors, efforts are being made currently to extend this model to Ghana, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Sudan. Free Zones will certainly be an important incentive for Turkish investors.

Turkish small and medium sized enterprises are among the leading suppliers of African market. This is due to the fact that the prices of goods of Turkish origin are more competitive, in comparison with Western products. Thus Turkish products have a favourable image in the African market in terms of quality / price.

Africa started to have a significant place in the growth strategy of many Turkish companies, especially the majority of the companies operating in the Sub - Saharan Africa market which are trying to catch up. Nevertheless, language problems, lack of qualified labor force, security, double taxation, high transportation costs, bureaucracy and corruption have adverse effects on Turkish investors as well as the others.

Although small and medium scale enterprises represent nowadays the majority of Turkish companies operating in Africa, investments are also being initiated by some large scale enterprises. For instance, in 2011, Arçelik A.Ş., a manufacturer of durable goods, purchased South Africa's Defy Appliances for \$324 million and became one of the most significant Turkish investors in the continent. Yapı Merkezi, a contracting company, won a major railway project tender of \$1.7 billion value in Ethiopia.³⁶ Enhanced business relations between Turkey and Africa led also to know-how sharing, Turkish investors considering Africa as a long – term partner.

Turkey's trade relations with Africa have shown a remarkable development over the last years. Especially, the rising trend with Sub – Saharan Africa is noteworthy. The trade volume with the region which amounted to \$1.3 billion in 2003, reached \$8.2 billion in 2014. The overall trade volume

³⁶ Ufuk Tepebaş, *Dönüşüm Sürecindeki Sahra altı Afrika: Kalkınma, Güvenlik & Ortaklık*, İstanbul: Tasam Publications, 2013, p. 353 - 354

with the whole of African continent exceeded \$23.4 billion in 2014, Turkey having registered a trade surplus of more than \$4.1 billion. While Egypt appears to be the biggest trading partner of Turkey in Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia figure among the other major trading partners.

Table – 4: Trade between Turkey and Africa (2003-2014 / US Dollar)

Period	Export	Import	Volume	Balance
2003	2.128.558.625	3.338.423.713	5.466.982.338	-1.209.865.088
North Africa	1.574.315.810	2.518.660.413	4.092.976.223	-944.344.603
Sub - Saharan	554.242.815	819.763.300	1.374.006.115	-265.520.485
2014	13.764.793.427	9.680.642.372	23.445.435.799	4.084.151.055
North Africa	9.766.327.405	5.468.975.912	15.235.303.317	4.297.351.493
Sub - Saharan	3.998.466.022	4.211.666.460	8.210.132.482	-213.200.438

Source: Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Turkey

Egypt, Libya, South Africa and Nigeria will have a predominant role in reaching the \$500 billion overall foreign trade volume target set up by Turkey for 2023.

It would, however, be more realistic to define accessible goals in terms of trade volume, because in spite of the recent progress achieved, figures remain far behind the targets. For instance, during the opening speech of the 3rd Africa Foreign Trade Bridge in 2008, Kürşat Tüzmen, the former State Minister in charge of foreign trade, had announced that a \$50 billion trade volume with Africa was aimed for 2012. However, the figure for that year had been \$23 billion. On the other hand, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, former Prime Minister, had declared during his visit to Gabon that Turkey wished to reach a trade volume of \$50 billion with Africa by the end of 2015. It seems again that this figure will be out of reach by the end of 2015.

The Role of Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Turkish – African Relations

Cooperation does not solely depend on government policy. Civil society has also an important role to play, but this cooperation model must be de-

signed for mutual benefit. Lack of knowledge of each other is usually the greatest barrier to closer cooperation. Linkages at NGOs level, is the most appropriate method to overcome that barrier.

Turkey–Africa cooperation has, especially since 2008, been reinvigorated with the involvement of NGOs. The Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies (TASAM) African Institute has also organized the Turkish–African CSOs Forum on 14 – 16 August 2008 in Istanbul with the participation of Turkish and African CSOs from 45 countries and the participants agreed to establish a cooperation platform which is known as USTKIP (International Development and Cooperation Platform of Non-governmental Organizations).³⁷ While institutional co-operation among NGOs is desirable, it needs to be supported by a sustainable fund flow. On the other hand, for the sake of mutual awareness, more think tanks should focus on the continent and organize regular events.

Today, many Turkish NGOs play a key role in strengthening relations with African countries. In this context, many Turkish NGOs have strong ties with their African counterparts. These NGOs become effective through their successful activities on humanitarian assistance, but they also need to focus on environment, energy, peace and security. For instance, it would be beneficial for Turkish NGOs to communicate with African NGOs which are members to the African Union Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC).

Turkish universities and the media

Today, mutual lack of information poses a challenge in relations between Turkey and Africa. It is a fact that academic research in Turkish universities with regard to the African countries has not yet reached a satisfactory level. Despite the fact that scholarships are provided by the Turkish Government, the Association of Foundation Universities and the private companies, Turkish universities and academics are not familiar with Sub-Saharan Africa. Turkey does not have experts on African affairs nor do African countries on Turkey.³⁸ Limited number of academic publications

³⁷ For detailer information about USTKIP, please see <http://www.ustkip.org/en>

³⁸ Kieran E. Uchehara, "Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy Toward Africa" in *Gazi Academic View*, (p. 43 – 64), Volume: 2, Number: 3, Winter 2008

is being mainly prepared with individual efforts and do not lead to any comprehensive research.

Turkish universities should therefore improve the cooperation with their African counterparts. In this context, the steps to be taken may be summarized as follows:

- forming a data bank about the universities and think tank organizations of the African continent,
- creating mutual awareness between the parties,
- promotion of academic and student exchange programmes,
- publication of articles and reports on topics of mutual interest,
- exchange of publications,
- organization of workshops and conferences.

Also, Turkish investors in Africa should promote the collaboration between universities. This type of partnership model will encourage research activities and thus, investors can find a skilled workforce to meet their needs.

On the level of media, more work should be done to help each nation understands each other.³⁹ A Turkey – Africa Media Forum was held on 9 – 10 May 2012 in Ankara and the African Media Initiative (AMI) and Turkey signed on November 2012 a convention aiming at more collaboration between the two sides. In addition, Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) web and radio stations are broadcasting in African languages including Hausa and Swahili. Anadolu Agency, a semi – official Turkish news agency, opened offices in Cairo and in Addis Ababa.

Unfortunately, Africa is generally reflected to the public opinion by Turkish media as being a continent with conflicts, health problems and food shortages. As a result of a negative image about Africa becomes inevitable. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze African countries in a more objective manner and to include also success stories in the countries of the

³⁹ Adeleke Omitowoju, “Setting the Stage for Cultural Exchange” in the Role of Civil Society and Think Tank Organizations in Development of Turkish – African Relations, (p. 143-150), Ed. Ufuk Tepebaş, Istanbul: Tasam Publications, 2010

continent in order to eliminate such prejudices. If, one looks at Africa from a broader perspective, it will be possible to add positive concepts such as potential, development and partnership to the keywords of famine, disaster and conflict. Steps to be taken in this respect will support Turkey's Action Plan for Opening up to Africa and will make Turkey more visible by the people of Africa.

Conclusion

As a result of outreach policy, Africa has gained a new dimension in Turkey's foreign policy. Thanks to its active diplomacy carried out between 2005 and 2011, Turkey became a strategic partner of the African Union and it is being considered as an emerging power in Africa. In spite of this, it is yet early to say that Turkey has got a sufficient experience in the continent.

China, India, and Brazil's growing presence in Africa is another challenge facing Turkey in its relationships with Africa. Top three emerging powers have more comprehensive partnerships with the continent. Because of this reason, they can analyse better the needs of the African countries than Turkey.

Turkey and Africa have poor knowledge about each other and mental distance is seen as the main challenge in Turkey-Africa relations. Besides, there is no coordination among Turkish national actors. In order to develop its partnership relations with Africa, Turkey will need over the next years to develop a cooperation model with the assistance of national actors such as public institutions, the private sector, NGOs, universities and the media. In short, a genuine and effective African policy must go beyond governments and involve all socio-economic actors. In addition to that, Turkey will have to follow a sustainable policy for a real strategic partnership with the continent.

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Foreign Minister Mevlüt Cavuřođlu Awarded Seyfi Tařhan, President of the Foreign Policy Institute

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Cavuřođlu presented Mr. Seyfi Tařhan, President of the Foreign Policy Institute, with a plaque for his contribution to the Turkish foreign policy.

Speaking at the ceremony which was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 9, 2015, Foreign Minister Cavuřođlu stated that he was considered the duayen in the academia and that many had benefited from his knowledge and experience. Foreign Minister Cavusoglu reminded that in 1989 Tařhan was awarded with the Ministry's Distinguished Service Medal.



Seyfi Taşhan, Foreign Policy Institute and the Genesis of Think-Tank Culture in Turkey

Prof. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Prof. Ersin Onulduran

Alexander L. George, in his groundbreaking work *“Bridging the Gap”*, points out that *“top policymakers often operate with inadequate conceptual and generic knowledge of strategies they employ in conducting foreign policy and that such policies are often based on an inadequate image of the adversary. Not only do these gaps and inadequacies in the knowledge base for foreign policy need to be recognized, but remedial steps need to be taken”*.¹ The most significant remedial step, George suggests, is to bridge the gap between the two cultures of academia and policymaking, between scholarly knowledge and practical action.

There has long existed a significant divide between two different cultures of academia and government. The rift has been particularly palpable in the field of foreign and security policy that has been considered as “high politics” or “matters of state”, a domain, which should be kept “insulated from the advance of democratic accountability and detailed research”.² Policymakers usually believe that International Relations scholars are lost in abstractions and rarely prone to deal with actual situations. Scholars, on the other hand, complain that foreign policy practitioners are uncritical and they often rely too much on intuitive judgment and simplistic generalizations. Contrary to International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis, International Law is the only academic discipline in which there has been a meaningful interaction between foreign policy practitioners and scholars.

A pioneering bridge between policy practitioners and academics was first built in 1920 by the creation of the *British Institute of International Affa-*

1 Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993): 143-144.

2 William Wallace, “Between Two Worlds: Think-Tanks and Foreign Policy”, in Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, eds., *Two Worlds of International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1994): 139.

irs (in 1926, named *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*- Chatham House). It included a number of young scholars such as Noel-Baker, John Maynard Keynes, and Arnold Toynbee. The Royal Institute was an independent research and publication center, albeit funded by the government. It served as a model of foreign policy think-tank which inspired the creation of research centers in other countries, such as *The Council on Foreign Relations* in New York.³

In the Cold War, the East-West conflict made a large impact on American government, foundations and universities which established new research centers, promoting and funding strategic analysis and foreign and security policy research. The influence of academics on the evolution of nuclear strategy and military affairs in the United States was particularly impressive. The most significant contributions generated from civilian scholars such as Albert Wohlstetter, Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, William Kaufmann, Thomas C. Schelling and study groups organized in the new post-war think-tanks such as the *RAND Corporation*. In the 1950s and 1960s, they developed new strategic concepts and formulated policy recommendations which had a pervasive lasting and profound impact on nuclear strategy. They made clear the viability of various strategic options between surrender and mutual suicide. Their innovative ideas contributed to the smooth functioning of the nuclear balance of power and helped avoid dangerous escalation of superpower confrontation. This was an exceptional period when the gap between theory and practice, between civilian scholars and official practitioners was so successfully bridged. Nevertheless, the American experience with think-tanks has remained the most developed one compared to other countries. West European countries followed the American experience slowly. Turkey was even slower.

The first Turkish foreign policy think-tank was established in 1974 by Seyfi Taşhan in his business office in Ankara. Taşhan had begun the work by the publication of a quarterly policy-oriented journal "Foreign Policy-Dış Politika" at the end of 1971. "Foreign Policy-Dış Politika" had been quickly recognized by academia and diplomats and provided a medium for the exposition and review of Turkish foreign policy. In a period of two years, Taşhan's initial, but successful experience with the journal led to the creation of the Foreign Policy Institute (FPI).

3 ibid. 140.

It is noteworthy that Seyfi Taşhan, then a businessman and part-time journalist, had the foresight to set up a think-tank when the idea was relatively unknown in Turkey but where, obviously, a need existed. In an interview with Dr. Ersel Aydinli of Bilkent University conducted recently (February 2004). Taşhan has the following to say about his early career and aspirations:

... in 1971, with Professor Fahir Armaoglu, Professor Suat Bilge and the then head of the press and broadcasting department, Altemur Kilic, we decided to bring out the journal Dis Politika, Foreign Policy. So my career began with that one. But after a couple of years, I saw that a journal issued, published by a couple of people only, would not be heavy enough. It needed more background, like an institute behind it, to be effective and continuous. So I decided that an institute of foreign policy would be needed for this purpose. Since my business interests allowed me, I travelled to Italy, saw the Italian institute, in New York I saw the Council on Foreign Relations, then I tried to see what sort of an organization I could set up. I did set up, more or less by myself, the Foreign Policy Institute. In those days, of course, the official thinking was that foreign policy was a matter of the Foreign Ministry, not seen from outside of foreign policy affairs.

The FPI has been an extraordinarily bridge-building experience between the two cultures of academia and the policymaking world. In national and international conferences it organizes, it has brought together scholars specializing in international affairs and policy practitioners with a view to enhance prospects for a more effective two-way interaction and to improve the knowledge base required for more effective foreign and security policy. The Institute has greatly improved the quality of public debate on foreign and security policy. Seyfi Taşhan and other members of the Institute have worked to inform wider civil society through publications, newspaper articles and interviews in Turkey and abroad.

Seyfi Taşhan has worked in many research projects in cooperation with leading strategic thinkers in Europe and America. He has established personal and professional connections with prominent think-tanks and their members all over the world. For example, his friendship with the late Albert Wohlstetter enriched the research agenda of the FPI in the 1970s and 1980s. His untiring efforts have greatly contributed to the improvement of policy-makers' knowledge of Turkey's foreign and security policy.

The FPI has all the characteristics of an independent non-governmental think-tank. Its members pay attention to long-term trends in international affairs without, however, losing contact with actual day-to-day practice. It keeps a certain detachment from government and partisan political debate without, however, overlooking practitioners' views and suggestions. Its study groups are usually composed of academics, retired diplomats and generals, and members of the Foreign Ministry.

How successful is the FPI in implementing its stated aims? This is hard to measure. In times of need it has produced several reports and monographs that explained and attempted to act as a guide for the policymakers on issues of burning concern for Turkey such as the Aegean problems with Greece, the Cyprus question, Turkish American relations, and the EU. It is likely that some of this material found its way into policy papers and positions the Foreign Ministry has produced. Actually it is not terribly important that any given FPI position is translated into policy right away. What is important is that public debate focuses on the issue at hand and public opinion is formed, indeed, guided by the FPI pronouncements and publications. This is the measure of the effectiveness of a think-tank that we can refer to in our assessments. In this regard, we feel that FPI has excelled.

Since the early 1970s, the activities of the Institute have developed a pioneering understanding how academic research can benefit from the experience of policy community and how, in return, policy practitioners can make use of scholarly research. This trend, however, has remained uneven. A number of scholars in various universities such as Bilkent, Middle East Technical University, Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University, and Hacettepe University are involved in policyrelevant research and established useful connections with think-tanks in the US, Europe and many other countries including China through the FPI. On the other hand, however, the policy practitioners have been much slower and much less prepared in making use of policy-relevant academic analysis in policymaking and implementation.

Are there challenges that still need to be overcome? Yes, absolutely. In Turkey, unlike in the United States, think-tanks do not have a rich or even adequate endowment from which income can be drawn to conduct their affairs, publish the books and journals and organize national and international conferences. Some time ago, in a conversation, the then presi-

dent of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Ambassador Morton Abramowitz had said that his organization was not in need of fundraising as there was enough of an endowment set up earlier in the 20th century for them. Taşhan points this challenge out in the interview as follows:

... of course, funding is needed to organize your seminars, publications, and so on. Unfortunately, in this country, private people who make donations usually donate either for a school or a mosque, there are very few people who would donate for an institute that would do international analysis. The second tendency is that the government, rather than helping these institutes, would prefer to have their own establishments. We had this debate with the Foreign Ministry for a long time before SAM (Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi-Strategic Research Center) was created I said, there is one Institute here already, you can get what you need from this institute. But they wanted to set up their own institute...

Of course as this happens, the limited resources are diffused and much redundancy can occur. On the other hand, however, through the perseverance of Seyfi Taşhan and the dedication of the various people who have volunteered their time and brain power, think-tank culture in Turkey has taken root and the hope is that increasingly, as democratic institutions in the country mature and role differentiation becomes the norm in the foreign policy decision making process, the seeds sown by the Foreign Policy Institute will flourish into maturity, and thus yet another step will have been taken to “beat swords into ploughshares”.

