



# **DIŞ POLİTİKA - FOREIGN POLICY**

Biannual Journal of the Foreign Policy Institute

**Vol. XXXXV – No.1**

**2018**

## **Dış Politika Enstitüsü-Foreign Policy Institute**

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Published in August 2018

Publisher for Foreign Policy Institute: Seyfi Taşhan

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## **First Six Months of 2018 and Contents of This Issue**

Tensions in the international scene were not any less during the first six months of 2018. While Turkey was busy with snap elections both for the President and the Parliament on the same date, June 24th, (which was) brought forward more than a year, US President Trump was continuing to surprise allies and foes with his erratic and unpredictable ways in dealing with the many problems the world is facing. With a little bit of bullying he seems to be achieving his objective of imposing an “America first” ideology. Meanwhile, not only President Erdogan was re-elected for a five-year term and his Justice and Development Party won a slim majority in the Parliament, an executive presidential system was put into force as it had been approved at a referendum carried a year earlier.

### **Turkey Intervenes in Syria**

As the result of the terrorist PKK affiliated YPG (Syrian Kurdish Protection Units) expansion in Northern Syria which Turkey considered as a security threat for Turkey on its southern borders, the Turkish Army with assistance from the Free Syria Army conducted a military operation, “Operation Olive Branch” to prevent the terrorist penetrations into Turkey. The objective was to clear the Northwestern province of Syria, Afrin, from terrorists since they had forced the local population to flee the country. This will enable those who have sought refuge in Turkey to return to their villages. Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister of Turkey Mevlut Çavuşoğlu had agreed on a plan with the previous US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and later confirmed with the present US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo for a coordinated operation of US and Turkish Armed Forces to clear yet another region of Syria, Manbij of the YPG units. With some hesitations and delays Turkish Armed Forces have conducted several rounds of patrols so far to secure its implementation.

### **US Pulling Out of Iran Nuclear Deal**

As US President Trump’s earlier withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Accord, once again we have witnessed a demonstration of US unilateral-

ism with US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. It was part of President Trump's election campaign promises. Tension is high on re-imposing tougher sanctions on Iran into effect. The other signatories of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed on July 14, 2015 by 5 UN Security Council permanent members plus Germany to curb Iran's nuclear enrichment program have tried to persuade US to the contrary without success.

## **US Embassy Moves to Jerusalem**

Ignoring the UN General Assembly resolutions, the US has moved its Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem which has been an action as an attempt to alter the internationally recognized status of Jerusalem. This has resulted in mass demonstrations and unfortunate deaths of Palestinians protesting and emboldened Israel to continue its provocations and distancing itself from a two-state solution without much reaction from the outside World, let alone from friends of Palestine

## **Recent Elections**

Parliamentary elections were held in Iraq in May with a very low turnout and highly disputed result where Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's populist coalition was leading. However, as the result was disputed the Parliament passed a law ordering a nationwide manual recount of the votes. The result has not yet been announced, nor a new government is formed.

On the other hand, President Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt was sworn in on June 2nd for a second four-year term again after an election with very low (41%) turn out, but an astounding (97%) support of those voting.

Further away from the region, Mexico under pressure from US President Trump since he took Office had a Presidential election resulting in a landslide victory for the leftist candidate Andres Manual Lopez Obrador which may not necessarily make it easier for the US to handle.

## **Tension in the Far East**

South Korean President Moon Jae-in wisely utilized the winter Olympics in South Korea to defuse tension with North Korea which had been testing

its long-range ballistic missiles and threatening nuclear war. He met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on April 27th paving the way for US President Trump to meet him at a Summit in Singapore on June 12th. Again with Chinese back scene role, US President reached an agreement with the North Korean leader that the two countries will make efforts to build a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will work toward denuclearization of the peninsula, will dismantle missile testing sites, will commit to the recovery and repatriation of the remains of American prisoners of war and soldiers missing in action in North Korea. While South Korea was taken by surprise, US unilaterally suspended annual military exercises with South Korea to defuse tension.

### **America's Trade War**

Summitry did not produce similar lowering of tension when the G7 countries met in Quebec, Canada just after US President Trump had announced new tariffs on steel and aluminum. On the contrary, the result demonstrated clearly the rift between US and the rest when it came to economic issues. Moreover, it is no secret that President Trump prefers to tackle contested issues in one on one basis rather than in a multilateral manner.

### **Ambiguities in US Security Strategy**

NATO Heads of State and Government met in Brussels on 11 and 12 July. As US President Trump is of the opinion that the US has been exploited by its allies, one wonders with US military initiatives in the Balkans and the Gulf region, as well as in Syria if US has different motives to reduce the burden of its transatlantic commitments and is pursuing security arrangements with limited scope and space, thus fragmenting the existing security structures and disregarding allies of many decades.

### **Turkey's Relations with the EU**

When Turkey was busy with its elections not much happened in its relations with the EU and Austria assuming term presidency of the Union, nothing is expected to be achieved during the second half of 2018 either.

Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz is himself known as a politician oppos-

ing Turkey's accession and as he is in coalition with the far-right Freedom Party it makes it even more difficult to hope for a new impetus.

### **Obstacle Removed from "Macedonia"**

Greece has agreed to remove the obstacle it has managed to maintain for the past 27 years on Macedonia's international relations. Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Macedonia's Prime Minister Zoran Zaev agreed to end this dispute with Macedonia changing its name to "Republic of Northern Macedonia". However, both in Greece and in Macedonia there were demonstrations against the agreement. As Greece has a province with the same name in the North which they claimed could be exploited by an independent neighboring country with territorial ambitions and as a result Macedonia was forced to assume the title FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in its international relations. Turkey from the very beginning did not utilize this strange title for the state and many others gradually started using this short version. But Macedonia's hopes to become a member of NATO and start accession talks with EU could not be realized because of the Greek adamancy.

### **EuroMeSCo Conference in Rabat**

EuroMeSCo (Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission) which is a network of think tanks from the region was initiated after the pronouncement of the Barcelona Process in 1996 organizes annual conferences to discuss recent developments in relations between the countries in North and South of the Mediterranean. Turkish Foreign Policy Institute is one of the founding members of the network now expanding to 32 countries and over a hundred think tanks. This year's conference was held in Rabat, Morocco on 12th and 13th of July. The title was "Changing Euro-Mediterranean Lenses" focusing on how recent developments in Europe affect the southern shore of the Mediterranean and more generally the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Not only the state of Europe and its impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations was discussed, working groups debated subjects such as "the Eastern Mediterranean: new dynamics and potential for cooperation", "the future

of EU-Tunisia partnership”, aftermath of elections in Turkey, EU policy response to migration, new governments in Spain and Italy, latest developments in Syria. There were also working sessions debating if Europe was exporting instability to the southern Mediterranean, if Europe was a priority for southern Mediterranean partners and how to re-vitalize Euro-Mediterranean relations.

The working group discussing the new dynamics and potential for cooperation in Eastern Mediterranean was of interest for many participants from Turkey. Focus was on the opportunities provided with the discovery of off-shore natural gas resources in the region. While there was an array of optimism in the presentations, some pointed out at the unresolved conflict between Israel and Palestine, as well as the negotiations which have not reached a positive conclusion aimed at establishing a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could be hindrance for establishing a bright future as portrayed and should not be overlooked when assessing the potential for future. The tendencies for usurpation of rights of others’ resources was another factor for pessimism. Moreover, it was pointed out that the strategic interests of Turkey not only as one of the guarantors of Cyprus but also as a country neighboring the region sharing an overlapping exclusive economic zone should not be ignored.

Presentation of the situation after the elections in Turkey was made by Dr. Eduard Soler of CIDOB (Barcelona Center for International Affairs). As a new executive Presidential system as approved at a referendum a year ago was taking affect, many thought it may be too early to reach at conclusions.

### **Contents of This Issue**

In this issue of our Journal we have an article by President of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, Mr. Seyfi Taşhan on how Turkey has aimed at integrating with Europe. Another article by Ambassador Selim Yenel who was the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the EU in Brussels and later the Undersecretary of the Ministry for EU Affairs, in the article he contributed, deals particularly with Turkey’s present uncertain relationship with the EU.

As uncertainties are abundant in the international scene, the article by Başar Şirin is on German foreign policy in this time of uncertainty.

As interest in Turkey has been on the rise on how Russian diplomacy has recently managed to expand its influence in the region we have an article by Dr. Hasan Yükselen who focuses on Russian grand strategy, taking dramatic steps from the concept of “near abroad” to “far abroad”. And another article by Dr. Jale Akhundov which scrutinizes changes in Russian diplomacy with softer but more powerful results.

Moreover, we have a section, “For the Record”, where we have included the texts of the interviews given by Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey to Ms Laura Pitel of the daily Financial Times on May 30<sup>th</sup> and to Ms. Judy Woodruff of the Public Broadcasting Service on June 4<sup>th</sup> for those interested in the axis of Turkey’s foreign relations .

**Oktay Aksoy** / *Editor*

# De Facto Integration of Turkey with Europe

**Seyfi Taşhan<sup>1</sup>**

The foundation of modern Turkey after the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire had for itself several objectives, among which security and modernization efforts were the most important ones. The new republic in its modernization efforts wanted to create a state based on European values and systems. Roman law based systems were adopted. The political system was similar to European ones. Secular educational establishments were transformed basing itself on French models. Arab alphabet was discarded and Latin alphabet was introduced instead. Turkey's reforms meant a serious turn back from Middle East to Europe.

Atatürk, great leader of Turkey, established the state system that would allow transition to modern democracy as soon as international and domestic conditions permitted. The Italian and German dictatorships posed threats to the integrity of young Turkish Republic. This situation did not permit Turkey to engage in full democratic practices, even though an unsuccessful attempt was made in 1930.

After the end of the Second World War, it was time for Turkey to complete its transformation into a fully democratic system. This was both a requirement and a national choice. A requirement when perceived Soviet threat led Turkey to search support and alliances with Western victors of the War and the outcome of its national ambitions. In 1949 Turkey began to seek a place in the creation of an integrated Europe and a true alliance with the US. In 1949 Turkey was one of the founding states of the Council of Europe which sought greater political union among member states and became an effective guardian of human rights in the continent of Europe.

While Council of Europe covered membership of all Western European states, a new international effort led by Germany and France began to

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1 President of Foreign Policy Institute

search creation of a deeply and firmly united economic union. Thus this new creation was also an effective entity for Turkey to join and in fact Turkey applied for membership in 1959 and signed a partnership treaty in 1963 that would gradually carry Turkey to full membership. In 1973 protocols were signed defining the steps that would carry Turkey to customs union and hopefully to full membership. These steps were taken by Turkey and Europe even though Europe decided not to implement the articles related to free circulation of people. Never the less, a customs union was established after 22 years as foreseen in the protocols. Thus Turkey became the only non-member state that has acquired this status. Even though the same year, the EU Council had already decided not to grant full membership to Turkey in its summit meeting in 1995 in Madrid. Never the less, this decision was not much played upon when Customs Union was established in 1995 and candidate for full membership status was recognized in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit.

Eventually this led to the start of membership negotiations in 2005 on an open ended non-committal basis. EU had political and cultural barriers for full integration of Turkey. The main problem was the status of Cyprus and firm opposition of Greece to Turkey's full membership, as well as from Southern Cyprus which had become a full member in 2005. Turkey's zest to become a member state in the EU continued for a few more years and relations began to gradually cool. Developments in the Middle East caused new security problems for Turkey and membership with European Union was almost frozen even though Customs Union continued.

In the following years the situation in Syria and Iraq, southern neighbors of Turkey, became major security issues for Turkey, while the breakdown of the Soviet Union had gradually led Turkey to become a central power in the region. Turkey, thus, became a fast growing economic entity with probably the largest Turkish population settled in Europe. Turkey's new policies and approach to Islamic countries in the Middle East and beyond created new fears in Europe where nationalist practices were coming out openly against Turkey's full membership.

# The Uncertain Relationship: Turkey and the European Union

**Selim Yenel<sup>1</sup>**

In a relationship that spans more than five decades, it may be an understatement to say that Turkey – EU relations have always been controversial. Even in the best of times, nothing was certain. As we approach the middle of 2018, the situation is still not clear. Nevertheless, after the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Turkey we might have a better idea of where we might be heading.

If we go back to the beginning of the millennium, after a period of positive developments, which culminated in the opening of accession negotiations in 2005, soon afterwards the optimism started to fade. When Germany and France changed governments in 2005 and 2007 and as Cyprus became a member in 2004, the relationship turned sour.

The relationship is actually quite comprehensive, which is normal when it goes back to the early 1960's. Trade is always around 40 %. Investment from the EU is more than 70%. Turkey has been in a Customs Union for more than twenty years. Financial cooperation through the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) has contributed to hundreds of projects in Turkey. Dialogue at ministerial level in various sectors such as the economy, energy and transport have continued. Turkey and the EU have convergence on many foreign policy and international issues. There is strong cooperation on the fight against terrorism. Turkey participates in Union programmes and through the ERASMUS programme, there are thousands of exchange students between the EU and Turkey.

Despite all this intrinsic interconnectedness, the overarching issue is accession negotiations. Out of 35 chapters, Turkey since 2005 has been able

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1 Ambassador

to open only 16 chapters. The rest have been blocked due to political considerations, mostly due to the Cyprus question. The French obstacle has been relaxed after President Sarkozy left power. Nevertheless, as we write today, the accession talks are stalled and although the EU has criticized Turkey on the judiciary and fundamental rights, as well freedom of speech and rule of law, the EU refuses to open those chapters.

One of the strangest development in these relations was that at a time when Turkey was getting closer to the EU with the opening of the accession talks, the EU was distancing itself. Up until the end of 2004, Turkey along with the other candidates was invited to all the European Council meetings. In other words, Turkey was invited to the EU Summits. This abruptly stopped.

Although there were efforts to overcome the difficulties and a number of chapters were indeed opened even during the German and French Presidencies, the relationship cooled down for a long period. The process soon ran out of chapters that could be opened due to political obstacles. The Commission tried its best to change the situation by coming up with an innovative idea called the “positive agenda”. This proposal was accepted by Turkey as a means of overcoming the stagnation. This meant that talks could proceed at a technical level on the chapters, which would prepare Turkey for the day when the political situation changed.

There was some hope when the Commission and Council was renewed in late 2014. However, when Commission President Juncker announced that there would be no enlargement until the end of the current Commission’s mandate (2019), it stifled Turkey’s and the other candidates’ aspirations.

This meandering relationship found an opportunity to pick up with the migration crisis that shook the EU in the summer of 2015. With the Arab popular movements/revolutions spreading throughout the Middle East, the subsequent civil war in Syria brought in thousands of Syrian refugees fleeing the carnage into Turkey. As the numbers climbed up, Turkey along with Jordan and Lebanon bore the brunt of the thousands of Syrians escaping their country. Several EU officials would visit the camps in Turkey and applaud the way in which they were treated. EU financial contributions were heading towards these two countries as the EU said that Turkey was managing the situation very well all by itself.

Everything changed in the summer of 2015 when Syrian migrants began to cross over from Turkey to Greece and beyond to EU countries in waves. Turkey at the time was hosting around two million Syrians and when Chancellor Merkel announced that she could take in a million of them, the flood began.

As things were getting out of hand, the EU through the Commission reached out to Turkey. The EU was already facing a dire economic situation that began with the Euro crisis in a number member states. The year before Russia had invaded Crimea. Now, the EU was facing a new emergency not of its own making, which was exacerbating the already many challenges it was facing.

When President Erdoğan was on an official visit to Belgium in September 2015, he had talks with Presidents from the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament.

At these talks, the EU at the highest levels of its institutions, was asking Turkey to help manage this emergency. They offered among others, to speed up accession talks, provide financial assistance to the Syrians in Turkey, move up visa liberalisation and have more regular contacts at all levels. Turkey saw this as an opportunity to bring back the relationship to a sustainable level.

Thus, between September 2015 and June 2016 there was increased contacts at all levels between the two sides. One of the biggest changes was in the fact that while there was no invitation for Turkey to attend a summit with the EU for a decade, in just four months three Summits with all 28 members took place. Such was the situation that the German Chancellor and Council President Tusk visited Turkey several times and Chancellor Merkel even came to the Turkish Permanent Delegation in Brussels to reach a deal with the Turkish Prime Minister to resolve this matter.

The Statement of 18 March, as it is called, on Turkey's insistence was not solely focused on migration but comprised an extensive variety of areas for cooperation. The result is a mixed picture. With regard to curbing the movement of illegal migrants the deal that was achieved had been criticised by certain groups as being immoral or/and unethical, if not unlawful. Nevertheless, it succeeded in curtailing the outward flow, as according to the deal all those who left Turkey, irrespective of their origin would be

taken back by Turkey. Yet, most importantly, as the numbers dropped dramatically, lives that were in peril, were now being saved.

As Turkey was honouring its commitments, the EU has not been able to deliver on most of its promises. Although two chapters (that had been previously blocked by France) have been opened and some preparation on others took place, the obstacle brought on by the Cyprus problem remained. Financial assistance for the Syrian refugees have been slow in dispersal. The voluntary resettlement scheme, which was supposed to begin once the irregular crossings ended or were substantially and sustainably reduced, has not begun although more than two years have passed.

Furthermore, although the two sides had agreed to upgrade the Customs Union so that it would include services, public procurement and agricultural goods, talks have not started. Even though there was an agreement to start negotiations by the end of 2015, the Commission asked the Council for a negotiation mandate only at the end of 2016.

There is an unfortunate myth that Turkey is holding the EU hostage over the migration issue. This is far from the truth. Yet, this view continues to be mentioned in many think tanks or meetings regarding Turkey. Turkey was and is proud to accept not thousands but millions of Syrians fleeing the civil war in their country. This in contrast to what we witness in many EU members on taking in the migrants. The so-called “threat” of “using” the migrants as leverage was never the case.

While the Statement of 18 March was seen as a watershed in our relations, the failed coup attempt of 15 July created a negative effect. On the Turkish side, the impression was that the EU did not provide sufficient solidarity with Turkey. The first high-level visit from the EU came after about two months by the President of European Parliament. The initial support by some EU leaders seemed lukewarm.

Turkey’s measures to those who took part in the coup or supported the Gülenist terrorist organization was seen by the EU as too harsh. The European Parliament went so far as to call for halting the accession talks. The two sides were now in freefall, which increased with the tough rhetoric in the preceding weeks before the Constitutional referendum in Turkey, as well as in some EU countries where elections took place.

In short, 2017 became a problematic year with a number of EU countries.

Yet, when President Erdoğan went to the NATO Summit in May 2017, he met once again with Presidents' Juncker and Tusk. The EU provided a road map, which was mostly about dialogue and meetings. The idea was that it would culminate with a Turkey – EU Summit. As the Bulgarian Presidency approached, the Bulgarian Prime Minister suggested that it take place in Varna instead of Brussels. Turkey wished to put aside past problems and have a fresh start with the Summit. Turkey even produced a draft statement similar to the one on 18 March. The goal was to revitalize Turkey-EU relations.

While we were trying to put the relations back in order, the European Commission was outlining its position towards the Balkan countries. They produced a Strategy paper in which although the candidates were not ready neither politically nor economically for membership, the EU declared that their path was clear and would do everything in its power to help them achieve this goal. In addition, it gave a tentative date, 2025 for possible membership. Turkey never got such a positive message from the EU even in the best of times.

For Turkey, the most important aspect remains an active and credible accession process. Turkey has always pointed out that the accession process is the most suitable framework for promoting EU-related reforms such as rule of law and fundamental freedoms in Turkey.

Accession talks, which have been in limbo since June 2016, should be re-activated. The EU had promised to prepare at least five chapters according to the Statement. This work is still pending.

Turkey also reminded the EU that the Statement of 18 March 2016 proved itself effective to tackle mass arrivals into the EU and resulted in a sharp decrease of numbers of deaths/missing persons and gave asylum seekers a safe and legal pathway while curbing irregular migration. Turkey insisted at the Summit that as the irregular crossings through the Aegean Sea to the EU had decreased substantially, the EU should fulfil its commitments by activating the Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme.

While Turkey continued to provide massive humanitarian aid by hosting nearly 4 million refugees, 3.46 million of which are Syrians, the EU was expected to complete the disbursement of the remaining amount of the initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey

(FRIT). Talks concerning the additional 3 billion euros have begun and Turkey insisted that the experience of the first disbursement should be taken into account. Turkey wishes that the financial contribution should be disbursed directly rather than through international organizations.

Given the unfortunate fact that the effects of the migration crisis will probably continue in the coming years, Turkey also proposed that the EU continue to provide additional funds of an appropriate amount within the framework of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey.

Turkey underlined the need to deepen Turkey-EU economic integration through the modernisation and upgrading of the Customs Union for the benefit of both sides. In this regard, the negotiations should start as soon as possible.

One of the most significant and concrete aspects of Turkey's relations is about abolishing visa requirements for Turkish citizens traveling to Schengen countries. Turkey completed its work on the remaining benchmarks in the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue initiated on 16 December 2013. Discussions with the Commission continue on these benchmarks and once the Commission gives the green light then both the member states and the European Parliament have to approve this decision. The prevailing political atmosphere in the EU is not the same as it was two years ago when the EU needed to manage the crisis. Thus, even if Turkey fulfils all the benchmarks, politics may interfere with progress in this area. Nevertheless, the EU should not change the goal posts if Turkey fulfils the benchmarks.

Turkey intends to continue high-level dialogues in areas of common interest like energy, economy and transport, which complement the accession process. The two sides are close on many issues regarding foreign and security policy. Turkey underlined the importance of demonstrating unconditional solidarity and taking concrete action against all terrorist organizations in line with international obligations.

Moreover, Turkey-EU Summits should be organised on a regular basis as agreed in previous Summits, rather than meeting only when the need arises.

This is what we envisage for the time ahead. However, the current situation is that the EU has sought to "punish" Turkey in what the EU perceives as a harsh reaction to the coup attempt. The EU has decided to curtail IPA

funds, prevent the Customs Union being upgraded, discontinued any preparation for the accession negotiations and slowed down the visa talks. This is the wrong approach. With this policy, the EU is pushing Turkey further away while on the contrary it should engage. The EU has the illusion that it has some leverage over Turkey. If the EU had solemnly promised Turkey an accession date, as it has done with Balkan countries, it would be a different story. However it has continuously postponed or stonewalled the most important aspect of the relationship, namely the accession process.

We understand that the EU is going through a difficult period. Too many crises' are happening all at once. Amongst these, Turkey regrets very much that the United Kingdom decided to exit from the EU. Even when governments changed, the UK always supported Turkey's membership aspirations. Ever since the Brexit referendum, the influence of the UK within the EU institutions has diminished. All enlargements of the EU can happen only with political support, and as Turkey faced strong resistance from several member states, the UK's departure has had an additional negative effect.

To sum it up, whatever result there is in the elections, Turkey intends to proceed in its relations with the EU in a stable and sustainable manner. It has been too long since we have had a regular relationship with the EU. We ask the EU to have a visionary approach but we understand that we may have to wait until the end of 2019 when the Council and the Commission as well as the European Parliament have new faces. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we should not do some preparatory work to that end. Turkey is more than ready. We hope the EU could respond to this call.



# It's Time to Step Forward: German Foreign Policy in Time of Uncertainty

**Başar Şirin**<sup>1</sup>

It was 2005, when prominent German historian Hans Peter Schwarz described Germany as “republic without compass” by referring inadequacy of German foreign policy strategy to answer uncertainties about the future of the EU, transatlantic relations and the newly emerging security problems both in Europe and the neighboring regions.<sup>2</sup> In the same year as well, Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) won the election with a very small margin and Merkel became Germany’s first woman chancellor.

As a successor of both domestically and internationally disputable political figure, Gerhard Schröder, Merkel had to face some serious foreign policy challenges as soon as the government was established. During the Schröder era, not only Germany joined country’s first foreign military intervention after the World War II with the 1998 Kosovo War and then in 2001 an out-of-NATO area intervention in Afghanistan, but also the biggest political crisis with the United States since the end of World War II, because of Germany’s decision to not join US-led Iraq War in 2003, were experienced. Therefore, when Merkel became the chancellor, Germany’s changing foreign policy had already been an important issue for both German politicians and academics.

The discussions about Germany’s post-reunification foreign policy has been shaped around two main camps. On the one hand, the more liberal *Handelsstaat* (trading state) approach proposes basically the utilization of trade as an instrument to realize foreign policy goals instead of military power by referring post-World War II foreign policy strategies of Ger-

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1 PhD Assistant

2 Hans Peter Schwarz, *Republik ohne Kompass: Anmerkungen zur deutschen Außenpolitik*, Berlin, Propyläen Verlag, 2005.

many and Japan.<sup>3</sup> In a more detailed way, Staack explains the concept of *Handelsstaat* as purposefully renunciation from foreign policy autonomy and embracing primacy of welfare optimization and using civilian methods to pursue national interests.<sup>4</sup> When the ratio of foreign trade to GDP is considered, therefore, importance of free trade for Germany can be understood better. According to Federal Statistical Office, this ratio has risen from 48 percent in 1991 to 84,4 percent in 2016, while Germany exported goods worth more than €1.1 trillion.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, for Stack, this foreign policy strategy works properly as long as the European Union keeps its unity and the United States does not withdraw from Europe politically and economically.<sup>6</sup>

On the other hand, the constructivist “civilian power” approach forms the other dominant foreign policy camp in the literature. As a partial successor of Peter Katzenstein’s “tamed power” concept, which offers the replacement of “power politics” in the German political vocabulary with the language of political responsibility and the “culture of restraint”<sup>7</sup>, Harnisch and Maull’s “civilian power” approach has been for a long time one of the most cited approaches in German foreign policy discussions. For them, civilian powers may be described as “states, which are willing to take initiatives and exercise influence over events, and which use particular strategies, means and instruments to achieve their objectives.”<sup>8</sup> This concept is shaped around five main principles;

- Efforts to constrain the use of force both within or between states through cooperative and collective security initiations,

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3 Richard N. Rosecrance, *Der neue Handelsstaat: Herausforderungen für Politik und Wirtschaft*, Leipzig, Campus-Verlag, 1987.

4 Michael Staack, *Handelsstaat Deutschland: deutsche Aussenpolitik in einem neuen internationalen System*, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2000, p.19.

5 Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, “Facts about German Foreign Trade”, Berlin, 2017, [https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/facts-about-german-foreign-trade-2017.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=6](https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/facts-about-german-foreign-trade-2017.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6).

6 Stack, pp. 542-543.

7 Peter Katzenstein, “United Germany in an Integrated Europe”, *Current History*, Vol.96, 1997, p.116.

8 Hanns W. Maull, “German foreign policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a ‘civilian power?’”, *German Politics* Vol.9, No.2, 2000, p.14.

- Efforts to strengthen the rule of law through multilateral cooperation, integration, and transfer of sovereignty,
- Promotion of democratic decision-making processes within and between states,
- Promotion of non-violent instruments of conflict resolution and management,
- Promotion of the social equality and sustainable development to legitimize the international order
- Promotion of interdependence and division of labor at the international level.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to those major approaches, Hans Kundnani's more recent contribution "geo-economic power" offers more political realist perspective. According to Kundnani, Germany lost its chance to pursue self-defined national interests and accepted the civilian power identity after the World War II. Also, thanks to European integration process, the post-war German foreign policy was shaped mostly within the European context. However, especially the changing world order, and newly emerging threats forced Germany to follow more autonomous foreign policy with economic means. However, this autonomy was not realized by leaving international organizations and cooperation behind. On the contrary, Germany aims to increase its influence in international arena by taking more responsibility. From that perspective, this approach possesses elements from both civilian power and *Handelsstaat* approaches. Unlike those approaches, however, it aims neither to civilize the international arena with only non-military instruments nor to give up from its sovereignty in favor of international trade system.

Even though the issue of the changing German foreign policy is still discussed academically, recent German governments also took steps towards the reconsideration of the traditional foreign policy praxis. In that sense, opening speech of former President Joachim Gauck at the 50<sup>th</sup> Munich Security Conference in 2014, in which he called for more German engagement

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9 Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns Maull, "Introduction", Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns Maull (eds.), *Germany as a Civilian Power?: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*, New York, Manchester University Press, 2001, pp. 3-4.

and for taking more responsibility in shaping international relations, may be seen the starting point for this process.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, German defense minister Ursula von der Leyen's words "to sit and wait is not an option. If we have means, if we have capabilities, we have the obligation and we have the responsibility to engage" explains Germany's news foreign policy perception in the future, while both Gauck and von der Leyen highlights especially the role of Europeans and the importance of acting together.<sup>11</sup>

After those initial signals, foreign ministry's first initiation, Review 2014, intended the reassessment of the foreign policy with the help of a working group containing many scholars, journalists, business and NGO representatives.<sup>12</sup> Following that, a more comprehensive work in 2017 with more than 150 experts from various areas, such as current President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Bill Gates, put forward twelve concrete recommendations to Germany;

- 1- "Assuming and living up to increased responsibility,
- 2- Demonstrating security and stability for EU citizens,
- 3- Recognizing Africa as our key neighboring region,
- 4- Prioritizing sustainability over economic development,
- 5- Stepping up efforts to fight global poverty and expand health care,
- 6- New approaches to food security,
- 7- Better evaluating Germany's activities,
- 8- Making sustainable urbanization a German key issue,

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10 "Germany's role in the world: Reflections on responsibility, norms and alliances", Speech by Federal President Joachim Gauck at the opening of the 50th Munich Security Conference, Munich, 31 January 2014, [https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Reden/2014/01/140131-Muenchner-Sicherheitskonferenz-Englisch.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile](https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Reden/2014/01/140131-Muenchner-Sicherheitskonferenz-Englisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile).

11 Speech by the Federal Minister of Defense, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen on the Occasion of the 50th Munich Security Conference, Munich, 31 January 2014, [https://www.securityconference.de/fileadmin/MSC\\_/2014/Reden/2014-01-31-Speech-MinDef\\_von\\_der\\_Leyen-MuSeCo.pdf](https://www.securityconference.de/fileadmin/MSC_/2014/Reden/2014-01-31-Speech-MinDef_von_der_Leyen-MuSeCo.pdf).

12 Rede von Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier anlässlich der Eröffnung der Konferenz "Review 2014 - Außenpolitik Weiter Denken", Berlin, 20 May 2014, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/140520-bm-review2014/262332>.

- 9- Boldly pursuing a new international finance policy,
- 10- Rethinking the way we deal with authoritarian regimes,
- 11- Structurally reordering foreign relations,
- 12- Investing more in our international responsibility.”<sup>13</sup>

Without a doubt, lack of realistic and clear foreign policy aims was one of the most important problems for Germany until recently. From this aspect, those recommendations may be seen as a valuable contribution. However, whether Germany has sufficient resources and instruments to realize those objectives is still a significant question.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, despite government's continuous efforts, the German public seems still unwilling to approve more military engagement. According to recent polls, while 62% of Germans disapprove stronger German involvement in international crises<sup>15</sup>, only 42% supports increase in defense spending in the coming years.<sup>16</sup>

In summary, although both governmental and academic level discussions are ongoing, it is clear that “more responsibility” will be the key term in those discussions. Besides, convincing German public for this increasing responsibility needs probably more time. On the other hand, thanks to ambitious French president Emmanuel Macron, Germany has a strong partner to act together. Probably it will not be so easy to find permanent solutions in a very short time, because of conflicting national interests and Eurosceptic tendencies in several EU countries but there are still some valuable proposals from both leaders, especially on three major foreign policy challenges, which may in the contrary case endanger not only German economic stability but also the whole European integration project.

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13 Wolfgang Ischinger and Dirk Messner (eds.), *Deutschlands Neue Verantwortung*, Berlin, Econ, 2017.

14 Wolfgang Klages, *Zeitwende: Strategie und Ziele deutscher Außenpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert*, Baden-Baden, Deutscher Wissenschaftsverlag, p.220.

15 ARD-DeutschlandTREND, “Finden Sie ein stärkeres Engagement Deutschlands bei internationalen Krisen grundsätzlich richtig oder grundsätzlich nicht richtig?”, 2017, <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/292766/umfrage/umfrage-zum-staerkeren-engagement-deutschlands-bei-internationalen-krisen/>

16 Stern, “Sollte Deutschland seine Verteidigungsausgaben in den kommenden Jahren erhöhen?”, 2017, <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/676259/umfrage/umfrage-zu-einer-erhoehung-der-verteidigungsausgaben-deutschlands/>

## 1) Transatlantic Relations

In Europe, no country other than Germany has profited from the post-World War II international order and transatlantic relations. As the guarantor of both Germany's external security and international open trade regulations, the United States played an indisputable role in Germany's post-war recovery. Almost 75 years after the end of World War II, however, German-American relations experiences a totally new period with the presidency of Donald Trump. In fact, as mentioned above, after Germany's decision to not participate Iraq War seriously deteriorated relations between the two countries. Unlike today, this deterioration took place particularly at the leaders' level and continued mostly on the personalities of then president George W. Bush and chancellor Gerhard Schröder, while at the same time lower level relations persistently continued.<sup>17</sup> Today, however, president Trump seems to be willing to completely reassess the American role in the security of Europe as well as the global trading system.

For military side, since the beginning of his election campaign, Trump emphasized his intends to radically change the burden sharing within the Western alliance. Unless the Europeans do not spend more money, Trump insisted, they could not rely on the United States.<sup>18</sup> Even if Trump have not taken any legal step in this direction yet, even this warning triggered European efforts in common security issue.

For the trade issue, Trump surprisingly justifies his new policies by arguing that the inequal balance of trade with countries such as Germany threatens United States' national security, because without a strong economy, having strong national security is also impossible.<sup>19</sup> Trump's subsequent executive orders on imposing steel and aluminum tariffs and proposed tariffs on imported automobiles forced the EU to take a step against the Trump presidency with similar economic responses, which may cause a trade war between in the future.

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17 Dieter Dettke, *Germany says "no": the Iraq War and the future of German foreign and security policy*, Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009, p.77.

18 "NATO Prepares for Trump Presidency", *Spiegel Online*, 16 November 2016, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/worry-grows-over-trump-threat-to-european-security-a-1121536.html>

19 Ana Swanson, "White House to Impose Metal Tariffs on E.U., Canada and Mexico", *The New York Times*, 31 May 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/us/politics/trump-aluminum-steel-tariffs.html>

In addition to that, two more foreign policy decisions of Trump, withdrawal from the 2015 Paris climate change agreement and the 2015 agreement on the nuclear program of Iran, concern the German foreign policy more directly. As German governments has traditionally supported civilian solutions as a primary method for solution of international problems, both agreements, in which Germany took a leading role in the processes, could be accepted as a clear sign of Germany's increasing role in the world politics and also as an evidence of taken responsibility to defend international law. However, Trump's recent actions against those agreements made German efforts substantially ineffective.

On top of that, after Trump's recent disinformation campaign to justify his refugee policy by claiming that the accepted refugees increase crime rates in Germany, German government and the public opinion showed their strong displeasure with the Trump government. So much so that, according to latest opinion polls, only 14% of the population see the United States as a reliable partner, while the other potential partners Russia and China have respectively 36% and 43% positive view from Germans.<sup>20</sup>

After seeing the early implications from Trump, chancellor Merkel declared already on March 2017 that Europeans needed to "take our fate into our own hands".<sup>21</sup> When the future expected steps from Trump are taken into consideration, Germany can and should no more depend on transatlantic relations. For some, Angela Merkel has already become the "chancellor of free world"<sup>22</sup> and now should take more responsibility. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, whether Germany has sufficient resources and instruments to take this role is still not clear. What is clear is that traditional wait and see policy will not be a solution.

French President Macron's proposal of European Intervention Initiative (EII), which aims to make the EU an efficient defense actor with the capability to move faster and to carry out more effective military operations,

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20 "Große Mehrheit: USA kein verlässlicher Partner", *ZDF Politbarometer*, 18 May 2018, <https://www.zdf.de/politik/politbarometer/grosse-mehrheit-usa-kein-verlaesslicher-partner-100.html>

21 Constanze Stelzenmüller, "Angela Merkel stretches out a hand to her neighbours", *The Financial Times*, 13 June 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/8ecbae4c-67e0-11e8-ae1-39f3459514fd>

22 "Chancellor of the Free World", *Time*, December 2015.

seems at the first stage as a very positive step. After signing of an intent letter, France, Germany, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, Estonia, Spain and Portugal are expected to take a part in discussions. Also allowance of the United Kingdom for full involvement after Brexit is very crucial step to increase military capacity of this initiative.<sup>23</sup>

In the long-run, an autonomous European arms industry and no dependence on the US companies are also expected thanks to no internal rivalries between the European companies, and new projects such as development of a German-French jet fighter.<sup>24</sup> At the same time, the ongoing Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defense (PESCO) project works with 25 EU members for mainly deepening defense cooperation in military areas such as funding, equipment acquisition, utilization and research<sup>25</sup>.

Against the trade policy of Trump, on the other hand, Europeans have not much to do, because a trade war between the United States and the EU, especially new tariffs on automobile exports, would damage the whole European economy. Therefore, rather symbolic responses against the United States and focusing on the protection of European producers may be the better alternatives.

## 2) Refugee Crisis

Without a doubt the on-going European refugee crisis is one of the major problems for German foreign policy, not just because the EU states failed to manage this crisis from its beginning and still could not find an EU-wide solution, but it has also a direct impact on EU countries' domestic politics with the rapidly rising populism and xenophobia. In that sense, the right populist party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) and its ever-growing sup-

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23 Daniel Boffey, "Nine EU states sign off on joint military intervention force", *The Guardian*, 25 June 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/25/nine-eu-states-to-sign-off-on-joint-military-intervention-force>

24 Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, "Eine Revolution für Europas Rüstungsindustrie", *DGAPstandpunkt*, No.6, Juli 2017.

25 European Union External Action Service (EEAS), *Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – Factsheet*, 2018, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en)

port in the German society threatens today both Merkel's 13-years leadership and the relations between the Merkel's party CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), which gradually loses its popularity in Bavaria to the AfD. On the other side, as mentioned above, effects of this crisis are not only limited with the domestic politics. On the contrary, as Merkel also declared, unless this "existential question" is not solved with EU-wide methods, even the very foundations of the EU, starting with the freedom of movement inside the EU, will be at stake.<sup>26</sup>

Despite the urgency of the solution, however, the EU countries are still far from finding a common solution. While Merkel basically calls for more border protection, a common EU asylum policy and more efforts for struggle against the causes of migration in origin countries, especially Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic reject all kind of solutions, which includes refugee quotas for member states. In addition to that, countries like Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands seek for a solution outside the EU borders by proposing refugee camps for rejected asylum-seekers outside the EU.<sup>27</sup>

A very clear result of the failure of EU refugee policy could be seen today in Italy. As one of the frontline of this crisis, Italy had to accept approximately 120,000 migrants in 2017, who arrived Italy by sea alone. Accordingly, lack of EU-wide plan to distribute those migrants within the EU countries and leaving Italy alone in this huge problem caused an election win for the populist *Lega* party, which used Euroscepticism and anti-immigration policies including mass deportation of illegal migrants as its main election strategy.<sup>28</sup>

Today, it is a crystal-clear fact that the Germany needs a better EU immigration policy. Chancellor Merkel accepts that the unforeseen conse-

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26 Joseph Janning, "An "existential question" for Europe – or for Merkel herself?", *European Council on Foreign Relations*, Berlin, 20 June 2018, [https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_an\\_existential\\_question\\_for\\_europe\\_or\\_for\\_merkel\\_herself](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_an_existential_question_for_europe_or_for_merkel_herself)

27 Alex Barker and Tobias Buck, "Merkel warns that EU is at threat from impasse over asylum", *The Financial Times*, 6 June 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/24f0f5b4-69b0-11e8-8cf3-0c230fa67aec>

28 Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Daniel Boffey, "Eurosceptic Italy in race to form majority government", *The Guardian*, 5 March 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/05/italy-turns-back-on-europe-as-election-points-to-hung-parliament>

quences of the initial “welcome culture” approach caused an unbearable burden in domestic policy. However, turning a blind eye to refugee crisis not only endangers the freedom of movement inside the EU, but it also severely damages the moral credibility of EU’s global policies on human rights advocacy. Therefore, Germany should take the leadership and find a solution both inside the EU borders, and in the refugee origin regions including eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East and the North Africa.

Against the problem, Macron seems once again as a very crucial partner for Merkel. Both leaders are willing to establish common European asylum standards together with better border controls and a possible European refugee agency, instead of failed system of forced refugee quotas.<sup>29</sup> Considering the deep divergence among the member states concerning a permanent solution, Merkel is not willing to take consent from the all 28 EU members. Instead of that, smaller bilateral and trilateral agreements appear as more reachable targets. After the success of EU-Turkey deal on migrant crisis, which reduced the number of people arriving from Turkey almost 97% since 2015, establishing screening centers in Albania for refugees following Balkan route or in Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Niger, Tunisia for refugees from Africa may contribute the solution in the short term.<sup>30</sup> For the long term, during the German G-20 Presidency initiated “Compact with Africa” program, which aims to bring together reform-minded African countries and to coordinate country-specific reform agendas in order to promote private investment in those countries, is an important step.<sup>31</sup> Especially with the help of partner organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, this initiative can contribute to a long term solution. Nevertheless, it is obvious that this initiative alone is far from providing a permanent solution for future refugee crises. Also, the refugee origin regions are not limited with the African continent. Therefore, Germany should continue to increase its responsibility to fight poverty and support sustainable development at the global level.

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29 Alex Barker and Tobias Buck, “Merkel warns that EU is at threat from impasse over asylum”, *The Financial Times*, 6 June 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/24f0f5b4-69b0-11e8-8cf3-0c230fa67aec>

30 Raf Casert and Lorne Cook, “EU papers over differences after ‘frank’ migration talks”, *The Associated Press*, 24 June 2018, <https://www.apnews.com/cf94f0b112bb4abbb1cf6ab5269ca278>

31 “G20 Compact with Africa”, <https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/home.html>

### **3) The Euro**

The third most problematic issue for Germany is the stability and the future of Euro. It is the fact that especially after the 2009 European debt crisis, Germany have stepped into the undisputable leader role with being the most powerful economy and key creditor in the EU. For some scholars, as a "reluctant hegemon", it was an undesirable result for Germany.<sup>32</sup> At the same time, some others see this hegemony as "embedded" one in the EU institutions. In other words, by taking active role in shaping EU regulations and institutions, Germany could establish a free trade environment and price stabilization system within the EU, which primarily serve Germany's national interest.<sup>33</sup> Whether reluctant or willing, that increasing leadership forces Germany now to find a comprehensive economic plan in order prevent future crises and to provide stability in the Euro together with considerable economic growth especially in the Southern Europe.

Italy at this point plays important role for the future of the Euro. Although the possibility of exit the Euro was brought into question by its new Eurosceptic minister of European Affairs Paolo Savona by describing the currency as "German cage", after the formation of the coalition, this issue lost its priority. Even so, it is still a fact that after launching of the Euro, Italian economy has been performing poorly as its real GDP in 2016 was at the same level with 2001. In fact, when considered the only 3% growth in the whole Eurozone since 2001, blaming the whole system rather than one country may be more logical. By taking away the necessary mechanisms such as interest and exchange rates from governments and not establishing new institutions to overcome economic problems, Germany and the northern European countries appear as the countries, which really profited from the Euro system.<sup>34</sup>

Five years after the agreement on a banking union, the plan still could not be realized, basically because of the German reluctance. However, Ma-

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32 William E. Paterson, "The reluctant hegemon? Germany moves centre stage in the European Union", *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.49, No.1, 2011, p. 73.

33 Beverly Crawford, "German power and "embedded hegemony" in Europe", Sarah Colvin (eds.), *The Routledge handbook of German politics & culture*, New York, Routledge, 2015, p. 338.

34 Joseph Stiglitz, "The euro could be nearing a crisis - can it be saved?", *The Guardian*, 13 June 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jun/13/euro-growth-eurozone-joseph-stiglitz>

cron's recent proposals to advance the reforms towards the banking union were welcomed by Germany. In fact, Germans have accepted for the first time macroeconomic stability is not only an issue of individual states, but a common concern.<sup>35</sup>

More recently, the European Commission has proposed a total of 55 billion euros to be used to support the reforms, convergence between economies and investment in countries experiencing financial difficulties. Both Merkel and Macron emphasized the need for such a bail-out fund. Nevertheless, Germany still insists this institution should mainly be an intergovernmental tool to strengthen budgetary discipline within the Eurozone. On the other side, Macron's proposal comprises a stronger EU institution, which also fight future Eurozone crises.<sup>36</sup>

As mentioned earlier, Germany's embedded hegemony concerning is still obvious concerning the reforms on the Euro. German government has resolutely resisted any reform proposals, which serve against German national interests. However, German decision makers should not forget that with great powers comes great responsibility and at least for keeping the legitimacy and the consent of the remaining members within the current system, which still works mostly in favor of Germany, more resources should be ready to spend.

## Conclusion

Germany's traditional foreign and security policy, which were shaped around the military protection of the United States and the EU integration process, does not match with the needs of today's changing world order. On the one hand, the United States is not a reliable security partner anymore and the international free trade system, which was established and has been protected by the US until recently, is purposefully damaged by a

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35 "A modest Proposal: France and Germany finally have a common position on euro-zone reform", *The Economist*, 21 June 2018, <https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/06/23/france-and-germany-finally-have-a-common-position-on-euro-zone-reform>

36 Guy Chazan and Jim Brundsen, "Merkel sets out views on eurozone reform", *The Financial Times*, 3 June 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/0b0bd67a-6706-11e8-8cf3-0c230fa67aec>

US President. On the other hand, the whole European integration process is threatened by rising populist and Eurosceptic parties all over Europe. Both the ongoing refugee and illegal migration crisis and the failure of the Euro to bring prosperity and solidarity to the EU are used by populist parties for spreading fear and gaining more votes from anxious citizens. Therefore, it is now time for Germany to reassess its whole foreign policy tradition, set realist goals and provide more resources to reach those goals. Failing that, Germany will have to face only more instability and uncertainty.



# Russian Grand Strategy: from 'near abroad' to 'far abroad'

**Dr. Hasan Yükselen**<sup>1</sup>

## **Introduction**

The crisis in Ukraine is accepted to mark the shift in Russian Foreign Policy in terms of its growing assertiveness without hesitating the use of force. Different from the previous examples observed in the 2008 Georgia Crisis, the means allocated to Russian assertiveness also underwent a significant change. Before 2014 while Russia was applying conventional forces to impose its interests and assertiveness, Moscow's means that were employed have changed to incorporate unconventional aspects to its conventional ones leading to call it 'hybrid warfare'. More striking is the fact that with the Syria crisis, Russia began to be more assertive to broaden its reach beyond its 'near abroad'. In fact, while the former represents a change in 'means', the latter represents a change in 'geographical reach'. And finally the meaning of these changes in terms of 'ends' is a question that needs to be clarified further to understand Russian intents for its future actions.

This shifts brings about the need to examine whether Russian Grand Strategy has undergone a major shift from 'near abroad' to 'far abroad'? This article is dedicated to analyze the question of why Russia has changed its engagement strategy beyond its traditional sphere of influence, called 'near abroad'? Is this a change from traditional grand strategy identified as the preservation of interests in its 'near abroad'? Does it mean more assertiveness or does it simply continuation of traditional foreign policy with a differing approach which can be defined as defend from depth?

In answering these questions, the contours of Russia grand strategy will be explored to provide a basis for further analysis. Then, the shifting dynamics of strategizing will be discussed to reveal the changing dynamics. In this part, it will be argued that Russian grand strategy has underwent a

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substantive shift leading to greater assertiveness. This shift, even though was perceived as the choice of Moscow, it will be suggested that the experiences has brought about the transformation in Russian grand strategy. Being experienced growing assertiveness of the West through infiltrating in Russia's near abroad, and Moscow's eventual inability to counter or prevent Western expansion led Moscow to defend its interest in near abroad by deterring the West in far abroad.

It will be argued that the strategic ends have not changed overtime, however, it can be suggested that the means employed to realize these ends has transformed to reflect the assertiveness and Russian adaptability to changing environments and conditions. Most notably, as a response to Western interference in its 'near abroad' Russian shifted its geographical space to include 'far abroad'. In this change, Russian believed that involving different regions might diffuse Western focus, and eventually will prevent concentration in its 'near abroad'. In other words, it was a move to divert attention of the Atlantic structures into different geographies and whenever suitable conditions evolved enabling positive strategic gain, Russia has not hesitated to exert its influence through a vast plethora of means.

## Contours of Russian Grand Strategy

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced major setback in its strategic reach which, in the end brought about the policy of 'near abroad'. Articulation of 'near abroad'<sup>2</sup> policy can be seen as a reaction to enlargement of Atlantic institutions into post-Soviet space. During Yeltsin era, Moscow retained the goal to be integrated into the West. However, debate of being "part of Europe or apart from Europe?"<sup>3</sup> highlighted the underlying structural factors that demand more substantial effort. Whenever, substantial efforts could not be introduced mutually, the outcome is inevitable furthering of division. The major difference in understand-

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2 Jonathan Valdez, "The Near Abroad, the West and National Identity in Russian Foreign Policy," in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (eds.), *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 84-110.

3 Vladimir Baranovsky, "Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?", *International Affairs*, Vol.76, No.3, 2000, pp.443,458.

ing between Russia and the West was in terms of the nature of this integration. Sakwa with a striking conceptualization of “enlargement and transformation”<sup>4</sup> sheds light on the differences that brought about incommensurability between the strategic ends of the two sides. Articulating irreconcilable strategic ends inevitably bring about diversion of the actors that are involved into the process. While the West with sense of victor of Cold War pursued the end of enlarging or projecting the values of ‘historic West’, Russia was keen to become part of the ‘greater West’, which can be regarded as the continuation of Gorbachev’s “common European home”, in which its identity and great power status was being recognized. Russia was perceiving itself not as a defeated nation in the Cold War, but the nation who ended it, leaving aside, making the Cold War antagonism irrelevant, or overcoming the question of victor-defeat dilemma. However, due to the contending approaches and perceptions, hence inability to overcome mistrust built during the Cold War fueled the irreconcilable ends.

In the early days, *Atlanticists* in Russia were eager to integrate into the ‘historic West’ to transform it into a ‘greater West’.<sup>5</sup> But, the Western reluctance to embrace Russia began to raise questions in Moscow, even though the will to be part of the West was still alive. The existing contending views could not be reconciled in the upcoming years, but deepened with subsequent developments. NATO Summits on enlargement starting from Brussels Summit in 1994, disregarding Russia’s will to transform NATO into a political organization, in which Russia would be an equal partner, and through which it is deemed to overcome old stereotypes and feed rapprochement, have fed distancing and drifting apart. Kozyrev, known as an *Atlanticist*, had once even stated that Russia sought NATO membership as ultimate goal.<sup>6</sup> However, NATO’s decisiveness to enlarge raised doubts in Moscow concluding the relevance of the first NATO Secretary-General Lord Ismay’s expression, stating that the aim of NATO is to get “Americans in, Russians out and Germans down.” Upon Western determination to enlarge NATO or Euro-Atlantic structures excluding Russia led Kozyrev and

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4 Richard Sakwa, *Russia against the Rest: The post-Cold War Crisis of World Order*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p.2.

5 Richard Sakwa, “Russia against the Rest...”, p.5.

6 Oksana Antonenko, “Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo”, *Survival*, Vol.41, No.4, Winter 1999-2000, (124-144), p.126.

Yeltsin to warn of a "Cold Peace"<sup>7</sup>. The suspicion on the Western interests and intents led to take preventive measures to limit the expansion closer to Russia and post-Soviet states. By claiming 'special rights' Kozyrev enacted measures to contain the Western expansion into the regions surrounding Russia. In articulation and implementation of 'near abroad' showed the old stereotypes couldn't have been overcome and prudent approach was kept in strategizing, despite the will to build constructive relations with the West.

Growing doubts and disappointment of Moscow led to renewal of foreign policy orientation with Primakov. Primakov's new doctrine of 'multipolarity' sought to overcome Russia's excessive orientation towards the West which is founded upon the belief that closer integration or partnership with NATO would eventually hinder Russia's strategy to develop itself into separate 'center of power in a multi-polar world'. The explicit outcome of this change was the foundation of Sino-Russian partnership, which continued to improve as Russia drifted apart from the West. Another important new element was Primakov's recognition that by 1996 NATO enlargement had become inevitable. In short, Primakov's efforts to 'keep damage at minimum', led to revision of Moscow's NATO policy from de facto boycott to renewed active dialogue accepting a limited engagement with NATO with the hope of maintaining some kind of leverage and influence.<sup>8</sup> However, Russia-NATO Founding Act of 1997 did not manage to last long as Kosovo intervention marked the end of this reconciliatory attempt between Moscow and NATO.

With Putin, Russia again tried to keep balance with NATO and overcome old stereotypes and mistrust once more. When Putin rose to power Russia still was dealing with Chechnya crisis which was sucking Russian energy, undermining Russia's intent to build equal relations with West, and causing questioning the effectiveness of Russian Armed Forces in dealing with new kind of threats. Putin's primary strategic end at that time was to restore domestic order that was threatened by separatist Chechnya, and to restore Russia's great power status. After the resolving the Chechen

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7 Andrei Kozyrev, "Partnership or Cold Peace?", *Foreign Policy*, No.99, Summer 1995, pp.3-14.

8 Alexander A. Sergounin, "Russian Domestic Debate on NATO Enlargement: From Phobia to Damage Limitation", *European Security*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1997, pp. 55-71.

problem in 2004, Russia focused on restoring Russia as a great power in a peaceful and cooperative environment which is conducive with that goal.

In the aftermath of 9/11 Russia extensively supported the US in the war against terrorism. This positive mood led to foundation of Russia-NATO Council in May 2002, which presumed to construct much better platform for cooperation. However, it is considered that Russia tacitly approved the inevitability of the NATO enlargement.<sup>9</sup> The positive mood left its place to another wave of suspicion with the big bang expansion of NATO in 2004 causing Russia to lose its leverage on Baltic States.

The second War of Iraq in 2003 was the second major cause of growing distance between Russia and the West. Particularly, coalition of willing led by the US intervened in Iraq with a justification of the continuation of chemical weapon program. However, in time it is understood that those allegations, upon which justification was built, was intentionally flawed to create legitimacy to intervene. Most importantly, starting from the crisis in Kosovo, the West bypassed international organizations, particularly the UN, for legitimacy but introduced coalitions to bypass international organizations and hence to legitimize their interventions by invoking 'humanitarian intervention' which Russia refused.<sup>10</sup> From the perspective of international law, what has been observed was the bypass of international law which led to the erosion of the international law that ensures some certain level of stability in international relations.

The West while continued to insist to install greater stability by expanding liberalism into the Russia's 'near abroad' and 'far abroad', in fact, triggered greater instability in the geographies they intervened confirming the dilemma of stability-instability. From a more objective perspective, it is obvious that none of the Western interventions, staged without UN mandate, provided stability. Interventions of Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011 rather than providing stability caused much deeply entrenched instabilities. Even, Kosovo relies on NATO's existence on the ground to prevent further eruption of outright conflicts.

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9 Richard E. Rupp, "NATO Enlargement: All Aboard? Destination Unknown", *East European Quarterly*, Vol.36, No.3, September 2002, (341-363), p.356.

10 James Hughes, "Russia and The Secession of Kosovo: Power, Norms and the Failure of Multilateralism", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.65, No.5, 2013, pp.992-1016.

While the developments in international relations created several occasions where Russia had been bypassed or discounted, the most substantive challenge that deepened the grievances between Russia and the West began to be experienced with 'colored revolutions' in its 'near abroad' together with the Western support to protests of 2011 parliamentary elections in Russia and with Western interventionism in 'far abroad' with Iraq War.

Russia was unwilling and reluctant to embrace the defeat giving that Russia believed that Moscow intentionally ended the Cold War, hence to acquiesce to Western expansion of liberal internationalism, of which, terms that was defined and imposed by the West. In fact, Russia rejected to renounce its great power status imposed on it, but instead, as a grand strategic end, sought the ways to resurge as a great power and regain its agential autonomy in the international relations. The mutually constructed suspicion inevitably brought about a security dilemma in which action-reaction cycle fueled the drifting apart and sharpening of foreign policy postures.<sup>11</sup>

### **Growing Assertiveness: from 'near abroad' to 'far abroad'**

The growing exclusion and disappointment eventually led to delineation of the division which in the end has fueled Russian assertiveness. This constant exclusion and disappointment not created Russian assertiveness by itself, but there were other factors that pushed Moscow to increase its assertiveness. Moscow's assertiveness can be seen as the accumulated result of these factors, and Moscow's adaptation to tackle with them. In other words, Moscow has revised its strategy to eliminate these factors which are becoming more threatening to its enduring strategic end defined as reacquiring great power status. Before explaining how Moscow revised its strategy and its scope, the reasons that led to this revision should be clarified.

Western unilateralism can be regarded as the main driving force behind the acts that distanced Russia from the West leading to growing asser-

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11 Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976.

tiveness. Russia from the very beginning approached cautiously to Western interventions to 'far abroad', while furiously to its 'near abroad'. The first one was the NATO's further expansion into 'near abroad' by discussing Ukraine's and Georgia's eventual membership. But, before Bucharest Summit in 2008, Russia particularly felt offended with the 'colored revolutions'.<sup>12</sup> This cycle started with overthrow of Milosevic in October 2000, known as the 'bulldozer revolution'. But, the most notable ones were the rose revolution of December 2003 in Georgia, the orange revolution of autumn 2004 in Ukraine, and tulip revolution of spring 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, all of which appeared in the 'near abroad' of Russia.

Putin's words, in his speech at Munich Security Conference in 2007, warning that the retreat associated with the Soviet collapse is over. Recognition of Kosovo's independence signaled that Moscow will start to revert the process and restore their influence which proved by the Russia's intervention into Georgia in August 2008, adding a new one to the frozen conflicts, underwent to keep them aligned with Moscow. In other words, until 2008, Moscow's strategy can be characterized as constant adaptation or reorientation to the changing conditions and expansionist efforts of the West, but, after 2008, a rupture replaced reorientation.

Intervention into Georgia, beyond being a response to the West, marked the growing Russian assertiveness, messaging that Moscow will intervene forcefully to restore its influence. As a respond to Kosovo's independence Russia recognized independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while overthrowing Saakashvili, who came to power with rose revolution. Russia viewed the colored revolutions was being orchestrated by West to promote Western interests at the expense of undermining Russia's interests in the 'near abroad' with the discourse of democracy. During the colored revolutions civil society is being instrumentalized to initiate regime change, installing regimes which are more prone to cooperate with the West. Employing civil society for strategic interests was seen as a new tool of a "newly militaristic, interventionist US geostrategy."<sup>13</sup> The 'reset' policy

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12 Vitali Silitski, "Survival of the Fittest: Domestic and International Dimensions of the Authoritarian Reaction in the Former Soviet Union Following the Colored Revolutions", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.43, No.4, December 2010, pp.339-350.

13 Thomas Carothers and Saski Brechmacher, "Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights under fire", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 20 February 2014.

designed to reestablish cooperative relations between the US and Russia in the aftermath of Russian intervention into Georgia, was once again dismayed with the Russian views that the protests of 2011 in Moscow against Putin and his party, United Russia, was backed by the US. Moscow this time faced similar attempt of colored revolutions on its territory aiming directly Putin, under the banner of 'snow revolution'. Clinton's words, "engaging constantly with the Russian people themselves,"<sup>14</sup> in his memoirs seems confirming Russian doubts about the goal of this protests.

While capitalization of civil society for regime change observed in 'near abroad' similar trend was observed with the Arab Spring which overthrown regimes in Middle East and North Africa. Particularly, the crisis in Syria was an outward erosion of Russian interests in 'far abroad'. Russia after 2011, intervened assertively and by use of both conventional and unconventional force to forestall the direction of developments. In Ukraine, upon Yanukovich's decision to suspend preparations for the implementation of an association agreement with the European Union, and eventual protests ended with ousting of Yanukovich. The protests soon enveloped the eastern Ukraine where Russophiles hold the majority who are in support of Yanukovich. Russian intervention to protect Russian population ended up with the annexation of Crimea. In that intervention Russia accused of waging a 'hybrid warfare', consisting of paramilitary and military units. But the most striking of this parlance is the use of 'hybrid warfare' concept to explain the actions of Russia to destabilize its neighbors, which was identified by Gerasimov in his well-known 2013 article<sup>15</sup> to identify Western involvement into its 'near abroad'.

The Crimean War represents how potential divide turned into an open actuality. The divide growing smoothly in the post-Cold War period that couldn't had been overcome leaving Russia as potential 'other' that is subjected to soft containment has left its place to open exclusion where is subjected to hard containment.<sup>16</sup> More bluntly, the Ukraine crisis removed to cloak and revealed how deep the grievances are.

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14 Hillary Clinton, *Hard Choices: A Memoir*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 2014, p.231.

15 What is known as 'Gerasimov Doctrine' to depict Western acts, was connoted as 'Hybrid Warfare' to identify Russian new type of warfare. Andrew Monaghan, *Power in Modern Russia*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2017, p.3

16 Richard Sakwa, "Russia against the Rest...", p.77.

After the Crimea, whether a new version of Cold War has already started began to be discussed widely. Even though, the new Cold War conceptualization is being used to represent the current level of relations between Russia and the West, there are other scholars that argue this conceptualization is misleading to understand the real nature of the problem, hence, to resolve it effectively. In fact, whether agreed or not, this discussion highlights the changing nature of the interaction between them. But, whether this observation refers to a change in strategy is another debate that will be discussed in following part.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, as the basic lines was summarized above, Russia maintained consistently one fundamental strategic goal of reassuring its great power status. However, in time, along with the experiences gained during the past twenty-five years has contributed to growing Russian assertiveness. Most importantly the geographical scope of Russian strategy underwent a significant change which also leads to suggestion that Russian posturing accompanied that change, but leaving strategic end as a constant.

When Putin came to power, his strategic end and statecraft aimed to avert disintegration at home and assert Russia's position abroad.<sup>17</sup> After resolving the Chechen problem in 2004, Russia refocused on rebuilding domestic cohesion of the society. But, the disappointment with the West led to adopt more assertive approach and change in strategy. It can be suggested that Russia pursued a defensive and reactive approach in the 'near abroad', but at the same time adaptive one. Whether, the new approach can be characterized as offensive in its nature needs further elaboration.

Strategy has three main indispensable and interconnected pillars (ends, means, and space) each of which determine the nature of the other two. In terms of means that are attributed in strategizing Russia rather than reinventing the wheel employs already experimented tools to respond to Western actions. In other words, Moscow employs the tools of the West that were tested on Russia to challenge the West.

The exceptionalism applied to Kosovo were copied in Georgia while recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and again in

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17 Richard Sakwa, "Russia against the Rest...", p.20.

Crimea. Significant difference is the way of seeking legitimacy through referendum which involves civil society. Again, the concepts that were developed as a source of legitimacy, 'humanitarian intervention' and 'responsibility to protect', were being observed in both Georgia and Ukraine. The colored revolutions, in which, civil society were instrumentalized as the primary driver of regime change, and which was named by Moscow as employing non-military means for political ends, was replicated in Crimea, but this time labelled as 'hybrid warfare' by the Western intellectuals.

One of the significant marker of the changing scope of Russian strategy in terms of space was the Syria crisis. Russian intervention was based on the Western way of legitimizing through a counter terrorism narrative. Furthermore, Moscow's legitimacy was further supported by the invitation of Damascus regime, which significantly raised the question of legitimacy of the coalition intervention into the soils of a sovereign state. In that sense, soft containment that was enforced with Western engagement through NATO enlargement and colored revolutions in the post-Soviet states, was mirrored with Russian engagement abroad, particularly where the Western policy suffered and criticized with ineffectiveness in terms of maintaining security such as Afghanistan. Furthermore, Russia being aware of its shortcomings in means at its disposal, selectively engaged into 'far abroad' short of military means, but effectively employing diplomatic, economic, and social means. In a way, Russia build its strategy similar to Chinese efforts to increase its existence in far abroad by building mutually beneficial agreements. From that perspective, Moscow innovatively exceeded geographical limitations by replacing geography with 'connectography'.<sup>18</sup> For example, Russian engagement in Africa already exceeded the levels of Soviet times, and most notably, African countries, such as Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, are increasingly Russian assistance as a viable alternative to Western partnerships.

Particularly, the Syria crisis and Russian involvement at a time where Western hesitance was at its height ensured Russia to become an indispensable actor in Syria. Initiation of Astana and Sochi talks, alternative to Geneva talks short of resolving the crisis, showed how timely involvement could serve both Russian, Syrian and regional countries interests. Even, Russian

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18 Parag Khanna, *Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization*, Random House, New York, 2016.

military effectiveness in keeping Assad in power confirmed that Moscow still has the power to realize political ends with military means. Putin's words that, "the recent events in Syria showed Russia's ability to deal with problems not only near our borders but also far from them"<sup>19</sup> underlines both growing self-confidence and assertiveness on the Russian side and confirms changing geographical scope of the adapted strategy.

Despite the successes on the ground, stopping NATO enlargement for the foreseeable future, paralyzing it strategically, and reverting Russian retreat with a new strategic reach, Russia still bears caution for the sake of not allowing overstretch and isolation. In that sense, it can be suggested that a cautious realignment is an integral part of Russia's changing geographical and strategic reorientation. The implications of this reorientation in a broader strategic context, in terms of strategic ends will be discussed below. But before, how Russia adapted to the economic sanctions that was placed on will be clarified.

In the aftermath of Crimea, the West introduced a series of economic sanctions with the hope of deterring Moscow. Basically, economic sanctions are tailored to create economic pains for political gains. But in the case of Russia, the effectiveness of them is questionable. Moscow perceived them as another Western style hybrid warfare waged on Russia. However, this sanctions have not produced desired political outcome. On the contrary, by employing tri-pillar strategy – securitization, Russification, and diversification<sup>20</sup> – managed to limit the effects of the sanctions breaking the causality between economic pains and political gains. Furthermore, developing a more self-reliant economy turned economic pains into economic and political gains for Russia, by building some sort of immunity for similar future actions.

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19 "Truth and Justice: Regional and Local Media Forum", 7 April 2016, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51685>, accessed on 04 June 2018.

20 R. Connolly, 'The Empire Strikes Back: Economic Statecraft and the Securitization of Political Economy in Russia,' *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 67, No.4, 2016, pp.750-773; R. Connolly, 'Towards Self Sufficiency? Economics as a Dimension of Russian Security and the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020,' *NATO Russian Studies Research Review*, No. 1, Rome: NATO Defense College, 2016; R. Connolly and P. Hanson, 'Import Substitution and Economic Sovereignty in Russia,' *Chatham House Russia and Eurasian Programme Research Paper*, London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2016.

What does these changing means and expanded geographical reach mean? What is the major driving strategic end behind this change? These questions bring about the need to locate the changing aspects of strategy into a broader context. Russia from the very beginning pursued an overarching strategic end, which is formulated as reviving Russia's as a great power again. Being recognized as a great power mean greater autonomy which allows to sustain its ability to make choice. In fact, choice perspective inherent to the strategic end is somehow equal to seeking Russian type of liberalism, instead of the liberalism defined by the Atlantic structure. In other words, Moscow is striving not to be subsumed and be driven by hegemonic order that was created and crafted by the West. However, the incompatibility of the post-Cold War visions motivated Russia to adopt neo-revisionism in its foreign policy.

Russia began to be perceived as revisionist state which attempts to shake the foundations of the post-Cold War international order. Revisionism or neo-revisionism are two concepts referred to Russian actions. While, the former refers to the attempts to change the foundations of international system, the latter seeks to alter the practices of the existing international system. But, Sakwa identifies Russian new strategy as neo-revisionist, in which practices of international order were being challenged, but foundations of that order.<sup>21</sup> In fact, Moscow by shifting its strategy began to challenge the practices established by the West during post-Cold War, rather than focusing preventing expansion of it into its 'near abroad'. In that sense, 'far abroad' represents Russian attempt to challenge the Western practices in a broader, deeper, and substantial way. However, Russia's main paradox and impasse is the misjudgment on altering practices request changing the foundations of that order, since practices are the outcomes of foundations of the structure. Hence, the major impasse for Moscow stems from being excessively embedded with the structure that it strives to eliminate the constraining factors emerging out of that structure.

## **Conclusion**

Russia's strategic end defined as reviving as a great power again has not changed in the past twenty-five years, but showed how deeply embed-

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21 Richard Sakwa, "Russia against the Rest...", pp.128-136.

ded to its identity, whereas the West pushed Moscow to admit its defeat and eventual terms that was identified by the West. That meant, giving up rather than reviving as a great power. However, Russia rather than giving up from its aspirations turned to transform the West to find a place itself within that 'Greater West'. The Western reluctance to embrace Russia as it is, and ignorance of Russian interests distanced Moscow, veined hopes to overcome the divide, eventually fueled assertiveness detrimental to stability.

Russia, at the beginning, adopted more benign stance in its relations with the West, mainly driven by the realities of Russia suffered. The disparity between Russia and the West, in terms of means, fueled this incompatibility. In that period, Russia focused on sustaining its influence what Moscow called as 'near abroad'. The West, on the other hand, was far from accepting this connotation that leaves a sphere of influence to Russia. In the end, from Russian perspective, different means employed to erode that influence in the 'near abroad'. Probably, Russian success lies in its ability to maintain its influence and empty the Western efforts within its 'near abroad'.

As Russia began to reduce the gap, and as economically recovered adopted more outward tougher stance against the Western actions in 'near abroad'. More significantly Russian assertiveness began to be felt once Russia employed the means to revert the losses in its near abroad, and to replicate western code of conduct in the areas where the West didn't succeed. The War in Georgia, and crisis of Ukraine represents the Russia's ability to halt expansionism of Euro-Atlantic structures into its 'near abroad' and the Syria crisis represents Russia's changing strategy which can be summarized as challenging the West in the 'far abroad' to diffuse their focus. In that sense, Russia adopted an approach as countering in 'far abroad', instead of facing in 'near abroad'.

Crimea's annexation granted Russia a permanent basing in the Black Sea, rather than renting from another sovereign state. And similarly, with the Syria crisis Russia acquired the ability to project power not only in the Black Sea, but also in the Mediterranean Sea, thus challenging the Western supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean and becoming more effective and assertive in Syria crisis at the expense of limiting Western options. It can be suggested that 'far abroad' represents the return of geopolitical com-

petition and great power rivalry. Brzezinski attained an extra importance on Ukraine by stating that "Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. However, if Russia gains control over Ukraine...Russia automatically gains the wherewithal to become major imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia."<sup>22</sup> In fact, Putin managed to get what Brzezinski called the "geopolitical prize" of the post-Cold War, after twenty-five years.

With regards to evolution of Russian Foreign Policy it can be suggested that depending on the actions and reactions of the West, Russia adapted its foreign policy course and strategy in line with the emerging new realities. This shift has not urged Russia to retreat mainly due to the evolution of Russia's domestic order, economy, and external relations out of the hegemonic structures of the Atlantic system. In other words, Western policies to expand into Russia did not produce the desired strategic outcome, but enhanced Russian immunity to Western actions. In the end, thanks to being kept outside of the Atlantic structures Russia developed its agential autonomy to assert itself to challenge the structures that intentionally kept it outside. Being excluded from the Hegemonic structures provided Russia to form anti-hegemonic alignments particularly together with China. The outcome of this process served Russian interests to establish pluralism in the international order against the monism urged by the Atlantic structures. In other words, as Russia could not become a part of greater Europe, shifted its efforts to build a greater Eurasia, where Russia is recognized as foundational powers of this new emerging order. As Igor Torbakov noted "Russia is no longer the eastern flank of the failed Greater Europe and is becoming the western flank of the emerging Greater Eurasia."<sup>23</sup> In fact, this marks a significant change in Russia's geographical focus in Russian grand strategy.

From the perspective of expansion-transformation dilemma, Russia, once again, made it irrelevant and started to focus on Eurasian integration rather than European transformation. The timing of Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit with that of G-7 Summit shows this changing vision. Whether Eurasia is viable alternative to Europe depends on the prospective cooperation between Russia and China, and their ability to transform their

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22 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York, Basic Books, 1997, pp.39, 84-85, and 121-122.

23 Igor Torbakov, "Russia, Ukraine, and the Future of Europe", *RIAC*, 19 March 2016.

relations from 'strategic partnership' to 'strategic alliance', which is currently laden with a lot of questions. Furthermore, such an alliance would further constrain Russia's strategic autonomy that it strives to assure. On the other hand, Russia's Eurasian focus does not mean a complete divorce from the West, but can be seen as an attempt to increase leverage against the West.

The Cold War as a practice was left, the Soviets as the main adversary was dissolved, however, the structure that had created the Cold War remains in place. Neither the West by insisting on expansionism, nor Russia by demanding transformation managed to show substantial effort to resolve the structural problem from its root. Hence, as the structural dynamics persists, the revival of new type of Cold War(s) is not surprising. The inevitable outcome is the breakdown of the international order and the re-emergence of great power competition which was intended to avert.



# Changing Diplomacy: Much “Softer” but More Powerful

Dr. Jale Akhundova <sup>1</sup>

*“Power is not revealed by striking hard or often, but by striking true.”*

*Honoré de Balzac*

## Introduction

During the period of globalization, the relations between nation-states as the fundamental actors in the international order go beyond the borders of traditional methods. In the new era, an increase is observed especially in the role of non-governmental actors on the creation and influence of the world public opinion. Therefore, in addition to bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental diplomatic relations, the relations between different actors in the system are getting much more important each day.

Within this framework, foreign policy strategies continue to be developed in order to ensure a positive creation and improvement of the international public opinion regarding the image of different countries. Within this scope, it can be stated that the tendency to achieve the national interests of states and societies through new methods is also becoming more prevalent. Sources of power which are of an international or more informal (traditional diplomacy whose actors generally consist of states) and material (military weaponry, economy etc.) nature are currently replaced by more intangible or intellectual (cultural, education etc.) sources of power. Today, said new political methods have become methods used by countries who are or are trying to be in the position of a super power or who are trying to maintain this position.

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On the other hand, the understanding of power and security which has undergone a major change especially since the Cold War underlined the human factor; this led to distinguishing of the tools of “soft power” as well as military power while building the security policies of states. This study addresses the content, relations and relevant areas of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and the concept of “soft power” which goes beyond the traditional diplomacy and takes on a new meaning in modern practices. Meanwhile, examples of practices from a variety of countries especially in the relevant area are also resorted.

**Keywords:** Public Diplomacy, Soft Power, Cultural Diplomacy, Compatriots Policies, “Transfer of Values”

## **Nye and “The Evolution of Power”: Theoretical Framework**

As previously stated, the concept of “power” in international relations has evolved in terms of scope and content and this evolution has caused some debate in the literature of the relevant area<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand, as non-governmental actors come to the forefront, especially apart from political and military tools, it is of great importance to have other tools which may have an effect on the world public opinion which includes these non-governmental actors and on their agenda<sup>3</sup>. According to Joseph Nye who comprehensively addresses this change in the concept of power, there is a need to create an attractive image in the minds of others through the use of culture, political values and institutions and policies based on certain norms in domestic and foreign policy. The success here may eventually affect the preferences of others after gaining their “admiration”<sup>4</sup>.

Therefore, the natural, economic and technological resources of a country may not be sufficient to have the necessary power in the international sys-

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2 Paršin, Pavel (2013). Problematika “Myagkoy Sili” Vo Vneşney Politike Rossii, Institut Mejdunarodnih İssledovaniy MGİMO (U) MİD Rossii, Analitiçeskie Dokladi, Moskva, 1 (36) Mart, s.7

3 Ponomareva, Elena (2013). Jeleznaya Hvatka “Myagkoy Sili” <http://www.mgimo.ru/news/experts/document238257.phtml>

4 Nye, S. Joseph (2004). Soft Power: The Means To Succes In World Politics, Public Affairs: Newyork

tem<sup>5</sup>. Within this framework, Nye who coined the term "soft power" in his book called "Bound to Lead" in the 90s mentions sources of power other than economic and military sources in international relations when trying to explain the concept. According to this, military and economic indicators are defined as "hard power" and addressed apart from "soft power" which includes many elements of influence and prestige. Accordingly, Cooper says that "soft power" may comprise of anything other than economic and military power"<sup>6</sup>. According to such writers as Campbell, O'Hanlon<sup>7</sup> and Wagner<sup>8</sup>, examples of "hard power" may include such methods as military intervention used for national interests, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions. At this point, different elements may define "soft power": culture, education, science, different fields of art, media, civil society and its elements, tourism etc. As can be fundamentally seen, these elements ensure the depth and sustainability of "soft power" of a country.<sup>9</sup>

According to Nye, in order to have said power which was put into more extensive conceptual frame with his book named "Soft Power" in 2004, one has to acquire a "model" country profile which is aspired and admired in the international area and whose values are often sought. Accordingly, it can be said that conflict, combat, competition and rivalry continue now in a new – mental level in the "power" area and the methods of this rivalry has changed.

From Nye's point of view, there are three ways to achieve what you want: fighting through the use of "hard power", "buying" target by different means or persuading through the use of "soft power". In other words, "soft power" means "ensuring that others want the same thing as you do"

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5 Cull, J. Nikolas (2009). *Public Diplomacy: Lessons From the Past*, Figueroa Press, LA, s.15

6 Cooper, N. Richard (2004). *Is "Economic Power" a Useful and Operational Concept?* Working Paper Series, 04-02, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs: Harvard University, s.6

7 Campbell, Kurt ve Michael O'Hanlon (2006). *Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security*, New York: Basic Books, s.328

8 Wagner, Christian, (2005), *From Hard Power to Soft Power? Ideas, Interaction, Institutions and Images in India's South Asia Policy*, Hedileberg Papers, University of Hedileberg, s.2

9 Nye, S. Joseph (2004). *Soft Power: The Means To Succes In World Politics*, Public Affairs: Newyork, s. 11

<sup>10</sup>. At this point, what matters is to use the ability of persuasion, reason and sentimentality all at the same time but “in the right proportions”.

Ying Fan describes “soft power” in one study as “the ability to attract, promote own values, become a model country and become a country to be pursued by others”, “the ability to play a key role in leadership, to create current issues and determine the agenda”<sup>11</sup>.

On the other hand, “soft power” can also be used to smooth the negative image caused by “hard power”. In this sense, there can be no straight lines between traditional “hard power” and increasingly effective “soft power” and the “right” use of both powers in terms of time and place also reveals “the level of “smart power” in the owner of this power.<sup>12</sup> There is no “recipe” regarding how to use these powers and countries may prefer to use one or both depending on the atmosphere, objective, target and other conditions. For instance, “soft power” can be simultaneously used to support or justify “hard power”. The military power used to gain interest requires “an explanation, justification or basis” in public opinion of a country and the world. The success to achieve said justification may also allow for the country to have the opportunity to move freely in the use of “power” in other areas<sup>13</sup>. However, it should not be forgotten that there is no guarantee in the assurance of legitimacy of any “display of hard power” by “soft power”. Eventually, “proportionate” and “target-oriented” operation in both these areas in accordance with the conditions will increase the success rate of countries. For instance, according to Nye, the superiority of the West under the leadership of the US against the Soviets during the Cold War resulted from the rational use of tools of “soft power” and “hard power”<sup>14</sup>.

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10 Nye, S. Joseph (2006). “Think Again: Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, February 23, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think\\_again\\_soft\\_power](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power), s. 23

11 Fan, Ying (2008). “Soft Power: Power Of Attraction Or Confusion?”, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, Vol. 4 No. 2, ss.147-158, s.148

12 Aude, Jehan (2014). Smarter Power: A Mindset or the Way Forward?, Smarter Power Working Paper Series, John Hopkins University: Center for Transatlantic Relations, s. 2

13 Paršin, Pavel (2013). Problematika “Myagkoy Sil” Vo Vnešney Politike Rossii, Institut Mejdunarodnih Issledovaniy MGIMO (U) MiD Rossii, Analitičeskie Dokladi, Moskva, 1 (36) Mart, s. 18

14 Nye, S. Joseph (1990). “Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, No. 80, Autumn, p.153-171, s. 154-55

## **"Sources of Soft Power: Culture, Values and Foreign Policy**

The sources of "soft power" of a country can include a wide spectrum: for instance, economic potential, human capital, education, level of welfare, cultural and historical depth, technological development potential etc. Therefore, any area apart from coercive and traditional – "hard power" methods that ensure the superiority of a country may be included in the sources of "soft power" of a country, society or government.

In this sense, "soft power" substantially results from "values". Nye mentions three elements of "soft power" such as culture (in places where it is attractive to others), foreign policy (when they are seen as legitimate and have moral authority) and political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad). In the meanwhile, said elements can be defined as areas where countries make and apply policies while they use soft power as can be seen in many examples.<sup>15</sup>

## **Culture**

Culture widely means the total of important and meaningful values of a society relating to any area (political, economic etc.). The source of these values may vary (individual, state etc.). However, in a narrow sense, culture embodies ongoing lifestyle elements. The increasing importance of culture aspect in international relations can be observed in many examples.<sup>16</sup>

It was Zhuge Liang, a Chinese military advisor during the period of the Three Kingdoms, who told a general that even in war, "Above all else is culture"<sup>17</sup>—a useful axiom for understanding the practice and place of cultural diplomacy in a nation's political life. The type of policy defined as "cultural and sometimes transformational diplomacy" is defined as the transfer of culture to abroad by a country through the use of its own cultural resources and acquisitions and the realization of mutual exchange of

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15 Nye, S. Joseph ve David A. Welch (2001). *Küresel Çatışmayı ve İşbirliğini Anlamak, Kurama ve Tarihe Giriş*, (Çev.: Renan Akman), İstanbul: Kültür Yayınları, s. 10

16 Hazar, Numan, (2018), *Sovyet Tehdidinin Gölgesinde Türk Dış Politikası: Kuzey Afrika Örneği*, Dış Politika Enstitüsü, Ankara, s.501

17 Liang, Zhuge. *Mastering the Art of War*. New York: 1989

citizens for cultural purposes. Cultural diplomacy is the linchpin of public diplomacy; for it is in cultural activities that a nation's idea of itself is best represented.

Such elements as language, religion, education, tradition etc. can be described as important tools for change. In this sense, language and education are two important instruments which function as important information and cultural channels, and play crucial roles in identity creation, ideology and value system transfers from one country to another. And cultural diplomacy can enhance national security in subtle, wide-ranging, and sustainable ways. Likewise, cultural diplomacy; helps create "a foundation of trust" with other peoples, which policy makers can build on to reach political, economic, and military agreements, creates relationships with peoples, which endure beyond changes in government, can reach influential members of foreign societies, who cannot be reached through traditional embassy functions, provides a positive agenda for cooperation in spite of policy differences, creates a neutral platform for people-to-people contact, serves as a flexible, universally acceptable vehicle for rapprochement with countries where diplomatic relations have been strained or are absent, counterbalances misunderstanding<sup>18</sup>, hatred, and terrorism, can leaven foreign internal cultural debates on the side of openness and tolerance.<sup>19</sup> Meanwhile, effective cultural diplomacy requires a long-term commitment to winning the hearts and minds of reasonable people everywhere.

For example education, apart from its political and economic dimensions, is also an important foreign policy instrument.<sup>20</sup> While discussing American soft power, Nye emphasizes the US as being the first destination of foreigners in terms of higher education.<sup>21</sup> In this context, Nye states that

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18 Milton C. Cummings, Jr. *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey*, Washington, D.C: Center for Arts and Culture, 2003, p 1.

19 "Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy", Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, U.S. Department of State, 2005, p.2

20 Nigel M. Healey, "Is Higher Education in Really 'Internationalizing'?", *Higher Education*, Vol. 55, No.3, p. 344; Jane Knight (1997) quoted in Ji-Yeung Jang, *Analysis of the Relationship between the Internationalization and the Quality of Higher Education*, Unpublished Dissertation, (Minnesota: Faculty of the Graduate School of Minnesota, 2009), p. 11.

21 Nye, S. Joseph, *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics*, *Ibid*, s.33

"International students usually return home with a greater appreciation of American values and institutions ... [m]any of these former students eventually wind up in positions where they can affect policy outcomes that are important to Americans."<sup>22</sup>

Furthermore scholarship programs of the US or the UK like Chevening and Fulbright, and seminar programs given by these countries to promising or high level officers are all examples in this context. Such policies facilitate cultural interaction, as well as knowledge and value transfers, as people spend time in the country and are taught by US or UK personnel. When these people return to their country of origin, their methodology, policy implementations and even their rhetoric will be influenced by the education or training they have undergone. Furthermore, this is one of the instruments for creating interdependency and a homogenous structure in terms of institutions and doctrines. Secondly, these programs help create networks between the officials, bureaucrats or academics of the countries concerned. Such networks can then form the basis for valid communication between the two countries.

In this sense, the below-mentioned factors are shown as the sources of "soft power" in the rating (2012) which was prepared by "Ernest and Young" company and "Skolkovo" Management School:

- Global image (such factors as export of media products, interest in learning the national language, the number of medals acquired in olympic games, the representation ratio of the citizens of nation in the list "100 most influential men in the World" in "Time" magazine, the number of the mostly-known companies of the country etc.);
- Global honesty (the rule of law, the freedom index, the activity of voters, CO<sub>2</sub> emission etc.);
- Global integration (immigration into the country, tourism, rating of universities, the level of English)<sup>23</sup>

However, as Nye suggested, the effects of "unlimited correspondence and communication" technologies which has been introduced by the globaliza-

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22 Ibid, s. 124

23 Rapid - Growth Markets Soft Power Index (2012).[http://www.skolkovo.ru/public/media/documents/research/SIEMS\\_Monthly\\_Briefing\\_2012-06\\_eng.pdf](http://www.skolkovo.ru/public/media/documents/research/SIEMS_Monthly_Briefing_2012-06_eng.pdf)

tion of international relations may still face “traditional borders”. Therefore, it is still an important prerequisite for a country which aims effectiveness and success in said fields to have a robust economy. Actually, it is a well-known fact that everything constitutes a cost element in the modern world<sup>24</sup>. Within this framework, nation state and its economic facilities are still of vital importance. This can also be understood from the fact that actors which successfully operate in such areas as economy, education, culture etc. in the international arena represent a certain state today. As Nye stated, brands of successful multinational companies can only be a reference to a certain country even though they carry out such activities as manufacturing etc. in many different countries. For instance, such brands as Finnish Nokia, Swedish Ericsson, English Unilever, French Peugeot, German BMW etc. and likewise such educational programs as EU’s brand Erasmus, England’s brand Chevening, Germany’s Brand DAAD indeed promote the culture and mentality of the EU <sup>25</sup>.

### **“Soft Power Born by Values”**

It can be said that political values which are among the three elements of “soft power” which has been institutionalized by Nye, may affect the success of foreign policy. At this point, countries “which are ratified to have a weak image” according to the international public opinion can be classified as “disadvantaged” in traditional diplomatic processes. For instance, countries where such political values as oppressive, sometimes interventionist regime etc. are less appealing than “Western democratic values which have become general standard trends” may experience said “disadvantage” <sup>26</sup>.

On the other hand, every country doesn’t feel obliged to function with the same line of values or same principles. Russia which has a specific historical, administrative and socio-cultural background tries to achieve success in its value-related “soft power” policies through values which are based on a common past. The main target group of the policies especially in this

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24 Nye, S. Joseph ve David A. Welch, Küresel Çatışmayı ve İşbirliğini Anlamak, Kurama ve Tarihe Giriş, Ibid, s. 389

25 Nye, S. Joseph, Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics, Ibid, s. 82

26 Rar, Aleksandr (2013). “Myagkaya Sila Rossii”, Argumentı i Faktı, 23 05/06/2013, <http://www.aif.ru/politics/world/43961>

field is those who still adopt a common past as socio-cultural, economic and political order of the Soviet period signifies a list of certain principles, values or disciplines. For instance, May 9 celebrations which depict "the Great Victory" in 1945 are a very important memory and value of those who witnessed said period, Russia shows great effort in order to carry on this memory in target countries and communities and to transfer it to the next generations. Meanwhile, such "values" are also in a rejuvenation process inside the country<sup>27</sup>. Similarly, Turkey having taken over a legacy as powerful and rich as the Ottoman Empire maintains its principle of "regional ownership" and comprehensiveness with a human-based approach in its foreign policy by referring to the principles of a centuries old state.

Another interesting example is "the Francophonie Project which suggests French and having knowledge of the French as a uniting value". The economic and cultural position and value of countries and societies which speak French, are a member of the International Francophonie Organization or just participate in said organization as observer was analysed in the study named "Economic Benefits of French and Francophonie: To Be a Francophone is Valuable Indeed".<sup>28</sup> According to this study, 75 countries benefit from important opportunities and advantages thanks to this in economic and cultural issues.<sup>29</sup> In accordance with the data in 2010, the member and observer states of the International Francophonie Organization are represented around the world as such:<sup>30</sup>

- 14 % of the world's gross product;
- 14 % of the world population;
- 20 % of the trade change around the world;
- 11 % of the exchange of culture and goods around the world.

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27 Smirnov, Vadim (2012). Rossiyskaya "Myagkaya Sila" v Stranah Baltii [http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id\\_4=351#top](http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=351#top)

28 Akhundova Jale, Fransa Soydaş Politikasında Fransızcanın Ekonomik Getirileri: "Ekonomik Francophonie" Projesi, *The Journal Of International Social Research*, Cilt: 8 Sayı: 39 Volume: 8 Issue: 39, Ağustos 2015, ss.271-279, s.275

29 L'Impact Économique De La Langue Française Et De La Francophonie: Être Francophone? Une Valeur Sûre! (2012). Conseil Supérieur De La Langue Française, Quebec, s.1

30 Le Français Est Une Chance (2014). [http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/oif-langue\\_francaise\\_2014.pdf,s.7](http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/oif-langue_francaise_2014.pdf,s.7)

In said study, the statistics of the profits achieved through the use of French in product and service sector in the field of culture by such countries as Quebec, France, Burkina-Faso, Cote D'Ivoire and Senegal are examined. According to said examination, as these countries produce movies, cinema, music etc. in French, they can easily access the markets of France and other Francophone countries and gain important benefits. For instance, Senegal is the export champion of books among the members of the Organization of the East Africa Economic and Monetary Union and these books can be distributed to a large geography because of French.<sup>31</sup>

Of course, it should be noted that before "the transfer of values" which constitutes an important part of "soft power" in foreign policy, re-building and strengthening the values on social level in a country is also of vital importance. Therefore, it should be stated that certain historical, cultural values "to be shared" with international actors (public opinion, foreign states, international institutions and organizations etc.) must be adopted in itself and remarkably "shared"<sup>32</sup>.

## Foreign Policy

It has been a long time since the importance of "soft power" in diplomatic platform was realized. Accordingly, the leaders of different countries may include "soft power" on their agenda from time to time. "It is time for change: time to articulate a vision of cultural diplomacy congruent with our position as what former Secretary of State Madeline Albright called "the indispensable nation," time to show how the values we preach in the political arena are embodied in our culture—and time to listen to what the cultures of the rest of world are saying about us."<sup>33</sup> "To win the war of ideas, "we should wake up each day with more friends than enemies said another American official.

On the other hand, the principles and attitudes adopted by a government of a country in the area of international cooperation and in its foreign

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31 L'Impact Économique De La Langue Française Et De La Francophonie: Être Francophone? Une Valeur Sûre! (2012). Conseil Supérieur De La Langue Française, Quebec, s.10

32 Viktorova, Larisa (2014). Urok İstorii, Prezident Uveren, Çto Ugrozı Ne Zastavyat Narod Otkazatsa Ot Svoih idealov, <http://www.rg.ru/2014/11/06/prazdnik.html>

33 "Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy", Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, U.S. Department of State, 2005, p.3

policy affect its "soft power" and earn said government a positive or negative point of view<sup>34</sup>. For instance, the degree of actualization of democracy, rights and freedoms ensured by a government and its positive image on cooperation and solidarity benefits the country in terms of "soft power" and otherwise, problems in said areas may lead to a loss. This negative image in the last-mentioned case may appear in world public opinion from time to time despite any military and economic power. For instance, in the surveys carried out following the war in 2003 in Iraq, the prestige of the US seemed to decrease rapidly.

Another example may be the first message delivered by Vladimir Putin, Head of State to the diplomats declaring that Russia is working on a new strategy to change its well-accepted "harsh" image.<sup>35</sup> On "Diplomats Day" which has been celebrated in Russia on February 10 since 2002 together with The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Russian diplomats, diplomats were asked to prioritize the soft power of Russia in foreign policy and what was clearly explained was the need to effectively use "soft power" in order to carry out pre-determined missions in the area of "soft power" to improve the country image and to achieve interests abroad.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, the aim to make Russia a prosperous country around the world and to completely achieve the Eurasia Economic Cooperation was reiterated. Moreover, the level of readiness of Russia in terms of foreign policy was found insufficient and it is widely thought that Russia should adopt a proactive approach.

In addition, political leaders, political parties, non-governmental organizations, ideologies, financial and economic system etc. of a country can also be considered as "soft power" elements of that country. In this sense, if the soft power and charm of a leader is able to affect other leaders and peoples, this leader may be defined all by himself/herself as an element of "soft power" in terms of a country or society.

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34 Ibid, s. 23

35 Akhundova Jale, Rusya'nın Yumuşak Güç Politikaları: Mevzuat, Kurumlar, Politikalar, 2015, Bursa: Ekin Yayınevi

36 Vstuplenie Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii V.V. Putina na Soveşanii Poslov i Postoyannih Predstaviteley Rossiyskoy Federatsii (2012) [http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp\\_4.nsf/575c9043ecfa485044257a32003f6d1b/7ddeb429decf279344257a36005245f6!OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/575c9043ecfa485044257a32003f6d1b/7ddeb429decf279344257a36005245f6!OpenDocument)

During the foreign policy processes arising from the goal of improving “soft power”, not only political tools but also cultural and economic tools need to be mobilized. For instance, the opinion that the fact of Francophonie which is fundamentally based on cultural (language and other common heritage) elements needs to be turned into an economic project has been reflected in some works. In the report titled as “Francophonie vs. Economic Obstacles” which can be evaluated in this framework and which is prepared by former French Ambassador Pierre Guidoni and others, there is a link between usage of French and the economic development of France in some countries. In the report, it is stated that the usage of French in Vietnam, Taiwan, Belgium and Africa creates a suitable environment for French investments and in this sense, France needs to follow policies to promote French in these countries.<sup>37</sup>

The argument in the report stating that “..preference of a partner in economic cooperation is not just an economic choice” is rather meaningful for every country which is rapidly developing and aiming a higher level of economic and political development in modern era. Accordingly, France faces a great geography “at its disposal” to grow and raise, to develop and improve. Unlike the old period when only through blood and war one could conquer, we are facing with a historic fact declaring that in the new period, this conquest can be done through “soft power” (language, culture, economy) and it is now realized that even economic tools are now at the hands of communities and countries that share a historical and cultural affiliations. Therefore, as clearly seen from such examples, “soft power” may sometimes become an element which feeds and serves for resources “defined as hard or traditional power”.

### **“The Power Arising from Historical, Cultural Affiliation”: Compatriots**

Historically, it can be said that countries “which has experienced a cultural transfer” (like language, religion etc.) possess “a natural power” arising from said affiliation/similarity which has been maintained until today. In this sense, compatriots who are the carriers of common values are important topics on the foreign policy agenda of said countries especially regard-

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37 Affaires, Entreprises Et Francophonie (1995). Agence Francophone Pour L’enseignement Supérieur Et La Recherche, Montréal, s.199

ing their traditional competition to gain regional and global power. These communities which can maintain similar cultures abroad can be defined as the concepts "compatriot", "diaspora" and "related communities" even though this definition changes from one country to another. Of course, how to define also depends on the nature of religion, language, historical, socio-cultural affiliation or political ties of these communities which are present in foreign countries.

However, the common feature here is that countries resort to different legal, institutional and political arrangements and practices for these communities. Therefore, the production of policies for compatriots around the world has become a main part of national and international political strategies of every country aiming to become an important power in its region and around the world. Among operation areas of such policies are to develop relations with compatriot communities in other countries, media activities, to grant scholarships to students and to organize in cooperation with non-governmental organizations so as to create a lobby power etc. The examples in this area reveals the importance of some aspects in the relevant area. First is the legal dimension. According to this, countries build their relations with their compatriot and related communities via certain national and international legal grounds they create for this sole purpose. Second is the structural dimension. According to this, countries found institutions and organizations and realize policies, projects and other activities based on said national and international legal grounds. Another dimension is ideological and according to this, states legitimate their actions through certain ideas, subjects or political rhetoric.

Moreover, it should be noted that the strategies and policies applied by each country regarding citizens and compatriots living abroad may result from historical, administrative, political, social, economic and cultural features of that country. For instance, Russia regards said communities which were left outside the state borders as a result of historical processes as important human potential that may solve demographic, economic, socio-cultural and thus geo-strategical problems of the country in the medium and long term. Similarly, the policy which is carried out by France under the name "Francophonie"<sup>38</sup> (Having the knowledge of French) aims at

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38 "Francophonie" kelimesini coğrafyacı Onesime Reclus, 1880 yılında, Fransızca'yı kullanan ülke ve topluluklara referans yapılması için önermiştir.

ensuring solidarity between the communities in the regions where French population is dense<sup>39</sup>. Therefore, this approach which perceives “Being French” or “Being a Francophone country” as Speaking French (countries where French is either a native language or a traditional one, the majority of whose population is French or communities or countries which have important ties with French language or culture) gives importance to maintaining and strengthening said ties with these communities.

Another example may be Great Britain. “Cultural boundaries” of the country embraces a wider geography especially as a result of its wide colonial past. In this sense, protection of the interests of Britain, its citizens and business world in areas overseas or abroad is the most vital goal of this country in said area. The aim of this policy can be summarized as below as stated by British experts: “Our diplomats who achieve world standard in understanding and influencing the world provide support for our citizens who travel, live or work abroad; manage the process of immigration to Britain, put forward trade and other interests of Britain and promote investments in the United Kingdom.” As can be seen, diplomacy has become a field of activity which may result in many side effects and has targets far from usual.

The United States of America also has an extensive approach to compatriot issues. Here “Being American” generally means having political ties to a country via citizenship and compatriotism and feelings of commitment are not just based on similarities of a certain language, religion, and nation-ethnicity. First of all, being an American means sharing certain values. The aim of the US policy in this area is to promote the elements of American mentality, lifestyle and similar world vision and ensures cultural affiliation with more countries and communities. This affiliation serves for the success of country’s foreign policy. Actually, compatriot and citizenship policy of US has a pragmatic and political nature. This reasoning is explained by an American diplomat as such: “The trend of other states to often support the American policies today may terminate if societies of these countries do not support us as well. We have to ensure the trust of communities/societies of countries in order to maintain the status quo.”

As can be seen, institutions which are assigned for carrying out different activities in public diplomacy or cultural diplomacy develop strategies

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39 La Francophonie: Passeport, [www.francophonie.org](http://www.francophonie.org)

according to the countries they work. On the other hand, said communities sharing "joint values" are regarded as "assets" that countries have abroad. These activities/policies targeted at communities which have historical-cultural "assets" seem to be efficient methods in the promotion of a country provided that they are carried out in a planned, result/problem-oriented manner. Moreover, it can be observed from the examined country examples that national administrations reserve special funds and resources for such studies and this is an important work area for countries having such opportunities. Likewise, as a result, it is a well-understood and experienced fact that "cultural and historical presence" of a country in target territories makes it especially advantageous in foreign policy against its opponents and makes its "soft power" success more sustainable.

## **Concluding Remarks**

As previously stated, international relations has changed in terms of the diversity of actors, the methods used and other factors. Accordingly, many factors that affect the level of success in state foreign policies in the world arena are getting more and more important, thus said factors are beginning to be considered more often in foreign-policy planning. The importance of the image or influence that countries have abroad can be shown among these factors.

In this sense, the methods used by countries to protect their national interests and achieve their goals go far beyond the traditional diplomacy. Now is a period when it is no longer sufficient for states desiring to be effective in international relations to only have relations with governments of other countries and it is a necessity to apply policies and programs targeted at the public opinions of other countries<sup>40</sup>. In this sense, today such concepts as information, communication, culture, perception of public opinion and perception management are rapidly gaining importance in international relations. Now many countries effectively use "soft power" tools to create a positive perception in the world public opinion<sup>41</sup>.

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40 Zlobin, Nikolay (2013). "Pravilo "Myagkoy Silı", Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Federalnyıy Vıpusk, No 6089 (113) <http://www.rg.ru/2013/05/29/zlobin.html>

41 Kalın, İbrahim (2012). "Türk Dış Politikası ve Kamu Diplomasisi", (Abdullah Özkan ve Tuğçe E. Öztürk (Ed.), Kamu Diplomasisi), İstanbul: Tasam Yay., s.150

In time, “soft power” has become an efficient and essential tool in every area of foreign policy. It is seen that it will be more resulting to use softer methods whose effects will appear in the medium or long term rather than traditional power methods which lead to much “sharper” reactions in the short term. In the new period, almost every state desiring to become global power uses “soft power” tools to strengthen its international image and turn the world public opinion in their favor.

The elements of “soft power” are seen to replace traditional power methods or to be used as its complementary from time to time. Main elements of “soft power” consists of especially such areas as culture, foreign policy and values and one country can increase its influence over other countries through said areas. In this framework, it is seen that any sub-element from fine arts to education, from different elements of a country’s political system to foreign policy instruments, from the characteristics of political regimes and rhetoric to other historical-cultural features may constitute an element of “soft power” for a country to achieve a certain goal in time.

Moreover, in our world where globalization is increasing each and every day, it is also important for the policies carried out to have a legitimacy among the other actors of the system. Otherwise, problems may arise in the international system and this may have a negative effect on all processes. The resources of said legitimacy traditionally do not consist of only “military and economic power indicators”. In this sense, one of the resources of a successful foreign policy of a country is its legitimacy before the other actors of the system<sup>42</sup>. Therefore, it is a fact that “soft power” a country has in the international arena cannot be considered (internally or externally) apart from certain positive, negative and unrealistic elements which determine the image and acceptance of a country by the world public opinion.

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42 Kalın, İbrahim, “Türk Dış Politikası ve Kamu Diplomasisi”, s.146

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# For the Record

## Foreign Minister of Turkey wants 'better relations with all sides'<sup>1</sup>

### After a bumpy 2017, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu says Ankara wants to repair ties with allies

It has been a rocky few years for Turkish foreign policy. The country that once declared that it wanted “zero problems” with its regional neighbours irked Gulf states last year by not joining the economic blockade of Qatar. It has had rows with the Kurdish government in northern Iraq, with Greece and other EU countries, and been dragged further into the civil war in Syria.

Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Turkish foreign minister, is unapologetic. “We never prefer to have bad relations with any country, or any international organisation,” he says in his office in Ankara. “From time to time we have problems or tensions with countries, but it happens between many other countries.”

Turkey has changed, he says, and developed greater confidence on the world stage under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who swept to power 15 years ago. “When you raise your voice, many European friends do not like it because they are not used to it,” he says. “They like lecturing but they don’t like any lecturing from the other side.”

Mr Erdogan has strived to attract foreign investment and tourism and to project Turkey’s power abroad through increased trade, humanitarian aid and military interventions. But he spent much of 2017 lashing out at EU leaders who warned that he was eroding human rights and the rule of law in the wake of the attempted coup of July 2016. He compared the Dutch and German leadership to Nazis after they banned him from campaigning on their soil.

This year has brought a reset, after German chancellor Angela Merkel applied heavy economic pressure following the arrest of German journalists and activists. Ankara had grown anxious that the rows were scaring away investment. Foreign direct investment fell from \$13.3bn in 2016 to \$10.8bn last year, according to the economy ministry. Today, the language from senior officials is more measured.

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1 Interview accorded to Laura Pitel of Financial Times on 30 May 2018

When you raise your voice, many European friends do not like it because they are not used to it and describes Europe as “our home”. European diplomats say that their approach to Turkey, which is technically still a candidate for EU accession, has entered a new, more “transactional” phase based on Mr Cavusoglu says that a recent meeting of Turkish and EU officials in Bulgaria was “very successful” co-operation on trade, defence, countering terrorism and dealing with refugees.

Mr Çavuşoğlu dismisses concerns — fuelled by Ankara’s decision to purchase an S-400 missile defence system from Moscow — that the Nato member is turning its back on the west. “There is no shift,” he says. “We don’t see any other relations as an alternative to our relations with Europe, because we are part of this continent.” As tensions with Europe have abated, however, other ties have come under strain. And Turkey’s recently repaired relationship with Israel became tense once again this month after Israeli forces killed more than 50 Palestinians protesting in Gaza.

For western diplomats, the biggest cause for alarm is the mounting pile of disputes between

Ankara and Washington. Analysts say that, in recent months, the relationship between the two Nato allies reached its lowest point since the 1970s, when Turkey invaded northern Cyprus.

Washington policymakers have been dismayed by Turkey’s increased co-operation with Russia, as well as the detention of US citizens and consular staff on what they say are unfounded charges. Mr Erdogan, meanwhile, is furious that the US has not extradited Fethullah Gulen, the Muslim cleric he accuses of masterminding the failed coup two years ago.

The prosecution of a Turkish-Iranian businessman and a Turkish banker for violating US sanctions on Iran has also riled Ankara. Mr Çavuşoğlu dismisses the case as “a Feto-motivated issue”, using the acronym for what the Turkish government has called the “Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation”, a reference to Mr Gulen and his supporters.

## **Recommended**

The biggest flashpoint is northern Syria, where Turkey has been enraged by US support for the Kurdish YPG militia. The group is linked with the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK), which has waged a violent insurgency against

the Turkish state for more than 30 years. In January, Turkey launched a military offensive to clear the Kurdish enclave of Afrin in northern Syria of YPG fighters. Following the capture of the district, Mr Erdogan vowed to push on into more Syrian areas under Kurdish control, risking a direct clash with US troops stationed there.

Mr Çavuşoğlu has spearheaded a joint US-Turkish bid to reduce tensions. He is due to meet Mike Pompeo, the new US secretary of state, on June 4 as part of those efforts. He says that the two countries have agreed on a plan for the YPG to leave the strategic town of Manbij, not far from the Turkish border. "The YPG will leave," he says, without giving details of timings. "Then we will decide together who is going to govern this city." He says that, from there, they will tackle the remaining swath of Syria controlled by the YPG and its partners.

But analysts remain sceptical about the prospect of a resolution, given US reliance on Kurdish forces to fight Isis and to counter Iranian influence in Syria. They warn that, even if Turkey reaches an agreement with the US administration, anger towards Ankara is rising on Capitol Hill, with growing talk of sanctions from Congress.

Mr Çavuşoğlu is keen to stress that, beyond its immediate neighbourhood, Turkey has also increased its influence in parts of the world beyond the Middle East and Europe, most notably in Africa. There are Turkish embassies in 41 of the continent's 54 countries, he says.

But the EU remains by far and away Turkey's biggest trading partner, and EU diplomats find it hard to imagine improved relations without a drastic change of direction from Mr Erdogan. Problems with Washington may yet get worse. But Mr Çavuşoğlu insists Ankara will continue to smooth tensions. "We need to have good relations — better relations — with all sides," he says. "That's what we are trying to do."

## **Interview of H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to PBS, 4 June 2018**

Judy Woodruff sat down with the Foreign Minister, and began by asking him about that sharp disagreement over America's backing of the Syrian Kurds.

### **Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu:**

It was a big mistake that U.S. prefer to work with a terrorist organization, because U.S. admits that YPG is the offshoot of PKK in Syria.

Turkey itself actually eliminated more than 3,000 DAESH elements through Operation Euphrates Shield. We could have easily done this together with our allies. We didn't need this terrorist organization.

It has become also big trouble for United States, and it also affected our bilateral relations very badly. And, also, it increased anti-American sentiments in Turkey and elsewhere.

### **Judy Woodruff:**

When will the YPG be gone from Manbij?

### **Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu:**

In months, I can say, in not in one year, but in some months.

### **Judy Woodruff:**

I don't know if you discussed it today, but another issue between the U.S. and Turkey recently has been the — Turkey's desire to buy the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets. There's been, as you know, opposition in the Congress for a number of reasons, including the fact that Turkey has said it wants to buy Russian surface-to-air missile systems.

Did you discuss it with Secretary Pompeo?

**Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu:**

Yes, we discussed all these issues as well.

First of all, it is not a desire or Turkey's desire. It is a deal. It is an agreement. It is a multiparty program. And we have been in that program, including some joint production, production of the parts of F-35s in Turkey.

So, Turkey has been paying in the installments on time, on due time. And Turkey have met all the requirements, but you cannot cancel this because of the S-400s that we are buying. It is a totally different issue. That is the air defense system.

We have had urgent needs. We had to buy an air defense system. In last 10 years, we tried to buy from United States, which is our ally, but it didn't work. U.S. couldn't sell us Patriot batteries.

But, in this case, I have to protect my airspace, and I had to buy from somebody.

**Judy Woodruff:**

But, right now, the Congress is saying, at this point, that the U.S. will not sell the F-35 to Turkey, that there are too many problems between the two countries.

So, if Turkey has to choose between working with the U.S., working with NATO, or working with Russia, which will it be?

**Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu:**

Why do I have to choose between? I don't have to choose between two sides or two countries.

The countries like Turkey in such a geopolitical situation and — shouldn't actually ask to choose between this country or that country. We have good relations with Russia, but U.S. is our strategic ally. And my good relations or my cooperation with Russia is not an alternative.

And we are member of NATO. We are member of OEC. We are member of Council of Europe. And we have been balancing our foreign policy, but nobody has the right to ask Turkey to choose between any countries or any sides.

**Judy Woodruff:**

Does your government now consider Russia as close a friend as it does the United States?

**Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu:**

Well, we have different relations, I can say. I cannot make such a comparison. And we have good relations with Russia. We disagree with Russia on many issues, like Crimea and Black Sea.

And we — since we are NATO allies as well. And we have all said — even though we are cooperating Russia on Syria, like through Astana process, which has been a very actually helpful process to consolidate the cease-fire and de-escalation zone, even though there have been some violations, but we disagree with Russia on certain issues, like the Assad regime.

They support the regime. We don't. And U.S. is on — strategic ally, but U.S. supported YPG-PKK terrorist organization, which is a big threat to us.

**Judy Woodruff:**

Relations between the U.S. and Turkey have been more strained since the coup attempt in 2016. You and others in your government, including President Erdogan, have said Western countries, including the U.S., backed the coup.

Is it your position today that the United States was backing the coup attempt against your president?

**Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu:**

We never said that U.S. supported the attempted coup in Turkey.

Yes, there's a public opinion in Turkey since this — the terrorists — and there are many others that we requested from United States to extradite them — are still here and they have not been extradited. It's fueling the anti-American sentiments. And...

**Judy Woodruff:**

Gülen?

**Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu:**

Fethullah, yes.

And also we officially requested from the United States to extradite him. Nothing happened.

**Judy Woodruff:**

You talk about the perceptions of the Turkish people of the United States and the West.

On the other hand, the U.S. looks at Turkey and sees over 100,000 arrests, thousands of people put in jail or in prison, journalists removed from their jobs, and — and the U.S. perception on the part of many in this country is that Turkey is cracking down beyond what was truly the cause of the coup attempt, and has — and has basically locked up a lot of civil servants in your country.

I mentioned journalists and others. That you're moving more toward an authoritarian system...

**Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu:**

Not at all, no.

**Judy Woodruff:**

... and, with these elections coming, it will be even more so.

**Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu:**

We are committed to democracy.

And Turkish people cannot tolerate any anti-democratic policies. And it is

Erdogan, President Erdogan, and his party that have reformed Turkey tremendously. And this reform process has been defined in United States and in Europe as silent revolution in Turkey, OK?

If you look at the legislations and the reform that we made, there is no step back.

**Judy Woodruff:**

Do you still welcome criticism in — from journalists?

**Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu:**

What do you mean? You don't need — don't you read media outlets in Turkey? It's not only criticism. Every day, they are attacking me. They are attacking president.

There are many media outlets and TV channels very, very strongly criticizing us. This is democracy. Look, before we reform Turkey, no journalist can criticize anybody. Now journalists or anybody can attack each other.

Of course, if you are offended, if you think that you are offended, you can go to the judiciary. That is different. But there is a freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, freedom of journalism in Turkey. And we brought all these freedoms to Turkey.







