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Introduction

As we prepare this issue of our journal, statements by eminent personalities are pouring in expressing hope and support for an imminent solution to the Cyprus conflict in the agenda of the UN for over 50 years.

As always, Turkey is much concerned with the developments in Cyprus which also have ramifications on Turkey's EU relations. Negotiations have been continuing between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders under the auspices of the UN Secretary General's Good Will Mission without producing a sustainable settlement ensuring bi-zonality, political equality and equal status for the two Constituent States so far. Lately the expectations for a settlement since the two leaders have intensified the negotiation process. In fact, Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey, said during his first official visit abroad to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus after the formation of the new Government in Turkey that "the ongoing talks aimed at finding a solution to Cyprus issue are the last chance to reach a peace accord". The Prime Minister of Turkey, Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, also visiting the TRNC expressed his expectation for a solution in a very short period. Also after the EU-Turkey Summit in Brussels on November 29th both the Prime Minister of Turkey, Prof. Davutoğlu and the President of the European Commission, Mr. Jean Claude Juncker expressed hope for a solution soon. Most recently, US Secretary of State, Mr. John Kerry, meeting the two leaders in Cyprus on December 3rd, 2015 emphasized US support for the negotiations and said that a solution was within reach. While during the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' first official visit to Turkey on November 18th, 2015 just after the Paris massacres and the G-20 Summit in Antalya, Turkey, even before a new Turkish Government was approved by the Parliament after the November 1st elections was primarily focused to find a solution to the refugee problem, it was reported that during the talks both sides encouraged further cooperation on issues of common interest, above all how to treat the ongoing Turkish Cypriot-Greek Cypriot negotiations. As Turkish Prime Minister Prof. Davutoğlu said after the official talks that "there was a window of opportunity over the Cyprus issue" and that there existed a common approach to contribute positively to these talks. Greek Prime Minister Mr. Tsipras also said that they had decided to encourage the two communities.

No doubt, the expectations and hopes for a solution are on the rise. However, some think that with the 1960 Agreements establishing the

State of Cyprus the British got what they wanted, two sovereign bases on the Island and the Greek Cypriots while rejecting the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's plan were awarded with membership in the EU and that it was only the Turkish Cypriots who are still suffering from international isolations and denials of their inherent rights.

Therefore, we thought that an evaluation of the negotiations process by someone who has a deep knowledge of the issue would be helpful to reach at conclusions. Mr.M.Ergün Olgun, a former Undersecretary of the TRNC President and also a former negotiator, has provided us with an article on this issue.

Will expectations for a solution on the basis of a bi-zonal federated structure for Cyprus be realized, or are the statements of hope are to ensure by encouraging the negotiations process not another simmering conflict is instigated in a most unstable Eastern Mediterranean region, or are they all illusions?

Since our last issue Turkey had two general elections, the first on June 7th and the next re-run on November 1st after the result of the earlier produced a hung parliament and the coalition negotiations could not be concluded to form a government and broke down. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, leader of the Justice and Development Party, in the wake of winning a clear majority in the Parliament was asked by the President to form the new government which was approved by the Parliament on December 1st, 2015. The government included Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu as the Foreign Minister who had served in the same post until a provisory government was installed to oversee the November 1st elections.

During this period the conflict in Syria escalated and the fight against terrorist DAESH gained a new impetus and a lot of complications with Russian involvement. Instability regions like Afghanistan and Northern Africa continued to create more tensions resulting in increasing number of refugees not only to the neighboring countries but also forcing their luck to reach a safer haven in Europe. At the G20 Summit in Antalya, Turkey on 15-16 November 2015 leaders agreed that the state of the refugee crisis was of global concern with major humanitarian, political, social and economic consequences. It is apparent that the problem of refugees, particularly from Syria have been the primary focus of the international community. EU held a summit with the African states on 11-12 November 2015 in Valetta, Malta to mitigate the mass refugee influx from Africa and at the summit meeting held on November 29th with Turkey dealing with the refugee crisis was one of the important items on the agenda. We have included the text

of the statement issued after the EU-Turkey summit where not only the EU and Turkey's commitments to re-energize Turkey's accession process to the EU was emphasized and the Joint Action Plan adopted for increased cooperation and stepping up of political and financial engagement to alleviate the refugee burden on Turkey was asserted is included in our "Documents" section. We also have the text of the Leaders' Communiqué issued at the end of the G20 Summit held in Antalya, Turkey on November 15-16th, 2015, which also includes a paragraph emphasizing need for a coordinated and comprehensive response to tackle with the refugee crisis.

To meet the interest and concern over the refugee crisis we have two articles focused on the problem from different angles and perspectives. The article by Assoc. Prof. M. Murat Erdoğan, Director of Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center, is on Turkey's experience with the Syrians. The article by Ms. Sherin Gharib, who is an Austrian political scientist specialized in Middle Eastern studies and now with the Vienna University of Economics and Business, focuses on the refugee problem from the Austrian perspective and dealing with Europe's response to the crises.

The crisis emanating from instabilities in the Mediterranean region definitely necessitates to deliberate over how to enhance cooperation and reduce the tensions in the region leading us to focus on developments 20 years after the inception of the Barcelona Process, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership struggling not to remain in name only but meet the original aims of the endeavor. Indeed, the article by Prof. Dr. Erwan Lannon from the Ghent University in Belgium narrates how the European Neighborhood Policy and the European Security Strategy needed to be revised in the light of geopolitical context. He emphasizes the political and socio-economic challenges to be encountered in the very unpredictable future. How to ensure EU's credibility in the face of the challenges seem to be an important aspect of the evaluations.

Not only the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean closer to our borders but also another important but not so often discussed part of the Southern Mediterranean is the ongoing conflict in an important North African country, Libya. Instability in Libya since the international intervention in 2011 ousting and leading to the death of Muammer Gadhafi, resulted in loss of lives and severely damaged the economy of that country still is a big concern of the international community as it has also become a gateway for African refugees to Europe which also has ramifications on the improving political climate in Tunis as well. Efforts to mediate between the parties to the internal conflict in the country has been carried

by a special UN representative, at the moment Mr. Bernardino Leon. The developments in the Syrian front have somewhat distracted the attention of the public from this very important part of Southern Mediterranean and a close friendly country to Turkey's South. Therefore, we thought that it would be timely to have an article on recent developments in Libya and the search for an agreement to stabilize and normalize this big country and the difficulties encountered, at a time when similar processes are envisaged to find solutions through the UN auspices also in the conflict through Syria and other regions. Dr. Roberto Aliboni, Advisor at the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI), has provided us with an article on the recent developments in the process. His views could also serve as a warning for those who have fallen prey to radicalization and terrorism, as well as endangering the country's territorial integrity. The negotiations mediated between two separate governments, one in Tripoli and Misrata controlled by forces loyal to Libya Dawn and the new General National Congress of Libya in Tripoli, which the international community recognizes. There seems to be hope that the efforts by the UN Representative for establishment of a unity government urging the parties to sign the document will bear fruit.

Every year the Middle East Technical University International Relations Department convenes an International Relations Conference and the Foreign Policy Institute organizes a panel. This year the panel on June 17th was entitled "International relations and area studies in Turkey". We have included in our present issue the presentations by Mr. Seyfi Taşhan, President of the Foreign Policy Institute, Ambassador (Ret.) Oktay Aksoy and Ambassador (Ret.) Numan Hazar, relating their views on area studies in Turkey, what the Foreign Policy Institute has done in this field and Turkey's increasing interest in its East in the ECO region and concluded that as a regional power it needed more area studies.

Preparing this journal we also cherish the memory of Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan, an international law professor, who was very knowledgeable, particularly in the problems between Turkey and Greece and the legal aspects of the Aegean and transboundary rivers. He was a regular contributor to our journal and a Board Member of the Foreign Policy Institute. We lost him on June 23rd, 2015. We miss him. May his soul rest in peace.

Oktay Aksoy

Editor

Cyprus: Towards a Settlement?

M.Ergün Olgun¹

Brief Background

The Republic of Cyprus was established as a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot bi-communal partnership republic in 1960. Unable to overcome the obsession to unite the island with Greece and to internalize partnership, the Greek Cypriot partner violently hijacked the Republic of Cyprus in December 1963, deprived the Turkish Cypriot community of its constitutional rights and forced them into surrounded enclaves. Another coup, this time by Greek Junta officers and Greek Cypriot extremists, was staged on 15 July 1974 to unite the island with Greece. This resulted in Guarantor Turkey's intervention, by virtue of the Treaty of Guarantee, to prevent such union.

Negotiations between the leaders of the two politically equal constituent peoples of the Island aimed at finding a comprehensive settlement have a long history. Negotiations go as far back as 1968 in Beirut. Without going into a lot of detail I briefly want to point out to some of the developments at the negotiations since 1968.

In 1977 and 1979 the two sides succeeded to reach two crucial High Level Agreements which still form the basis of the ongoing negotiations. According to these agreements the objective of the negotiations is to form a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation that will be based on the political equality of its two constituting communities. The negotiations have since been conducted under the auspices of the UN Secretary General's Good Offices mission.

Despite these agreements the Greek Cypriot side has rejected the 1985-86 Draft Framework Agreement, the UN sponsored Set of Ideas of 1992, the package of Confidence Building Measures of 1994 and lastly the UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan (the famous Annan Plan) of 2004, which were all based on the word and spirit of the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements.

¹ Former Undersecretary of the Presidency of the TRNC and former Turkish Cypriot Negotiator

The sustained efforts of the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey following the failure of the intense 2004 settlement effort and the unilateral admission of the Greek Cypriot polity into the EU (despite the refusal by the Greek Cypriot side of the UN settlement plan) finally bore fruit against the background of a change of leadership in the Greek Cypriot community. A new process started following the meeting of the Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat and the newly elected Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Hristofiyas in 2008. This new process yielded a set of convergences. In April 2010 Derviş Eroğlu was elected the new President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. He was committed to continuing the negotiations from where it had left off in a constructive manner, but little progress could be achieved during the remaining term of office of Mr. Dimitris Hristofias.

After the Greek Cypriot elections in 2013 it took almost a year for the new Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades to sit at the negotiation table. As a result of international pressure (particularly American) negotiations between President Derviş Eroğlu and Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades yielded the 11 February 2014 Joint Declaration which injected new impetus to the process and added substance to the agreed settlement parameters. Some key elements of this Joint Declaration are as follows:

- *The leaders expressed their determination to resume structured negotiations in a results-oriented manner. All unresolved core issues will be on the table and will be discussed interdependently. The leaders will aim to reach a settlement as soon as possible and hold separate simultaneous referenda thereafter.*
- *The united Cyprus, as a member of the United Nations and of the European Union, shall have a single, international legal personality and a single sovereignty which is defined as the sovereignty which is enjoyed by all members States of the United Nations, under the UN Charter and which emanates equally from Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. There will be a single united Cyprus citizenship, regulated by federal law.*
- *The powers of the federal government and like matters that are clearly incidental to its specified powers, will be assigned by the constitution.*

The Federal constitution will also provide for the residual powers to be exercised by the constituent states. The constituent states will exercise fully and irrevocably all their powers free from encroachment by the federal government. The federal laws will not encroach upon constituent state laws within the constituent states' area of competences and the constituent states' laws will not encroach upon the federal laws within the federal government's competences.

- Neither side may claim authority or jurisdiction over the other.*
- The united Cyprus federation shall result from the settlement following the settlement's approval by separate simultaneous referenda. The federal constitution shall prescribe that the united Cyprus federation shall be composed of two constituent states of equal status.*
- Union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession or any other unilateral change to the state of affairs will be prohibited.*
- The sides will seek to create a positive atmosphere to ensure the talks succeed. They commit to avoid blame games or other negative public comments on the negotiations.*

On 24 July 2014, following intense meetings between the leaders and their negotiating teams, the two leaders agreed that both sides had completed the submission of proposals on all issues. When the leaders met again on September 17 following the summer break there was hope that basic agreement could be reached to move to the next phase of structured negotiations. The expectation was that the talks would proceed in a results-oriented manner and that following the referenda on both sides a lasting settlement would be achieved.

Despite the distance covered with the support of the Secretary General's good offices mission and the push by the Turkish Cypriot side, Turkey and the Americans, the Greek Cypriot side again resorted to delaying tactics and attempted to frustrate the process by initiating a new round of unilateral off-shore drilling activity in jointly owned waters in the south east and south of the island. Pointing out that the two parties were in the midst of federal partnership talks, the Turkish Cypriot side proposed joint exploration

and exploitation, both in the Northern Turkish Cypriot controlled and south Greek Cypriot controlled parts of the Island. As an alternative, the Turkish Cypriot side proposed that both sides put exploration activity on hold and, as a priority, focus on a comprehensive settlement, since it was already agreed that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources would be a federal competence.

When the Greek Cypriot side rejected both of these proposals and continued with its unilateral exploration the Turkish Cypriot side was forced to take counter measures to protect its equal and inherent rights over offshore natural resources. Unfortunately, the Greek Cypriot side used the Turkish Cypriot's counter measures as a pretext to step away from negotiations in October 2014. This created an atmosphere of "insecurity" which made companies and countries involved and interested in hydrocarbons exploitation uneasy. This in turn resulted in intense pressure on both parties to resume the talks by finding a face saving formula that will apply to both. This was discretely achieved with the simultaneous suspension of activities by both sides in March 2015.

This suspension coincided with the Presidential elections in North Cyprus. Elections in April 2015 resulted in a change of Turkish Cypriot leadership and Mustafa Akıncı was elected President. Meanwhile, through the UN Secretary General's Special Advisor on Cyprus (former Foreign Minister of Norway) Espen Barth Eide's efforts, a new round of comprehensive settlement negotiations resumed on 15 May 2015 with the expectation and hope that a successful conclusion would be reached before the Greek Cypriot parliamentary elections in May 2016.

Most recently, after the EU-Turkey summit held in Brussels on November 29th, both the Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and the President of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker expressed their hope that a successful end is near.

Given this background, as someone who has been directly involved with the negotiating process between 1993-2005 and also between 2010-May2015, I now want to express my views on the opportunities/expectations that lay ahead and the potential obstacles and threats that face us.

Possible Opportunities and Expectations

Though the Cyprus problem is described by many as a “Cypriot” issue there are other interested parties/stake holders in the Cyprus dispute. Among these are the Guarantor Powers of the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance (Turkey, Greece and the UK) and of course the EU. Each of these has different expectations from a Cyprus settlement and sees different opportunities.

The opportunities and expectations I will be sharing here are those expressed by the TRNC President Mustafa Akıncı and his negotiating team, which I also mostly share.

1. The 52 year old conflict is incurring a heavy cost on the two communities, as well as their mother countries Turkey and Greece. Settlement and the building up of a cooperative relationship can bring positive energy and synergy to Turkish Cypriot-Greek Cypriot relations, to Turkish-Greek-EU relations and to the region in general.
2. A bi-communal, bi-zonal federal settlement to be based on the political equality of the two constitutive communities and on the equal status of the two Constituent States will enable the elimination of political, economic and social restrictions imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people, will facilitate the integration of the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State into the global system and will provide it with international legality. For their part, an agreement will address Greek Cypriot security needs, will provide for enhanced security and stability in and around Cyprus, will open up the Turkish market for tourism, shipping and other Greek Cypriot services activities and will enable hydrocarbons exploration and exploitation for the benefit of both communities.
3. There is enough conflict, instability and human drama around Cyprus. The region cannot carry further conflicts and instability. Unless managed well, newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the maritime region around Cyprus could be a source of competition between stake holders and may cause conflict. An agreement to be found to the Cyprus conflict, including the joint use and exploitation of the hydrocarbon sources, will turn a possible curse into an opportunity.
4. Settlement and political stability in Cyprus will produce geopolitical and economic opportunities for both sides and the region.

5. Among the conflicts in the region, Cyprus is at the closest point to resolution and can turn into a model of cooperation, tolerance and living together among different ethnic and religious communities.
6. Cyprus can set a win-win example to the prevailing win-lose approaches in the region.
7. With settlement in Cyprus an area of cooperation could evolve in the fields of energy, water and electricity. Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons from Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Cyprus can be carried to the EU through Turkey. This may reduce dependence on Russian gas. The interdependence in the fields of energy and water may create an atmosphere of regional stability and the resulting cooperation may enhance the ties between Turkey, Greece and the EU. Moreover, mutual interdependence may have a “gluing effect” on the region.
8. Settlement in Cyprus could give a boost to Turkey’s accession process to the EU.

Possible Threats and Obstacles

General

In this section I would like to point out to some of the general obstacles and threats that the bi-communal and bi-zonal federalism objective could face before moving on to some specific obstacles and threats.

1. A clear majority of Greek Cypriots passionately consider Cyprus a Hellenic Island and consequently see themselves as its sole owners. This hegemonic frame of mind is the major obstacle in the power sharing negotiations and finds reflection in Greek Cypriot solution proposals and the discussion of all chapters.
2. The favourable atmosphere and window of opportunity that emerged following the simultaneous suspension of unilateral hydrocarbon exploration activity may close with the forthcoming Greek Cypriot parliamentary elections to be held in May 2016. Because the Greek Cypriot side is benefiting from the existing unacceptable status quo it refuses to conduct the process on the basis of a timetable despite pressure from the Turkish Cypriot side.

3. Population and economic power asymmetries constitute key sources of political and economic problems, which particularly become serious in dyadic (two partner) federations. Such asymmetries exist in Cyprus and attempts by Turkish Cypriot negotiators to proactively introduce constitutional safeguards and/or checks and balances to contain future problems are strongly opposed by Greek Cypriot negotiators. Greek Cypriot negotiators have in fact consistently pursued policies that aim at perpetuating such asymmetries. Since usurping power in 1963 Greek Cypriot authorities have been imposing inhuman economic and social restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot community. At the recent talks, Greek Cypriot negotiators have been trying to permanently fix a 4 to 1 population ratio, an indication that Greek Cypriots want to keep Turkish Cypriots a permanent numerical minority. The continuation of the existing gap between the two politically equal peoples in the fields of political and economic power will leave the Turkish Cypriot side at a very disadvantageous position in a federal partnership which, eventually, could turn into a source of conflict.
4. Alongside constitutional safeguards, the 1960 agreements foresaw effective external guarantees under the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance. These aimed at deterring the violation of the state of affairs created by the agreements. The Greek Cypriot side and Greece violated their pledge in both December 1963 and again on 15th July 1974 and it was thanks to the external guarantees that Turkish Cypriots, with Guarantor Turkey's intervention, managed to obstruct the union of Cyprus with Greece. Now, the Greek Cypriot side and Greece are jointly trying to eliminate these external guarantees as well.
5. Greek Cypriot negotiators are also refusing to give legal certainty to the arrangements that will be negotiated in Cyprus and that will go through separate simultaneous referenda, thus making such arrangements liable to legal challenges at EU courts.
6. Both administrations suffer from high levels of public debt. Unless serious sustainable remedies are found and public governance and financial management improved on both sides, with the deep crises of confidence and the absence of a culture of cooperation, the federal partnership runs the serious risk of facing problems with financial and economic sustainability.

7. Very few in each of the two communities speak the language of the other. This is bound to create communication problems, particularly in the initial years of a possible federation. The English language could be a medium of communication but not everybody speaks English. Furthermore, the absence of experience in power sharing/joint decision making processes could pose problems.
8. Despite its refusal of the 2004 UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan the Greek Cypriot side was awarded with membership in the EU on 1st May 2004. Since then they have been trying to undermine some of the long established and UN endorsed key parameters for settlement by exploiting their membership of the EU. One crucial parameter the Greek Cypriot side is trying to undermine is the principle of bi-zonality. In his Opening Statement of 26 February 1990 the UN Secretary General had stated in clear terms that ***“The bi-zonality of the federation should be clearly brought out by the fact that each federated state will be administered by one community which will be firmly guaranteed a clear majority of the population and of the land ownership in its area.”*** It is the practical requirements regarding population and property that Greek Cypriot negotiators are now trying to undermine. This shift poses a serious threat to the bi-communal and bi-zonal federation objective that is currently on the negotiating table.
9. Despite the fact that the two sides say they are talking bi-communal and bi-zonal power sharing and despite the strong push of the Turkish Cypriot side since May 2015, all attempts have failed to implement a modest package of CBMs, particularly regarding arrangements to interconnect the mobile phone systems on the two sides and regarding the PDO registration and auditing of the Cyprus cheese Hellim/Halloumi, because the Greek Cypriot side insists that their authorities should remain the sole competent authority.

Property

The centre point in the negotiations of the Property Chapter is the establishment of criteria that will enable the settlement of the property issue in view of the bi-zonality principle and the fact that 40 years have passed since the Voluntary Population Exchange Agreement of 1975 which

ensued the 15th July 1974 Greek-Greek Cypriot coup d'état. The mass movement of people to safer areas (both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot) has, out of necessity, led to the emergence of a new socio economic fabric, both in North and South Cyprus. After 40 years very few in North Cyprus today want to become refugees again and give up the safe and secure living they have long established.

It is with this background and on the basis of the criteria to be agreed that the Joint Property Commission will be mandated to settle relevant property issues through three agreed remedies: compensation, exchange of relevant properties or restitution. In doing this the Commission will take into account the rights of current users of properties, based on the right to use or occupy such property by an authority, as well as the rights of the previous property owner.

Without any doubt, if arrangements were to be adopted in a manner that would significantly disrupt the socio-economic fabric/structure that has evolved over the past 41 years, this would lead to a human rights tragedy and paralyze the economy and social structure of the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State. TRNC President Akıncı is well aware of the fact that Turkish Cypriots will not say "yes" in the referendum for a settlement unless the large scale continuation of the socio-economic fabric that came about in the course of 41 years in Northern Cyprus is ensured.

Contrary to the needs of translating the principle of bi-zonality into practical terms, the Greek Cypriot side continues to insist that the first right of say regarding the choice of remedies in the settlement of property issues should be with the original owner. Such a criterion would in no way facilitate the realization of bi-zonality and could result in the return to pre 1974 conditions, which is exactly what the Greek Cypriots want and which is anathema to Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots also reject giving legal certainty to arrangements that would be agreed (by making such arrangements part of primary EU law) thus making the terms of a possible political settlement liable to challenge at courts.

With the erosion and destruction of bi-zonality the Turkish Cypriot community would lose its territorial basis and with it risk becoming a subject community in a Greek Cypriot dominated state, unable to maintain its identity, political equality and security.

Security and Guarantees

The fact that the numerically strong Greek Cypriot community sees Cyprus as a Hellenic island and have resorted to every means to unite it with Greece (Enosis) for more than a century (most recently in 1963 and 1974) necessitates the presence of a strong and effective deterrence to prevent the repetition of such attempts in the future. The 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance provide the only legal and effective instrument through which such deterrence is provided and the Turkey – Greece balance that was established with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 maintained.

The purpose of the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance was to prevent the violation of the state of affairs that was created in 1960. That state of affairs was violated by the Greek Cypriots in 1963 and again in 1974, this time by Greece and Greek Cypriot extremists together. It has not been possible to agree on a new state of affairs since. The last attempt to secure a comprehensive settlement by the UN was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in 2004.

The union of the island with Greece, something prohibited by international agreements, was narrowly avoided thanks to the 1960 guarantee system. Turkish Cypriots do not want to risk another onslaught by Greek Cypriot/Greek fanatics. The elimination or enfeeblement of the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance (which complement each other) and/or the full withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus will create a vacuum of authority and eliminate a factor of deterrence against conflict in the Island. Such a development could lead to the recurrence of violence. There has not been violence on the island since the 1974 intervention of Turkey.

The undermining of the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance is also likely to put the Sovereign British Bases under the spotlight. This could lead to the undercutting of Western security and strategic footing in the region at a time when Russia (having lost its grip in Syria) is likely to bribe its way into Cyprus benefiting from Orthodox solidarity and the influence of the strong Communist AKEL party.

Population

It is claimed that in the course of negotiations, at the insistence of the Greek Cypriot side, both parties have officially declared their population

numbers. The claim is that the Greek Cypriot side declared its citizens as 802 thousand (including citizenships granted to foreigners), and the Turkish Cypriot side as 220 thousand. It is further claimed that Greek Cypriots expected a larger number of TRNC citizens and were relieved with the declared number, this time demanding that the 4 to 1 population ratio be maintained between the two communities and also applied to Greek – Turkish nationals who would choose to live in Cyprus, even when Turkey becomes a member of the EU.

No doubt this is a racist, discriminatory and irrational stand which aims at permanently keeping the Turkish Cypriots trapped in the 4 to 1 minority ratio. Surely Turkey will also reject such discrimination and irrationality as regards its own citizens.

There are a good number of “non-citizen” people in North Cyprus who have fully integrated into the Turkish Cypriot community and economy for more than 10 years, many with their spouses and children. Having fulfilled the necessary requirements, many of these have applied for and are awaiting TRNC citizenships. The TRNC has an economy which functions with approximately 300 thousand people and caters for even more, bearing in mind the nearly 60 thousand foreign student population. Some among those in the TRNC are temporary/occasional or seasonal workers who have come for temporary work. But there are some who now see the TRNC as their home and who have become inseparable parts of the TRNC economy and society. The TRNC economy and society cannot now afford to lose these skilled people because the Greek Cypriots want to maintain the 4 to 1 ratio. To treat them as second class is not compatible with human rights and contradicts economic logic.

A study conducted on behalf of the Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and published in the Journal of Peace Research (11 April 2012) emphasizes that ***“in highly unequal federations, both relatively developed and underdeveloped regions are indeed more likely to be involved in secessionist conflict than regions close to the country average.”*** (Inequality and conflict in federations, Christa Deiwiks, Lars-Erik Cederman and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch).

Research also indicates that large inequalities in population numbers in dyadic (two partner) federations is equally likely to lead to secessionist conflict.

Given the above findings increased parity between the political/economic power of the partners and their populations could contribute to the sustainability of a Cyprus federation.

Territorial Adjustment

The Turkish Cypriot position on territorial adjustments is that it will not be possible to secure a “yes” vote from North Cyprus if the arrangements presented to referenda on the territorial arrangement and the property issue seriously hamper the established socio-economic fabric and structure that has come into being out of necessity as a result of the 15th July 1974 Greek-Greek Cypriot coup d’état. Many Turkish Cypriots have been forced to abandon their homes, villages and towns for three times since the beginning of the Greek Cypriot EOKA/Enosis campaign in 1955. Turkish Cypriots do not want to be forced into rehabilitation by abandoning their homes and villages again.

The European Court of Human Rights in its “Demopoulos versus Turkey” ruling has underlined that arrangements that will affect the lives of current users of properties in Cyprus (be it territorial adjustments or arrangements on the property issue) will have humanitarian and human rights implications.

There will need to be “give and take” to reach a political solution in Cyprus, but to get popular support behind such political solution the arrangements that will be offered cannot significantly jeopardise what people are currently enjoying out of necessity and due to no fault of their own. Furthermore, even limited rehabilitation will involve housing, arrangements for employment opportunities, education, health and similar infrastructure arrangements/projects which will all need significant contributions from the international community since such funds are not available locally.

Harmonization with the EU

As a member of the EU the Greek Cypriot side has already achieved harmonization with the EU. Turkish Cypriot businesses and producers, for their part, have little competition capacity vis a vis the EU market since Turkish North Cyprus has not been able to go through any EU harmonization

process. This disadvantage may be overcome after the implementation of a reasonable transition period, but it will be difficult to overcome the “size” advantage of the Greek Cypriot economy and businesses.

Another problem is that both Greek and Turkish Cypriot public finances and economies are in serious trouble. Greek Cypriot public finance relies on a rescue package from the EU while Turkish Cypriot public finance relies on credit and aid from Turkey. Both have failed to improve the productivity and effectiveness of their public sectors and to restructure their public finances. A serious concern is that, in the absence of a culture of partnership and of working together, this failure could reflect itself in the functioning of the federal government and federal finances, particularly in the initial transition period when the federation will face a multitude of costly problems like the linking of infrastructure networks, rehabilitation, harmonization and compensation needs.

It is worth remembering that Germany faced serious financial and economic problems in the unification process of West and East Germany. Uncertainties (particularly regarding property ownership), time needed for EU harmonization, limited experience with foreign markets and limitations in relevant entrepreneurial skills and capital may all have a stronger bearing on the Turkish Cypriot economy as compared to the Greek Cypriot economy. Furthermore, the transition from the Turkish Lira to Euro and new federal formalities/difficulties that may be faced in benefiting from the cheaper Turkish labour market may lead to production cost increases and further undermine the current competitiveness of the Turkish Cypriot economy.

Conclusion

The pressing need for settlement, together with the opportunities that lay ahead for Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and the region, are glaringly obvious. If rationalism had prevailed the Cyprus issue would have been solved a long time ago.

It is the hold of history and out dated visions and obsessions that are obstructing settlement in Cyprus.

The stability/security needs of our turbulent region and hydrocarbons discovery could together act as catalysts for change and resolution.

Political leaders need to look ahead and vision in the broader context. The coordinated exploitation of the hydrocarbon resources of the region could bolster cooperation between Eastern Mediterranean countries and contribute to security and stability.

The critical arrangements of the comprehensive settlement agreement that will be approved by the two communities in the simultaneous referenda will need to have legal certainty, particularly regarding EU and international courts. The Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance, which have proven their effectiveness by preventing union with Greece in 1974, will need to remain in force to deter any violation of the terms of the new settlement agreement .

International involvement in the Cyprus dispute is on the rise. Over the last month or so the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece, UK, Germany, Russia and the USA have all visited Cyprus. The Chinese Foreign Minister is due to visit the island shortly. Foreign Ministers are the Marketing Directors of the countries they represent. Their task is to promote the interests of their respective countries. While international support is essential and can help move the process forward (if handled/managed properly and in a balanced manner), resolution in Cyprus needs to be geared to the realities on the ground and the needs/merits of the bi-communal, bi-zonal federal partnership that will be based on the political equality of its two constituting communities and the equal status of its two Constituent States. Lessons need to be taken from both failed and successful federations (particularly dyadic federations) in designing the terms and arrangements of the settlement. If not properly addressed and remedied, the existing asymmetry of political and economic power could undermine the sustainability of a future federation. Such asymmetries should have been addressed yesterday and it is their continuation that is feeding non settlement in Cyprus.

It will not be easy to change the hegemonic frames of mind of the past into inclusive and consensus building frames of mind that are essential for power sharing today. Respect of the principles of political equality and of bi-zonality and the translation and application of these principles into practical terms will be crucial for the survival and sustainability of a possible federal partnership.

The Greek Cypriot side is entering an election atmosphere for parliamentary elections in May 2016. If an agreement is not reached by then the parliamentary elections will overshadow the negotiation process.

Failure to achieve a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal settlement yet again will fatally undermine the credibility and feasibility of the federal settlement model and will inevitably demand the discussion of alternative solution models.

Syrians in Turkey: From Emergency Aid Policies to Integration Policies¹

Assoc. Prof. Dr. M. Murat Erdogan²

The Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre-HUGO conducted a comprehensive research study on the social acceptance and integration of Syrians in Turkey, who escaped from the initial conflict and subsequent civil war that has been ongoing in their country since April 2011 and sought refuge in Turkey within the framework of “open doors policy” and are provided with “temporary protection”, whose registered number of Syrians exceeded 2.181.293 by November 2015. This comprehensive study, which is managed by the Director of HUGO Assoc.Prof.Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan with a research team of 11 people in 8 months between January-October 2014 duration with the application of various scientific methods is focused on the social acceptance and integration perspectives of this severe and multifaceted crisis faced by Turkey and the world. This study’s aim is to understand both Turkish and Syrian societies and to provide predictions for developing sound public policies. In the framework of this study, it is intended to reveal the current conditions, properties, levels of satisfaction, problems and attitudes towards permanence of Syrians in Turkey, synchronously with Turkish society’s opinions, expectations and problems with Syrian refugees.

One of the important predictions of this study is that day by day Syrians in Turkey are getting further from being “temporary” to becoming “permanent”. This study predicts that the social acceptance of Turkish society is immensely high on the issue of Syrians in Turkey though

1 This article is based on the report of HUGO study headed “Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration”. The report was published in detail but with same title as a book by Bilgi University Press in February 2015.

2 Director, Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre-HUGO

certain limitations are evident as “hospitality” may turn into “hate, enmity”, especially obstacles before the accessibility to public services, apprehension to lose current jobs and security concerns stemming from the very existence of Syrians, which is a potential occurrence to be taken seriously, and for social acceptance to be sustained, comprehensive migration management is necessary. Policymaking gets harder due to the fact that the issue of Syrians in Turkey is not merely humanitarian but also imbued with political aspects as well.

The most prominent pursuit of this study concerns how to handle the process and what to do for the refugee issue. Two important aspects to be taken into consideration in terms of well crisis management in Turkey are indicated in the study. First of all is the impossibility of a sound process management without registration, and the other is the necessity of synchronous strategy development for both cases of temporariness and permanence. The issue of Syrians in Turkey, even if the Syrian regime collapsed today, should be considered an issue that has potential impacts on Turkey’s prospects in the next decade. It is necessary to develop short, middle and long term strategies, which will fill the gap between the assumptions that “Soon the Syrians will return home by the end of the crisis.” and “The crisis will take longer to resolve, and even if it is granted, a significant amount of the Syrian population will stay here due to the appeal of Turkey or the dire conditions in Syria.” Another important finding of this study is that social acceptance in Turkey is extraordinarily high despite the problems encountered, yet it is on fragile terms and for it to be sustainable, a well-managed process, e.g. making strategies of “temporariness” and permanence” is necessary, and these strategies should be brought to public attention and inspire public support. While it is almost impossible to keep the partially unguarded 911 km long Syrian border under constant control, precautions must be taken for possible newcomers as well as for those who are present.

As an institution academically specialized on Turkish-origin people abroad, this study conducted by HUGO benefited from the experiences of social acceptance, social exclusion, and integration of the Turks abroad who went to Europe for work with a one year contract, yet could not return and became permanent.

Studies Conducted In The Framework Of This Research:


- **In-Depth Interviews:** A total of 144 people divided in half as 72 locals and 72 Syrians from 6 provinces of Turkey—Gaziantep, Kilis and Hatay on the borderland and Istanbul, Izmir and Mersin out of the borderland—were subject to an in-depth interview.
- **Survey Research:** Survey research titled “Perception of Syrians in Turkey” was conducted with a sample of 1501 people from 18 provinces between September-October 2014.
- **Media Analysis:** Internet news, commentaries and assessments by 21 general/national and 56 local media institutions were examined.
- **NGO Analysis:** Meetings were arranged with 38 different national and international NGOs working on the subject in and out of the region in which their works are assessed.
- **Expert Contacts:** Meetings were arranged with the managers of almost every state agency and local authorities associated with the subject; moreover, the abovementioned studies were analyzed in an international workshop in Hacettepe University by the field experts and high profile authorities, the results of which are assessed in this report as well.

Syrians In Turkey: Status-Number-Finding

- **“Open Door Policy”-“Temporary Protection”:** Since April 2011, in alignment with what international law and conscience dictates, within the framework of “open door policy” and “temporary protection” policies, Turkey has admitted Syrians who escaped from upheaval caused by the bloody suppression of the protests opposing the Syrian regime and the subsequent outbreak of civil war. This policy adheres to the principles of international law, notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Convention of 1951.
- **Number of Refugees and Duration of Their Stay Could Not Be Predicted During the Process:** At the onset, the anticipated duration of stay for Syrians was 1-2-3 weeks with 50-100 thousand in number, while now it is protracted day by day. As the upheaval and state of war continue, further extension of the duration is expected. A new situation emerged after the increase in ISIS activity in Syria, which may result in an immediate influx of thousands of people toward the border as seen in the Kobani case.

- Number of Syrians in Turkey:** The figure provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on November 3, 2015 is 2.181.293, which indicates the number of registered Syrians. The UNHCR states that weekly updated numbers under the “registered” label are received from Turkish officials. However, since sound registration has thus far been unavailable and border crossings are so frequent to/from Syria, there are a variety of claims asserting that the real number is higher or lower than provided. The officials of General Directorate for Migration Management, who carries out the registration process, state that they put significant effort on the “Biometric” registration and managed to register 90% of the Syrians. However, there is no doubt that the total number of Syrians in Turkey exceeds 2,5 million at any rate.
- Numbers Inside-Outside the Camps:** While 10-11% of the refugees (260.000) are sheltered in 25 camps (accommodation centers) located in 10 provinces, the real mass of the at least 2 million people are outside the camps, spread across almost everywhere in Turkey. Among those the highest number resides in Şanlıurfa with 356.000 people. It is followed by Hatay with 341.000 people and İstanbul with 305.000, Gaziantep with 277.000, Adana 121.000 people. Kilis and Mersin host each 114.000, Mardin hosts 88.000, İzmir 73.000 and Kahramanmaraş hosts 72.000 Syrians outside the camps. 10.000 to 50.000 Syrians are shared by 11 other provinces in Turkey.


Number of the Refugees in Turkey: Top-Ten Cities in Turkey



- **Registration:** By November 3, 2015 onward, it is stated that 2.181.293 Syrians are registered among the estimated 2,5 million. However, by November, 90-95% of the Syrians are registered. The Ministry of Interior Affairs put vigorous effort into concluding the registrations by the end of 2014 with technical assistance from the UNHCR. The reasons behind the registration problem are thought to be that it was seen as “unnecessary” at the onset due to the expectation that “Syrians would return before long” and later it became harder to control due to the continued refugee influx, as well as an avoidance of people to be registered. The failure to register Syrians in Turkey hinders crisis management and causes problems in fulfilling the requirements of refugees and in providing them with security.
- **Women and Children:** Among the Syrians in Turkey, the number of women and children who are in need of special care is above 75%. 53.3% of the Syrians in Turkey are comprised of people below 18, who are defined as children by the UN.

Syrians in Turkey and Their Ages

Demografi




<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php> (Erişim tarihi: 27 Ekim 2015)

- **Syrian Babies Born In Turkey:** It is stated that in the 4.5 years between April 2011 and November 2015 the number of babies born in camps and the cities where camps are located is 200.000.
- **Education-Enrollment Rate Remains At Low Levels:** More than 54.2% of the Syrians in Turkey are children and youth below 18 years old. There is a serious problem about the enrollment of Syrian children since their stay was not expected to take so long at the onset and the

medium of instruction is Turkish. Despite better conditions in camps, the general rate of enrolment remains at the low levels of 15-20%.

- **Change in Ethno-religious Characteristics:** In the aftermath of April 11, 2011, the vast majority of incomers from Syria were Sunni-Arabs. However, by 2014 onward, significant variation took place in the ethno-religious characteristics of Syrian refugees, as ISIS violence intensified in the region. The arrival of many non-Sunni-Arab Syrians such as Yazidis, Armenians and Kurds validated the discourse of open doors for the sake of humanity and eased the concerns of those who perceived the arrival of Sunni-Arabs as a political move.
- **Costs and Lack of International Support:** Turkey bears the enormously high costs of Syrian refugees. Foreign support in meeting those costs is quite limited. As of November 2015, Turkey has spent more than 7.5 billion US dollars on Syrians. Furthermore, Turkish NGOs allocated 635 million dollars of financial support. Foreign support during this period remained at 417 million dollars, which is only 4-5% of the total expenses. The UN's calls for "urgent" aid in terms of basic needs attracted very little interest from prosperous and developed countries and institutions. For instance, while the requested sum for the year 2014 was 3.7 billion dollars, the funds raised were only 50%, which is 1.9 billion. The share of Turkey within these funds is quite low as well (70 million USD for the year 2014).
- **Insensitivity of International Community in Humanitarian Cost Sharing:** As they were reluctant and inadequate in sharing the financial costs, prosperous and developed countries remained even more so when it came to sharing the humanitarian costs (refugees). Only 10-15% of the total Syrian refugee population was admitted or committed to admission by countries other than the 5 in the region (Turkey (2.181.293), Lebanon (1.078.338), Jordan (629.627), Iraq (245.585), and Egypt (128.019)). Despite the urgent and humble calls of aid, financial support was not adequately ensured. The total number of Syrians that Western countries committed to admit is 600.000-700.000 in 4.5 years. These number was in March 2015 only 150.000.

SYRIAN REFUGEES JANUARY 2015



Source: UNHCR (<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id:224>) (31 Aralık 2014)

- **Call from Western World to Turkey: “Open Your Doors In The East Close Them In The West!”** Western countries expressed sensitivity on the “open doors” policy of Turkey. However, it is observed that in the same western countries, particularly in the European Union, the thinking revolved around “open your eastern borders, but always keep the western ones closed so that they won’t come.”
- **Crisis Management:** Turkey has devoted enormous effort for Syrian refugees since April 2011. While a Deputy Prime Minister (Beşir Atalay, Numan Kurtulmuş, successively) specialized on the issue, “Prime Ministry General Coordinatorate for Syrian Refugees” was established and a Coordinator Governor (Veysel Dalmaz) was appointed to the post in Gaziantep by a Prime Ministry Circular dated September 20, 2012 “in order to deal with all matters related to the coordination of state agencies concerning Syrian refugees in Turkey.” Moreover, the associated departments of all ministries keep operating in and out of the region. Since July 2015 Chef Advisor of Premierminister Dr. Murtaza Yetiş is responsible for the coordination.

- **Geneva Convention and Protocol (1951-1967):** The international obligations of Turkey on the issue of refugees are determined within the framework of the **1951 Geneva Convention** and the **1967 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees**. However, Turkey's reservation to accept only those who come from Europe as "refugees" has been a disputed issue for years. Turkey insists on the reservation in order to avoid legal obligation, despite the services that it provided regarding frequent cases of mass migration caused by acute instability in the region. However, when the fundamental rights of refugees in terms of universal principles of law and the de facto situation in the region are considered, it is pointless to maintain the geographical reservations. The Syrian crisis revealed that those reservations generate problems. Turkey should abolish the geographical reservations with a rights-based consideration. According to the 2014 UNHCR figures, Turkey awaits 170.000 refugee candidates besides the Syrians. Although that number has no significance when compared to Syrians, it will increase through its "**Readmission Agreement**" with the EU.
- **Law On Foreigners And International Protection (2013):** As a result of the process started in 1999, Turkey enacted the **Law on Foreigners and International Protection for the** first time in 2013 widely through the influence of the EU, and in the framework of that law the **Directorate General of Migration Management** was established in an effort to move towards a new policy that is more human and rights-based, where civil initiatives are prioritized and security oriented attitudes are partially abandoned. This law was designed bearing in mind that Turkey becomes a "**target**" country for irregular and mass migration day by day. It is unfortunate that the Syrian crisis took place in the same period, as this institution had just been established and was in the process of drafting internal legislation and because the Syrian crisis reached far beyond any expectation. Only after the second half of 2014 was it possible to get the situation under control.
- **Regulation of Temporary Protection:** "**Regulation of Temporary Protection**", which was introduced on October 22, 2014, is widely affected by the Syrian crisis. The regulation also introduced the concept of "conditional refugee" for the first time together with "refugee" in association with the geographical reservations of Turkey in the Geneva Convention. The regulation did not specify a time limit for "temporary protection", yet defined the framework of services to be provided for "conditional refugees" within the bounds of possibility. Thus, the

mentality behind the regulation is not about the recognition of the “rights” of the refugees and “obligations” of the state, but rather displaying a character of “host’s support for guests in goodwill—within the scope which conditions allowed—”. Both the law and the regulation establish a basic framework, yet it is deduced that regulations allow particular arrangements for Syrians. Temporary Article 1 of Regulation of Temporary Protection clarified the status of Syrians via a special regulation:

“After April 28th, 2011 due to events occurring in the Syrian Arab Republic, Syrian citizens, stateless people and refugees who came from Syrian Arab Republic to the border of Turkey or cross the border of Turkey individually or massively for the purpose of temporary protection will be granted temporary protection even if they applied for international protection.

As the temporary protection is on process, individual application for international protection will not be put in process.”
(RTP- Temporary Article 1)

- **Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency** performed an earlier prior role in the process for several reasons: Rapid and unexpected escalation of the crisis, assumptions of “temporariness” and the fact that migration management was only possible within the field. So long as the Syrian tendency to stay is reinforced, the Directorate General for Migration Management will gain more initiative and a different structure of policymaking will emerge. The law and the regulation also create due designs to confer main authority on the Directorate.
- Extraordinary and devoted efforts undertaken by the **state staff** working in the region or in Ankara should be appreciated and they should be encouraged to continue such outstanding behavior.
- **Syrians and Unemployment:** Turkey has hosted more than 2.2-2.5 million refugees in 4.5 years. However, analogous to many other cases of mass migration around the world, one of the main concerns of the local people refers to the labor market. Apart from the unrest in the society, employing people who are “helpless” and eager to work underpaid seems advantageous to many businesspersons. It is necessary for the state to provide particular support for those who are at risk of losing their jobs. However, it is not easy to respond to the question of whether Syrians cause unemployment in Turkey. According to 2013 data provided by the Turkish Statistics Institute, Kilis, Gaziantep and Adiyaman are the top three provinces in which unemployment

decreased synchronously with increasing capacity. These surprising numbers indicate new economic development brought by Syrian refugees. Additionally, it is claimed that many Syrian businesspersons transferred their capital to Turkey due to the crisis, which ensured a significant amount of foreign capital inflows.

- **Camp Standards:** There are 25 “accommodation centers”, or camps, in 10 provinces with the capacity to hold 260.000 people. Here, Turkey rather applied the presented scenery in the foreign camps in its own practice, which proved effective. There is even news published by foreign media with headings like “Go See Turkey to See How to Build Perfect Camps.” Undoubtedly though, high standards in these 6 container cities only address a small fraction of the general Syrian problem and has received criticisms for being a “PR” effort. Another outcome of high standards in the camps is that it may have caused a decreased amount of support for Turkey. Comparative studies also revealed that high-standard camps are not enough to derive satisfaction by itself.

I. Hugo Fieldwork: In-Depth Interviews

In the framework of HUGO research, 144 In-Depth interviews were conducted with 72 Turks/Locals and 72 Syrians outside the camps from 6 provinces (Gaziantep, Kilis, Hatay, Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin), which provided some important clues about the subject.

Provinces where in-depth interviews were conducted:

GAZIANTEP-KİLİS-HATAY-MERSİN-İZMİR-İSTANBUL



- **Syrian Views and Expectations**

- Syrians expressed that they are happy and content to be in Turkey, for which they are grateful to the Turkish people.
- The most pressing issue expressed by Syrians is about the right to labor. They stated that they desire to engage in working life; thus, they will no longer be a burden for Turkey. In case of undeclared working, they are very likely to be exploited.
- Despite the high standards in the camps (accommodation centers), which stand as an example for the world, Syrians do not prefer to reside in camps unless necessary. Major reasons for that are: The strict discipline in the camps, lack of employment opportunities, reluctant religious families who perceive life in camps as unfit for their daughters, a sense of isolation-exclusion. It generates problems for all refugees to stay in camps longer than expected. Therefore, the number of those who leave the camps after they are admitted is quite high.
- Almost all of the Syrians, who intend to return when the war is over and desirable conditions at home are ensured, are quite pessimistic about it as peace is not likely to be established anytime soon.
- Syrians expressed that if they were conferred upon citizenship, particularly in the case of dual nationality, they would admit at once.
- One of the biggest concerns of Syrians is their children's incomplete education. Since the medium of instruction is Turkish in Turkey, a separate system structured by several NGOs working in and out of the camps in which a "sorted out" version of Syrian Curriculum. On the other hand, this system falls short of fulfilling the necessity. Only around 15% of Syrian children are able to receive education.
- Syrians expressed that Turkish people embraced and hosted them very well. Still, they stated that their prolonged stay has affected their relations and emotions. Distinctively, when asked "What disturbs you most?" Syrians responded "to be called 'guests'". In fact, to be a guest is not a "right" but a condition, which depends largely upon the host. In line with that, by affirming the "guest" status, a host basically intends to put the guests in their place, particularly in case the visit is longer than expected.

- The tendency of female Syrians in particular to permanently stay in Turkey increases daily. This is a universally common development, which is similarly observed in other places in the world.
- Educated and professional Syrians expressed that they want to be transferred to a country in Western Europe, or to countries like the USA or Canada. They commonly emphasize the lack of working opportunities in Turkey as a reason for that.
- Another point that disturbs Syrians is the issue of “Syrian beggars” common in Turkey. Syrians claim that these beggars are not the people impoverished after coming Turkey, but rather are professional “Gypsy/Roman” beggar groups who were begging in Syria as well. They expressed that beggars had an extremely negative influence on the perception of Syrians in Turkey.
- Syrians expressed discontent about the political instead of humanitarian treatment of the issue. According to Syrians, the government’s discourse causes exclusion of Syrians by other political groups.

- **Views and Expectations of Turks/ Local people³**

- Responses are distinct in and out of the region. In the region, three principal points emerge: Increasing rents, fear of losing jobs, disruptions in receiving public services, mainly healthcare.
- A massive increase in rents occurred and is a reality that makes many people victims. Local people become rather reluctant to rent homes to Syrians as well. Descriptions about Syrians being unable to pay their rents are common, causing trouble and living with excess numbers such as 15-20 people in the homes they rented as a single family.
- In any case of mass migration in the world, local people are disturbed, or even prompted to xenophobia, by “losing their jobs” or “competition induced by an increased labor supply, resulting in income decrease”. This is clearly observed in the region. Among the tradesmen and industrialists, there are those who consider the Syrian presence as

3 There are people in the region who describe themselves with their religious or ethnic identities (Arab, Kurd, Sunni, Alawite) instead of “Turk”. Therefore, concept of “local people” seems academically relevant.

an opportunity. On the employee's side, the situation seems rather unpleasant. The availability of a Syrian who will work for 300TL monthly in a bakery, instead of a local person who will ask for 1000TL for the same job increases the social tension and refusal.

- From time to time, the existence of a Syrian population that exceeds that of the local population causes problems in receiving public services, particularly healthcare, in the region. In fact, this is rather a matter of perception. In the research carried out by the Governorship in Kilis, which hosts more Syrians than its population, healthcare services received by Syrians is merely 3%. However, the appearance of hospital emergency rooms filled with Syrian crowds disturbs local people and negative perceptions are reinforced by disruptions in services.
- Regarding public services, several views are observed as "Priority is given to Syrians rather than us. Sometimes we are even only able to receive services by impersonating them."
- At the local level, Syrians are commonly identified with theft, prostitution, seizure, property damage, etc. Nevertheless, all of the studies indicated that crime rates are lower among Syrians than among locals. Still, the perception about that is inflated and negative.
- There are a lot of complaints among locals that "they are disturbed by the arrival of Syrians since everywhere is filled with thieves and bullies, while they were sleeping with open doors and windows once."
- There is a perception among locals about the prostitution of young, impoverished Syrian women. From the data provided in this study and contact made with associated institutions, it is concluded that this is largely an exaggerated rumor. Two "sex workers" (prostitutes) we contacted in Istanbul stated that they were already in the profession back in Syria and continued in Turkey when the war broke out, and never encountered anyone who engaged in the "prostitution sector" after arriving in Turkey. A camp authority stated that they investigated a complaint about a woman who was reportedly working as a prostitute in Syria and continued in the camp, on which they took necessary measures.
- Similar claims are made about child marriages, which are common, and most of these are in the form of polygamous marriages involving

several wives. This is a highly complex matter, as the marriage of 13-16 year old girls is perceived as “normal” by a large segment of Syrians. More importantly is the problem of marriages taking place on religious terms inside the families without being registered. The sphere of influence of Turkish officials is limited in terms of the legal status of Syrians. Nevertheless, serious inflations are detected about the matter of marriages made on religious terms with multiple wives or those who work as servants in houses disguised as wives. Surely, these sorts of incidents have happened, yet these are not so common as to be generalized. The number of officially confirmed incidents is extremely low.

- It is observed that the matter of young, Syrian women raises severe concerns among women in the region. Women in the region demonstrate their discontent with young, Syrian women who are thought to be under hard conditions and in a position to easily accept marriage proposals. It is observed that men in the region sometimes use it as means to oppress and threaten their wives. The existence of these men pressuring their wives by asserting “behave and obey or I will take one of these 15 year old girls from the camps as a second wife, no dowry, no grumbling from in-laws” is easily observed. Serious findings indicate that this causes discontent even depression among women to the degree that they ask for professional help from psychiatrists-psychologists. Women in the region contacted in the framework of this study are extremely eager for Syrians to return home and expressed their discontent about Syrians through a sentiment in line with hate. Though it is a perception largely caused by men, it is a problem that should be taken into serious consideration.
- The number of people underlining the cultural gap, marginalizing the Syrians or describing Syrian presence as “trouble” is extremely high. The “Our Syrian brothers” attitude is not so common in society. Syrians are described as “People who escaped from tyranny/brutality” “People under hard conditions”, yet they are remarkably not perceived as “one of us”. This is evident in the survey research.
- It is often repeated that Syrians are “guests” and they are under the obligation to “conform”. Here it is observed that “to be a guest” suggests a concept of “restriction”.

- Local people sympathize with Syrians who are closer to their own ethnic or religious properties while excluding the others. While Arabs think highly of Arabs, Kurds of Kurds, and Turks of Turkmen, each group marginalizes every other one.
- There are local people who put in a lot of effort in solidarity with Syrians, as many as those who are concerned and demand Syrians to leave at once. Notably, some people who said “I cannot caress my children’s heads at home when I see those people who are desperate and poor” share their bread and spend a lot of their time on providing a bit of help to Syrians.
- Significant differences are observed among the provinces. Hatay is where the highest level of tension is observed. The main reason is that the population in Hatay, mainly the Alawites, perceive the government’s Syria policy as means of “Sunnification of the region” and Syrians as “terrorists”. Erdoğan’s statement of “Our Sunni citizens were killed.” after the bombing incident in Reyhanlı had a tremendous impact. Results of the local elections held on March 30, 2014 are indicative of the reaction.
- In the beginning of 2014, there were widespread claims in the region that the government brought Syrians to have them vote in favor during the elections on March 30, 2014. Although these claims are still evident, they no longer have so much effect.
- Out of the region, the Syrian issue is largely associated with “beggars”. In major cities, there are no serious complaints about Syrians other than this “security-aesthetic” concern. As it is known, the policy of placement of beggars in camps after August 2014 produced evident results. However, this beggar issue should still be taken into serious consideration due to its security dimension and its being an element of Syrian perception that is “on Syrians’ heads.” Strict measures are widely demanded on the issue of beggars, which triggers marginalization, degradation, hatred and enmity.
- In the provinces out of the region, ambiguity about the number of Syrians causes extremely inflated assumptions. Official numbers suggest that there are 30.000 Syrians in Ankara, while many people claim that it is around 200-300.000. Surely, the main problem here is the state’s communication policy, which is characterized by shortcomings in disseminating sound information. This also causes a lack of trust in the state.

II. Hugo Research Survey: Findings Of “Syrian Perception In Turkey”

The issue of Syrians in Turkey is one of the most pressing matters of the past 3 years. More than 87%, that is 2 million, of the Syrians whose number is reported to be 2.2-2,5 as of November 2015, live outside the camps spread out over all regions in Turkey. In a statement by the Ministry of Interior, only 9 provinces were reported to be without Syrian presence, while Syrians live in all other 72 provinces. But in 2015 all cities in Turkey have Syrians.

The issue of Syrians in Turkey has become an integral part of daily life and politics. Despite the positive picture evident in the level of social acceptance, several social incidents are observed to raise concerns. Many incidents took place, such as demonstrations demanding “Syrians Out” and direct assaults on Syrian people. Such incidents generally originate from a crime in which Syrians are associated. An important reason behind the protests in some places is the issue of unjust competition in enterprise or employment. Unless the process is well-managed, xenophobia and enmity may rapidly spread among some groups within Turkish society, which so far has demonstrated high levels of social acceptance toward Syrians and has been quite supportive of them. The attitude shown thus far is a humanitarian gain on the side of Turkish people. However, these qualities face a serious risk of depletion. Considering that Turkish society has hosted 1.6 million Syrians for 4.5 years without making problems about the 7.5 million dollars spent on Syrians and has kept reactions limited, despite unjust competition and all the security risks, the question of how Turkish society perceives Syrians remains essential in producing future strategies.

Survey research conducted in the framework of this study with a sample comprised of 1.501 people from 18 provinces revealed the general picture of Turkey and provided an opportunity for testing the results with the findings from in-depth interviews.

A- Technical Properties Of The Research Survey Of Syrian Refugees In Public Perception

The survey research of “Syrian Refugees in Public Perception” was conducted by contacting 1501 people above the age of 18 in 18 provinces

between October 3-12, 2014. ⁴ Among those contacted, 57.7% were married, 42,5% were single; 49.7% were female and 50.3% male. In the survey research, by asking about their first language, it is intended to obtain clues about ethnic features. Furthermore, observations were made regarding political party affiliations, age groups and differences between the provinces closer to the Syrian border and those out of the region through analysis of crosstabs. Questions are prepared in a way that will provide data assistance for the study of "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration." There are 31 questions to be responded by a 5-level "Likert item" (I strongly agree, I agree, I neither agree nor disagree, I disagree, I strongly disagree), 26 of which are related directly to the subject, 5 of which are about demographic information. Research was concluded within +/- 2.5 margin of error within a 0.95 confidence interval.

B- Findings Of The Research Survey Of Syrian Refugees In Public Perception⁵

Here are the general findings revealed by the survey research:

- This research, which tries to measure the perception of Syrians in Turkish society, reveals that: Despite the effects and risks of hosting over 1.5 million Syrians in 3.5 years, which directly impact the daily life, social acceptance of Turkish society regarding the Syrians is extremely high.
- If the attitude toward Syrians are evaluated in terms of political preferences, quite similar views are shared between the supporters of Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Peace and Democracy Party-People's Democratic Party (BDP-HDP), and between the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). When political views are determined through responses to the proposition of "Which party would you vote for if the elections were held today?" and these are associated with other prepositions, supporters of

4 Survey Research is applied by Ankara-based Optimar Research Company

5 The public opinion research is conducted with answers given to statements through "5 point likert scale" technique. In order to provide a general view, the option of "neither agree nor disagree" is eliminated. The options of "I strongly agree"- "I agree" and "I strongly disagree"- "I disagree" are evaluated as one.

the AKP and BDP-HDP are observed to be more “protective” toward Syrians than those of the CHP-MHP.

- It is fair to think that the issue of Kobani and the admission of Kurdish-origin Syrians in Turkey had a serious impact on the approach of the supporters of BDP-HDP during the times in which this research was conducted.
- In the assessments, it is observed that no significant differences were detected between the provinces inside and outside the region. In case such differences go above 5%, separate evaluations are presented.
- No distinct differences of perception are detected between age groups.


1. Admission of Syrians and Basis of Admission

In order to measure public perception concerning the admission of Syrians into Turkey as refugees, we principally tried to reach findings about the reasoning behind such admission. Here, it is remarkable that the most supported proposal with 64.6% is the one with humanitarian emphasis: “Admission of Syrians without any discrimination regarding their language, religion and ethnic background is a humanitarian obligation on our part.” Maybe an even more significant response is given to the provocative proposal asserting that “the Refugees should be sent back to their country even though the war is ongoing.” Despite the 30.6% support for this proposal by Turkish people, the rate of those who opposed and refused is 57.8%. This attitude is very important both in terms of “sensitivity towards fundamental human rights” and “social acceptance”. “Humanitarian” reasoning got stronger support when compared to “historical and geographical necessities”, “religious fraternity” and lastly “ethnic kinship” respectively. This attitude of a society that has accepted over 2.2 million Syrians in 4.5 years could be perceived as a promising picture for “social acceptance”. In order to understand the sensitivity and determination of Turkish people regarding Syrian refugees, responses given to two crucial questions reveal the extent of sensitivity and interest. The rate of those who disagree with the proposal of “Syrian refugees are not our concern. We should not be involved” is 45.8%, while those who agree is 41.6%. Similarly, the rate of those who disagree is higher than those who agree when it comes to another provocative controller question with the proposal of “Refugees

should not have been admitted, as this is an intervention in the domestic affairs of Syria.” These results demonstrate a very positive picture in terms of acceptance of refugees despite their large numbers. Although Turkish people disagree with the proposal of “Syrian refugees are beneficial for our country”, the “humanitarian” attitude shown is remarkable. It can be deduced that the attitude shows a character of principle rather than that of opportunism.

2. How are the Syrians in Turkey Described?

Among the answers to the question of “Which one below best describes your opinion regarding the Syrians in Turkey?”, responses of “People who escaped from persecution”, “Our guests in Turkey”, “Our brothers and sisters in religion” got 74% in total. Those who perceived Syrians as “People who are burden on us” or “Parasites-Beggars” got a mere 26%. The number of respondents that perceives Syrians as “People who escaped from violence” is the highest among the BDP-HDP supporters. Negative judgments are rather prevalent among the supporters of the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party).



3. Are Syrians Economically a Burden?

Some basic points of tension and refusal regarding the Syrian refugees are tested through several proposals. Here, it is understood that economic burdens are particularly important for Turkish society. 70.7% of the

people shared the opinion that the Turkish economy has weakened due to Syrian refugees. Additionally, those who are against providing aid for Syrians when there is poverty in Turkey comprise 60.1%. Turkish people demonstrated their objections about the money spent.

4. Tendency to Engage in Personal Support for Syrians

Regarding the support for Syrians, findings indicate that 31,7% of Turkish people somehow helped Syrians by providing material-moral support; however, 68.3% remained indifferent on the issue. This amount of 30,7% is surely significant considering that such extend of support is intensified in the region.

5. Right to Work

One of the most disputed aspects of Syrian refugees is their right to labor. Syrians, who were assisted by donations in Turkey or counted on their own resources for a period, stated their desire to engage in working life and make their own living as that period has extended. This increased tension among people working closer to the border regions. Occasionally, the discontent of local people who feel threatened by losing their jobs due to the influx of cheap labor is transformed into protests or even assaults. In that regard, several propositions are offered in the survey research to measure general perceptions on right to labor. 56.1% of Turkish people agree with the proposal asserting that "Syrians take our jobs." 30.5% disagree. In the provinces closer to region, that rate goes as higher as 68.9%, which could be anticipated.

In response to the question *"Which one below best describes your opinion about Syrian labor?"* it is observed that almost half (47.4%) of the people clearly have a "negative" attitude. Local people get rather sympathetic to the idea when limitations based on occupation or duration are applied. Those who agree to grant Syrians permission to work in any occupation for an unspecified duration are a mere 5.4%. In that regard, the relation between provinces in and out of the region is remarkable. "They should not be granted work permits" got 44% in the provinces in the region, while surprisingly the same question got a higher response

of 48% in the provinces out of the region. “Working in any occupation without restriction” received just 2.1% support in the region and 6.1% out of the region.

6. Education

Considering the fact that more than 54.2% of Syrians (over 700.000) in Turkey are children and youth below 18, perhaps the most pressing problems to be faced in the middle and long terms is access to education. UNICEF reported that 73% of Syrian children do not attend school. This lost generation must be regained in education. Unlike the case in the right to labor, society pays greater interest in providing education for Syrian children. Despite the resistance towards admission of Syrians in Turkish universities without examination—due to the already distressed conditions of Turkish candidates—results are generally promising. 72,5% of people supported various sorts of education, while 27.5% raised the opinion that “They should be provided with no education at all.

7. Social Tension

Survey research examined perceptions on the demonstrations and “protests” of 2014 involving assaults against Syrians, which took place in several provinces, such as Ankara, Adana, and Gaziantep.

First, it is intended to reveal the general opinion through the proposition of “Syrian refugees disturb the peace and cause depravity of public morals by being involved in crimes, such as violence, theft, smuggling and prostitution.” 62.2% of Turkish society agrees with the proposal, while those who disagree are 23.1%. The amount of agreement is doubled in the provinces of the region. As the age goes up, the rate of agreement increases.

As a response to the question of “Strong reactions took place against the refugees in several cities on the grounds that some Syrian people committed crimes. What do you think about that?” it is remarkable that half of society (47.5%) thought reactions were “right” and “supported” them. Those who thought reactions were right but excessive are 26.1%, and those who thought reactions and assaults were “wrong” is 13.9%. In

the provinces of the region, the rate of those who think reactions were right is 52.3%, while in the provinces out of the region that is 46.7%. The rate of those who think the reactions were right is highest among people who would vote for the MHP in an election, and the rate of those who think reactions were wrong is highest among those would vote for the BDP-HDP. In terms of age groups, those who stress on the responsibility of state and rightness of protests are located to 55+ age group.

8. Approach towards the Permanence of Syrians in Turkey

In the framework of the research headed "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration", predictions and expectations of Turkish people concerning the stay of Syrians are examined under the general topic of "In case the war in Syria drags on, which policy should Turkey pursue?". The proposition that closely relates all the research and perception is formulated as "Syrians should be sent back to their country even though the war is ongoing." Those who responded "I agree" and "I strongly agree" are only 30.6% together. A greater portion of 62.8% of Turkish people expressed their disagreement with the proposal. The result is valuable and important in terms of showing the state of mind in a country that hosted over 2.2-2.5 million Syrians in 4.5 years. Interestingly, the rate of disagreement with the proposal is lower in the provinces of the region, where people face more concrete and direct problems concerning the Syrians. In terms of political party affiliations, this proposal got the lowest support from proponents of the BDP-HDP, as they opposed deportation by 80.6%. Arabic-speaking people, thus thought to be Arabs, expressed higher support for "deportation".

When the "state of war" is excluded from the proposal and is reformulated as "Refugees are not a concern of Turkey and they should be sent back to their country." 38.9% agree and 47.8% disagree. The "state of war" seems to be an important aspect for Turkish people.

The arrival of more Syrians hereafter is perceived as negatively by Turkish people as expected, yet 31.7% still support the admission of newcomers from Syria. In terms of the culture of acceptance, this rate is significant when the current situation and capacity are taken into consideration. Resistance to the arrival of new refugees is higher in the provinces of the region.

Turkish people commonly share the opinion that “Syrians who stay in Turkey may cause major problems.” The rate of those who responded “I strongly agree” and “I agree” are 76.5% in total. It is higher in the provinces of the region (81.7%). Within the political party spectrum, that view is mostly common among supporters of the MHP, followed by the CHP and the AKP respectively, while the least concern is observed among BDP-HDP supporters. (50%)

According to these observations, the general will of Turkish people is that Syrians should not be spread all over the country, but sheltered in camps. Support for the proposal of “Refugees should only be sheltered in the camps.” is 72.6%. In the region, that demands goes up to 80.2%. A similar attitude is evident in the responses toward the proposal of “Refugees should be sheltered in camps to be built in a buffer zone on Syrian soil along the border” for which the rate of support is 68.8%, while the rate of those who are against is a mere 18.1%. The BDP-HDP proponents are widely against this proposal. The Kobani incident of September-October 2014 is thought to be in line with that. However, responses to both of these proposals indicate that Turkish people are not pleased about Syrian presence out of the camps. As it is inconceivable for 1.4 million Syrians to be sheltered in the camps, policymakers should address such sensibilities.

9. Predictions on Coexistence and “Neighborhood”

Research findings have indicated a different perception than the widely referred to similarities between Turkish and Syrian people in terms of religious and ethnic properties, sharing a long 911km border. Turkish society is not so sympathetic with the idea that “We are culturally akin to Syrians”. Those who support this proposal are 17.2%. Those who think we are culturally distinct are as high as 70.6%. As is known, Syrians who arrived before 2014 were widely comprised of Sunni-Arabs. After ISIS came into equation in 2014, other Syrians, such as Yazidis (Ezidi), Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds and Alawites arrived and significant alterations took place in the ethno-religious picture. Despite little differentiation of the BDP-HDP supporters on the idea that we are “akin” to Syrians, no significant difference in perception can be reported. When compared to the 17.2% support for the “cultural proximity” proposal, assumptions expressed to explain admission of Syrians in Turkey like “religious fraternity” (52.9%) and “ethnic kinship” (42.1%) lose their relevance.

One of the important questions inquired in the research is “Would you be disturbed to have a Syrian as your neighbor?” It is observed that half of society responded “yes” (49.8%) and the other half responded “no” (50.2%). Those who answered yes were then asked “Why would you be disturbed to have a Syrian as your neighbor?” Here, the findings are remarkable. 52.3% of the Turkish people expressed that they would not be pleased to have a Syrian neighbor due to the “concern that Syrians may do harm to their family or their person.” Interestingly, that perception got higher rates out of the region, which is basically indicative of a perception problem. With a rate of 15.9%, the second most prominent reason expressed by Turkish people is that they do not feel culturally close to Syrians. When compared to those out of the region, people in the region feel slightly more distant to Syrians.

10. Citizenship

One of the striking results of “Syrian Refugees in Public Perception Survey Research” is related to the citizenship. Despite embracing Syrians, Turkish people are widely against conferment of citizenship. Support for the proposition “Refugees should be conferred Turkish citizenship” got only 7.7 %. A clear refusal is expressed by 84.5%, which is an unmatched result among all cases of this research. When this is analyzed in terms of political party spectrum, it is observed that there is no significant difference in the attitudes on citizenship. Conclusion is that this could be a politically risky area which should be taken in consideration for developing policies of integration in future.

11. Views of Turkish Society Concerning the Permanence of Syrians

Through several proposals in the survey research, the study titled “Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration, has attempted to explain Turkish people’s opinions of coexistence and predictions on the prospects of over 1.5 million Syrians who have been in Turkey for 3.5 years by now. As a first step, Turkish people’s perceptions of Syrian permanence is investigated. Findings are striking on “the aftermath of the war in Syria”. It is reported that 45.1% of Turkish society expect all Syrians to return home.

The remaining 54.9% think that Syrians will stay in Turkey either partially or wholly. This means that more than half of the Turkish society believes that Syrians will stay in Turkey in some way or another.

It should be emphasized that opinions here display no significant distinction between provinces in/out of the region, political affiliations or age groups.

The expectation regarding the permanence of Syrians is of vital importance for the prospects of coexistence. In line with that, strong support for the proposal of “Syrian presence in Turkey may cause severe problems” is noteworthy.

Expectations regarding Syrians being integrated into Turkish society are on quite limited levels. A related proposal had a similar amount of support as the “cultural proximity” question. A serious segment of Turkish people (66.9%) does not believe that Syrians would be integrated into Turkish society. In terms of integration, the AKP (27.8%) and BDP-HDP (35.6%) voters are rather hopeful.

The proposal formulated as “Refugees should be provided countrywide residence and policies should be developed addressing their employment and integration.” had 38.2% support. However, a larger amount of 47% thinks that integration strategies are unnecessary. This is the result of demoralization and a lack of hope in society. The increasing Syrian population in Turkey sometimes triggers claims that this is a deliberate state policy on demographics. A proposal was formulated regarding the possible association between Syrians and President Erdoğan’s frequently expressed request to produce “3 children” as a condition to form “a strong state”. However, the proposal that a “Population increase through Syrians will lead Turkey to be a stronger country.” had little support (12.3%). The rate of those who disagree with the idea that the contribution of Syrians will lead to a stronger state is 70.6%.

12. Social Sensitivity and Crisis Management

The proposal that “*Turkish people embraced Syrian Refugees*” was asked in order to reach evidence on the interest and support for Syrians in Turkey, as this proposal had enormous support of 79%, where the rate of those

who disagree is only 9.8%. This indicates that Turkish people think “they did their part”.

An important aspect of the Syrian crisis is its management. The proposition of “The state displayed efficient management concerning the refugees.” was included in the survey research in order to understand the perception of society on crisis management. 31.8% of Turkish people agree with the proposal, while 49.7% are dissatisfied. Here, there is a huge gap between those who vote for the AKP and those who do not. Also, the approach regarding state performance is rather negative in the region than out of it.

Conclusion

It no longer seems possible to base Turkey’s Syrian policy on “temporariness”. Actions that are postponed, halted or neglected due to the expectation of “temporariness” may bring severe problems in future. Therefore, while doing what should be done through domestic and foreign policy for Syrians to return home, it is necessary to recognize that a significant proportion of them will stay in Turkey permanently and strategies of coexistence must be developed in line with that. While making strategies of that sort, especially during the management of dynamic process, a science-based approach should be embraced by utilizing the knowledge and counsel of experts, academicians, NGOs, international institutions and organizations. It is of vital importance that the strategies related to “permanence” should be human and rights based, and the support of Turkish society should be gained. It is not the time for holding someone accountable-guilty, rather it is the time for a human and rights based resolution for the sake of the future of Turkey.

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Dealing with Refugee Flows in Austria – A Crisis of Policy?

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Introduction

The last months were characterized by a large influx of refugees from the Middle East to Europe. Most of the refugees arriving in European countries stem from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The number of first time asylum seekers in the second quarter of 2015 compared to the same quarter in 2014 increased by 85% (EUROSTAT: Quarterly report September 2015). While refugees were leaving everything behind and risking their lives in hope of escaping from war and political instability, the European Union in general and Austria in particular were extremely overburdened with dealing with a constantly growing number of incoming refugees. Although the importance of finding a common EU strategy and developing a fair Burden-Sharing became more and more evident, a consensus between the EU Member States could not be reached. The EU's policy to deal with the refugee crisis has completely failed.

Not only did the EU's policy fail, but also the Austrian government was not able to deal with the crisis. Austria received thousands of refugees per day, most of them wanting to continue their journey to Germany, Sweden or to another European country. For those who have chosen to apply for asylum in Austria no appropriate support has been offered, forcing thousands of refugees to sleep in the streets or tents. In order to prevent an intensification of the humanitarian crisis, the Austrian civil society played a central role in providing support for the exhausted refugees. Civil society organizations such as the Austrian Red Cross and especially large numbers of volunteers have provided food, clothes as well as first aid. Moreover, besides assistance in regard to basic needs, they have given a feeling of being welcome. Thousands of volunteers have worked at the borders in "Nickelsdorf" and "Spielfeld", and at the "Westbahnhof" and

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“Hauptbahnhof” in Vienna as well as at the train station in Salzburg and at various reception centers. Without their work, the so called “refugee crisis” would have turned into a “humanitarian crisis” of a much larger scale.

This paper deals with Europe’s response to the current refugee crisis in general, and with Austria’s policy towards the refugee issue in particular. Its main focus lies on the role of civil society and the inabilities of the state agencies to deal with this humanitarian crisis. It does so by analyzing the situation in the Traiskirchen refugee camp and the fight between local governments and the federal government in regard to the distribution of refugees in the country. Both examples serve as examples for the state’s failed refugee policy. The paper first gives an overview of refugee flows in Europe. In a second stage the article sets the current refugee crisis into context with the broader debates on the integration of migrants. In a last step the engagement of the civil society is analyzed.

The recent refugee crisis and asylum applications in Austria

The year 2015 was characterized by an immense increase of refugee flows into Europe. In comparison to the second quarter of 2014 the number of first time asylum seekers in Europe in the same quarter increased by 85%. The number has reached 213 200. (EUROSTAT: Quarterly report September 2015)

According to EUROSTAT the three largest asylum seeker communities in the EU came from Syria, Iraq and Albania (EUROSTAT: Quarterly report September 2015).

In the second quarter of 2015 most Syrian refugees were registered in Germany, followed by Hungary, Austria and Sweden. As for the Afghanis about half per cent were seeking asylum protection in Hungary, and about 90% of the Albanians applied for asylum in Germany. In ten EU-Member States Syrians made up the main citizenship of asylum applicants. (EUROSTAT: Quarterly report September 2015).

Concerning Austria in the second quarter of 2015 the third largest absolute increase of asylum application in the EU was recorded. (EUROSTAT: Quarterly report September 2015). In the period January until September 2015 Austria’s asylum seekers were mainly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. (BMI: Vorläufige Asylstatistik September 2015).

The way to Europe – A choice between bad and worse

As referred above Austria's asylum seekers mostly have their origin in the Middle East. The Middle East is currently experiencing a dark period characterized by conflicts, unstable regimes and economic downturn. An ending of Syria's four year lasting internal conflict is currently not in sight, while military confrontation is continuing. Syrian refugees make up about 4 million people, most of them living in Turkey, in Lebanon, in Jordan, in Iraq, in Egypt as well as in other Northern African States. (UNHCR: Press Release: 09/07/2015). The limited livelihood opportunities lead to a feeling of insecurity and loss of future perspectives. Many suffer from high costs of living and restricted access to legal employment. In many cases savings are already spent and refugees have difficulties in covering their basic needs. Due to the lack of access to legal work, they are forced to resort to informal employment risking exploitation or they have to work in unsafe conditions. In Jordan for example working illegally can lead to be returned to a camp. In Lebanon, refugees have to sign and declare not to work when renewing their residency status. Aid programmes face chronic financial cut-backs. The food aid cuts, which affect thousands of refugees, are a central reason for leaving the country. Difficult conditions in refugee camps force Syrians to beg and to make use of child labor and marriages in a young age. (UNHCR: EuropePress briefing by Adrian Edwards: 2015). The lack of access to healthcare and limited opportunities of education further intensify the situation. Migration is considered (UNHCR: EuropePress briefing by Adrian Edwards: 2015). Iraq and Afghanistan are still characterized by political instability leaving the population without any future perspectives. Due to limited alternative possibilities to reach the EU, refugees are pushed into illegality and forced to turn to smugglers.

The end of Dublin regulations?

According to the Dublin regulations the state where a refugee enters EU territory first is responsible for the asylum procedure. The consequence is that the EU external border countries are overwhelmed with large numbers of refugees. They are not able to offer full services to refugees, can't fulfill their duty in asylum procedures and don't feel responsible to handle the refugee problem alone. In the case of Greece for example, the European Court of Justice of the EU and the European Court of Human Rights declared

that conditions for refugees are inhuman and therefore Dublin regulations are not to be implemented there. (Guild et al: 2015. p. 4). In fact the distribution of asylum seekers across the EU is very uneven. Especially this crisis showed that the EU is in a need of a new system with far reception quotas for asylum seekers.

The Dublin system has to be reconsidered. It is necessary to ensure that obligations for the reception of refugees are fulfilled. The EU Member States have to agree on a fair distribution key. Therefore new measures by the EU are necessary. (Guild et. Al: 2015). It is important to find a common European response to meet the EU's collective obligations in international law, according to the EU legal order, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as the EU Treaties and legislation. European interior ministers met on September the 14th 2015 to discuss the refugee crisis and to find ways out. But it remains a challenge to reach a common strategy – the suggestion to relocate 120 000 asylum-seekers from Greece, Hungary, and Italy to other Member States under a quota system was not approved. Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland as well as Hungary belong to the most skeptical EU-Member States in terms of a quota system. (Guild et al: 2015).

Austria's history with migration and the political discourse

Austria has a long history concerning migration flows, which can be traced back to the Habsburg Empire. In the 1960s and 1970s the dominant form of migration in Austria was the so called "guest-worker" migration. Temporarily labor migrants were recruited in order to fulfil the national labor needs. (UNHCR: October 2013)_

Dealing with refugee flows is nothing new for Austria: between 1989 and 1993 Austria received huge numbers of refugees, who fled from the Yugoslav war. These refugees were given permanent status. (Mourão Permoser / Rosenberger: 2012. p.42). However, the process to be granted refugee status can take several years. Their rights during this period are extremely limited and often people are forced to return back to their origin countries after spending years in Austria. (Mourão Permoser / Rosenberger: 2012. p.42). Asylum seekers for example have restricted access to social rights and do not benefit from labor or welfare policies. (Mourão Permoser / Rosenberger: 2012. p. 40/41)

How to integrate these people into society was long time not dealt with. Only within the last recent years, integration has become a priority for the Austrian government. It was firstly institutionalized by the creation of the State Secretariat for Integration within the Ministry of Interior in 2011, and became in 2014 a part of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, headed by the Federal Foreign and Integration Minister, Sebastian Kurz. In fact immigrant integration belongs to one of the most controversial topics in Austria. It is mainly focusing on language acquisition and civic education, as well as the sharing of values and norms. (Mourão Permoser / Rosenberger: 2012. p. 40/41) Due to ethnic differences and socio-economic marginalization of migrants (Mourão Permoser / Rosenberger: 2012. p. 46). Politically this also led to the rise of right parties, which were successful in promoting xenophobia among the population.

In the 1990s therefore a negative shift in the political perception of asylum was recorded. It was claimed that Austria has reached its receiving capacities. Asylum seekers were associated with criminality and the exploitation of the welfare state. At this time also the terms “bogus asylum seeker” as well as “economic refugee” occurred. (Mourão Permoser / Rosenberger: 2012. p. 46).

Integration was often used in order to justify restrictive legislation by arguing that migrants and asylum seekers are not enough integrated. The Slogan “” (Integration before new immigration) of the coalition government between the far-right wing party FPÖ and the centre-right party ÖVP made the negative discourse evident. (Mourão Permoser / Rosenberger: 2012. p. 46). A lack of integration has been often connected with religion, in particular with Islam. Muslims are often “.” (Mourão Permoser / Rosenberger: 2012. p. 46).

A very similar discourse is taking place in connection with Europe’s current refugee crisis. Right wing parties highlight the fact that refugees are mainly arriving from Middle Eastern countries and have different traditions, religion and values. According to right wing parties they would be difficult to integrate. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban for example decided to close the Hungarian borders to Serbia and Croatia in order to reduce the number of refugees entering Hungary. (Tirone / Petrakis: 2015) Concerns that refugees would bring in diseases, crime and terrorism are constantly increasing and lead to violent acts against migrants and refugees in various

countries. Although, in Austria violent attacks on refugees have not been recorded so far, the rhetoric of “activists”, anti-immigration initiatives and local platforms as well as the discourse of right-wing parties is getting more and more xenophobic and islamophobic.

At the same time, debates on the motivations of refugees have gained ground. Such discourses divide refugees into humanitarian ones who have fled war and violence and economic ones who are “just” seeking better living conditions. Austrian’s Integration Minister Kurz highlights that the European Union is in need of securing the EU’s external borders. He also distinguishes between “humanitarian” and “economic refugee” arguing that “economic refugees”, cannot be accepted. On the 19th of November he presented a plan with 50 priorities for integrating persons granted asylum. The central elements are language acquisition, entry to the labor market as well as the determination of values. (Austrian Integration Fund). This is being to be achieved by obligatory workshops dealing with European values. (Die Presse: 4 November 2015).

“Traiskirchen” as an example for a failed refugee policy

While the political rhetoric has focused on the “otherness” of refugees and the problems they might cause for security and the labor market or on how to secure and control borders, the state has largely failed to provide humanitarian assistance.

This has been particularly evident in the Traiskirchen refugee center. The camp outside Vienna is run by the private Swiss firm ORS. In 1956, Traiskirchen served as a place of humanitarian services to welcome refugees from the Hungarian Revolution. It is now the biggest refugee camp in the country. It made headlines in media because of the poor care offered for refugees and the inhuman accommodation and sanitary conditions. In the summer of 2015 at the height of the crisis, refugees were forced to sleep under the sky or in tents that were neither rain nor wind proof. According to a report of Amnesty International, asylum seekers were facing insufficient medical care, as well as unhygienic conditions in an overcrowded camp. Many complained about no access to sanitary facilities and the lack of security within the camp. In light of the state’s failure to provide basic needs, individual volunteers and civil society organizations have stepped in. (Al-Jazeera: 2015, Amnesty International: 2015).

Traiskirchen represents just one among many other examples of reception centres where state authorities failed to provide adequate care and assistance.

In addition to the situation, the distribution of asylum seekers within the country hardly functioned. The federal states have failed to take in their allotted quota of asylum seekers. Vienna represented the only federal state that accepted more asylum seekers than its national quota requires. (Der Standard: 2015) A constitutional amendment that gives the federal government the right to create accommodation centres for asylum seekers without the permission of states and municipalities, is with no doubt a positive development in regard to the accommodation of asylum seekers. However, it does not necessarily placate the heated public discourse on their integration.

The involvement of the civil society

Undoubtedly, the Austrian government was absolutely overwhelmed with the huge migrant flows. Thousands of refugees entered the country but wanted to continue travelling to Germany, Sweden or to another destination. This caused an extreme overstraining at the Austrian-Hungarian borders in “Nickelsdorf” as well as at the Austrian-Slovenian borders in “Spielfeld.” While state authorities seemed to be in a state of shock and hardly able to react to the humanitarian dimension of the crisis, civil society played a central role and responded immediately to the need of assistance for refugees.

Volunteers, civil society organisations, the Austrian Federal Railways, supported police and the Austrian Armed Forces in their work at the Austrian borders. They have been an indispensable part of the humanitarian work made at the borders. Refugees could pass the borders freely and were brought by buses to the train stations “Westbahnhof” and “Hauptbahnhof” in Vienna. Refugees with enough money went by taxis. (UNHCR: 25 September 2015). The assistance was mainly managed by the Austrian Red Cross.

At the train stations volunteers offered food, hygienic articles and clothes. While at Westbahnhof the Austrian Red Cross took the organisation and coordination, at Hauptbahnhof a platform named “Train of hope” emerged.

It was an ad-hoc creation of volunteers. Its aim is to offer supply (food, material donations) as well as information about the onward journey. Volunteers and translators are recruited through social media. Train of hope considers providing help as its obligation, especially because the European governments failed in handling the situation. (Train of hope). Due to its efforts "Train of Hope" was nominated by the Austrian League for Human Rights for the Human Rights Price 2015. (Österreichische Liga für Menschenrechte).

These are not the only positive examples of civil society humanitarian assistance. There are many initiatives taking place, one of them is "Flüchtlinge Willkommen (Refugees Welcome)", which is an initiative inviting asylum seekers and refugees to stay in people's spare rooms instead of in mass accommodation centres. (French: 2015). "Refugees Welcome" also organized a concert where more than 150.00 people participated in order to show their solidarity with refugees.

Other initiatives include leisure activities together with refugees or free language course provided by volunteers.

Conclusion

The EU in general and Austria in particular are facing big challenges as regards to the current refugee flows. In the short and middle term view, solutions for the political instability in the Middle East are not in sight. The agreement of the 29th of November 2015 on migration between the EU and Turkey aims at gaining a win-win situation: Turkey would take steps to reduce the migration flows to Europe, while the EU facilitates the entering of Turkish citizens in the EU and provides more financial aid for refugees in Turkey. However, these agreed measures would not really reduce the humanitarian crisis taking place; they would only delocalize it outside Europe.

The international community has to react on the current developments by firstly finding diplomatic solutions for the crisis and the unrest in the Middle East and secondly by integrating the refugees who have already entered Europe. The EU Member States have to find a common strategy regarding the distribution of refugees. They cannot escape any longer from their responsibility to react to the current migrant flows. It became evident

that the Dublin regulations are no longer realizable. Providing possibilities to apply for asylum in the origin countries would enable safe journeys to Europe and prevent refugees from risking their lives. This would also be an effective measure against smugglers.

Austria as well has to deal with its asylum seekers by providing them with the necessary care. The quick and professional engagement of civil society organizations and volunteers prevented a humanitarian crisis in Austria. However, in a long term view the assistance by volunteers is likely to decrease. The government has to act, and to provide better conditions in reception centers. Traiskirchen was and still is an example for a problematic refugee policy. Austria's federal states have to meet their obligations in terms of fulfilling the refugee-reception quotas and the federal government has to insist on that.

One of Austria's biggest challenges will be to fight xenophobia. At the latest after the attacks in Paris 2015, where two refugees were accused to be involved, fear towards refugees has increased. However, statistics show that criminality by refugees in 2014 only made out 2% of the total criminality in Austria. (News: 2015). Thus, many fears are groundless. This has to be stronger communicated. As described above, there are also many positive examples concerning interaction between the local population and refugees.

Although the planned "values workshops" for asylum seekers by the Foreign and Integration Minister Kurz are questionable, the 50-points plan to integrate persons granted asylum and the focus on language and labor are good steps forward.

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The 2015 Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Future of Euro-Mediterranean Relationships

Prof. Dr. Erwan Lannon¹

2015 has put once again the Mediterranean on the top of the international agenda. The deepening of the migratory crisis, the direct military intervention of the Russian Federation in Syria, the consolidation of an “arc of crisis and strategic challenges”² from the Sahel to Afghanistan-Pakistan *via* the Horn of Africa and the Gulf and the terrorist attacks in Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, France and Mali, to name a few, are unfortunately only some of the indicators of the very serious global deterioration of the situation.

The revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the European Security Strategy are clear signs that the European Union (EU) and its Member States are trying and willing to adapt their strategies in the light of the evolution of the geopolitical context. However, the refugee crisis has shown a deep divide among the EU Member States, whereas most of the proposals put forward in the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative on the review of the ENP, published on 18th November 2015, will have to be discussed in 2016 and could lead, in 2017, to a difficult revision of some of the provisions of the current ENP financial instrument.

Are the EU and its Member States well equipped to face these challenges and did the European Commission and the High Representative put the right proposals forward in November 2015? These are pressing questions

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2 See E. Lannon, “Introduction: the ‘neighbours of the EU’s neighbours’, the ‘EU’s broader neighbourhood’ and the ‘arc of crisis and strategic challenges’ from the Sahel to Central Asia”, in S. Gstohl & E. Lannon, “The Neighbours of the European Union’s Neighbours-Diplomatic and Geopolitical Dimensions beyond the European Neighbourhood Policy”, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014, pp. 1-25.

to be answered. Given the need to put these issues into perspective it is necessary to make a brief overview of the Euro-Mediterranean Relationships from 1957 until 2006 (I). Then the current fragmented cooperation frameworks for Euro-Mediterranean Relationships (II) will be analysed in the light of the proposals contained in the 2015 review of the ENP (III).

I. The Euro-Mediterranean Relationships from 1957 until 2006

If we look back to the Euro-Mediterranean relations' history, that started with some provisions inserted within the 1957 Rome Treaty, it is obvious that these relations have always been characterised by up and downs depending on the evolution regional and international contexts and the political will of the different parties.

The first attempts of the European Economic Community

The signature of the 1957 EEC Treaty can be considered as a starting point for the relations between the EEC and the Mediterranean. Article 227 § 2 of the EEC Treaty referred to the peculiar situation of Algeria, a situation that ended in March 1962 with the conclusion of the Evian negotiations, which led to the independence of Algeria. Several 'declarations of intend' with a view to associate to the EEC: Libya, Morocco and Tunisia were also inserted into the final act of the Rome Treaty. The aims of these declarations were threefold: to take into account the agreements concluded between France and Italy and the Maghreb countries; to enhance trade relations; and to contribute to the development of those countries. At this stage "economic association conventions" were envisaged for the future. The first association agreements were however only concluded at the end of the 1960s with Morocco and Tunisia. Those *transitory agreements*, concluded for 5 years, were limited to trade relations. At the beginning of the 1960's and during the 1970's four association agreements were also signed with the Northern Mediterranean countries: Greece, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. The main objective of these agreements was to give the possibility to become Member States of the EEC.

This first period (1957-1971) was thus characterised by a post-colonial context that implied the perspective of privileged relationships

(association conventions), a strong differentiation between the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean on the one hand, and the Northern (European) Mediterranean, on the other hand. Moreover, the strategy was limited to bilateralism.

The Global Mediterranean Policy

From the beginning of the 1970's the EEC and its Member States tried to develop a first proper 'Global Mediterranean Policy' (1972), going beyond pure trade relations with an important development cooperation component. Concretely it took the form of new 'cooperation agreements' and the conclusion of five years bilateral financial protocols. At that time however no real multilateral framework was put in place, bilateralism remained the rule but the approach became more holistic. A renewed Mediterranean Policy was put in place between 1992-1995 to answer the consequences of the fall of the Berlin wall for the Mediterranean (fear of marginalisation of the Mediterranean countries) and the creation of the EU. This renewed policy was conceived as being a transition between the Global Mediterranean Policy and the future Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). What was noticeable, in this period, was that a greater attention was paid to the civil society networks in the framework of the financial cooperation.

The European Union and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The 1990's were marked by the end of the Cold War, the creation of the EU with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993 and the launching in 1995 of an ambitious Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that was based on a strong multilateral framework (the Barcelona Process) and a new generation of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) establishing progressively bilateral Free Trade Areas (FTAs). A quite strong 'spirit of partnership', meaning a real sense of ownership, was one of the main characteristics of the process. The fact that the European Commission played the role of the secretariat, promoting the general interest of the EU Member states but also, to a certain extent, of all the partners is to be underlined. Numerous ministerial conferences were held after the November 1995 Barcelona Conference, thus reinforcing this sense of ownership. The

context was of course very different compared to the current one, with noticeable progress on the Middle-East peace process track for instance. The situation deteriorated however quite quickly with the degradation of the situation in the Middle East. The atmosphere of the first Summit to celebrate the 10 years of the Barcelona Process was for instance very tensed and put forward the limits of the EMP consensual approach.

The long genesis of the ENP: 2002-2006

Between 2002 and 2006 the ENP was progressively put in place after the 2002 Copenhagen European Council concluded that: “the enlargement will strengthen relations with Russia. The European Union also wishes to enhance its relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the southern Mediterranean countries based on a long-term approach promoting democratic and economic reforms, sustainable developments and trade”³. A series of communications of the European Commission were then published between 2003 and 2006 to, very progressively, define the methodology, instruments and final objectives of the ENP. This very long and difficult genesis is to be emphasized as it illustrates the absence of a clear common strategic vision of what should - or should not - be the ENP.

The major differences with the EMP were that the ENP was primarily European interests based and encompassed not only Mediterranean countries but also East European countries (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine), and, from 2004 on, three Southern Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). The later was a direct consequence of Russia’s refusal to participate to the ENP, a first major setback for the EU. Another major difference is that the ENP was conceived to anticipate the consequences of the future (2004 and 2007) enlargements of the EU and was based on the pre-accession methodology (evaluation reports, alignment on the *acquis*, strong conditionality etc.) without however offering the perspective of the accession as such to the EU or even envisaging an appropriate financial support for launching so many and deep political and socio-economic reforms. The lack of ownership was also obvious, given the fact that no common founding declaration was even envisaged. Bilateralism but also

3 Conclusions of the Presidency of the 12th December 2002 European Council, Copenhagen, point 24.

unilateralism (a European policy primarily based on European interests) were reinforced, whereas the multilateral dimension was weakened by the vicissitudes of the first years of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

II. The current fragmented cooperation frameworks for Euro-Mediterranean Relationships

Today, the current cooperation frameworks for Euro-Mediterranean Relationships are very complex and quite fragmented.

The residuals of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The residuals of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are mainly the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that are now used by for the implementation of some aspects of the ENP, through the creation of thematic association sub-committees notably. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), envisaged with Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan, will be created on the basis of these, sometimes quite old agreements, as for instance the one with Tunisia was signed in 1995 even before the Barcelona Conference. Moreover, the 2010 global Euro-Mediterranean FTA, a key objective of the Barcelona declaration, has not been reached. The problem is that these old association agreements were conceived for the objectives of the 1995 EMP not for the ENP.

The Union for the Mediterranean

Since 2008 the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) covers 43 countries and its Barcelona based Secretariat concentrates on promoting ('labelling') concrete multilateral Euro-Mediterranean projects and more recently has been tasked to re-launch the sectoral Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial meetings. However, this initiative proved originally to be very detrimental to the multilateral dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean relations (the former Barcelona Process). A new impulse was given with the appointment of a new Secretary General and a few sectoral conferences were held since then. The problem is that much time has been lost and that, for the time being, the geo-political context allows limited high-level multilateral convergence.

The European Neighbourhood Policy

The European Neighbourhood Policy as such encompasses now the EU's strategic vision (strategy papers/Joint Communications) and a substantial share of the EU's financial bilateral and multi-country cooperation through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). But countries like Belarus, Syria and Libya or to a less extent Algeria still do not participate fully in this policy. Other beneficiaries of the ENP like Armenia and Azerbaijan also refused to negotiate a DCFTA with the EU, because of the strong pressure of Russia. One of the major objectives of the ENP, put forward by the 2002 European Council, was to avoid the creation of "new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union". Today, Crimea has been annexed and the cease fire in the Donbas remains fragile; South Ossetia and Abkhazia are *de facto* new borders in Europe whereas Syria and Libya are facing terrible civil wars, the whole region being more unstable than ever.

The pre-accession track: Turkey and the Balkans

Turkey is still on the pre-accession track and included in the UfM but is not a beneficiary of the ENP. In the Balkans, one should recall that the candidates countries are currently: Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia; the potential candidates being: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In any case, the President of the European Commission has taken the decision with the consent of the Member States that there will be no accession during the five years of his mandate and even renamed the former DG enlargement of the European Commission: "DG European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations", putting *de facto* these countries in a grey area.

To conclude this first point one can consider, on the one hand, that the EU approach is quite fragmented, but, on the other hand, the whole Mediterranean looks also much more fragmented compared to 1995. There is more divergence than convergence in the Euro-Mediterranean area to the point that it would be very difficult to organise a Barcelona conference today. The challenge of proposing a new approach for the ENP was thus considerable.

III. The 2015 European Neighbourhood Policy Review

A 2015 'review' after a 2011 'revision'

The review and consultation process⁴, “proposed by President Juncker and requested by EU Member States”⁵, and launched by Mrs Mogherini and Mr Hahn on 4th March 2015 took place four years after the first (2011) ENP revision that was effectively implemented with the entry into force of the new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) in March 2014. This meant, from the start of the process, that no new financial regulation (and financial envelope) as such could be negotiated before 2020, but that amendments could eventually be introduced during the mid-term revision of the financial cooperation foreseen in 2017. The problem is that the situation is evolving very quickly on the ground.

The EU Member States, in the 20 April 2014 Council conclusions ‘on the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, affirmed the “four priority areas that the current ENP review seeks to address: ‘Differentiation’; ‘Focus’ (including inter alia security, economic development and trade, good governance, migration, energy and human rights); ‘Flexibility’; and ‘Ownership and Visibility’” adding that these “areas reflect the key principles that should help define a more streamlined ENP, in line with the EU’s political priorities and interests”⁶. In other words, the Member States framed the – at that time – future joint communication.

The 2015 Joint Communication on the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy

The joint communication on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy⁷ was published on 18 November 2015. It is however important

4 See European Commission and High Representative Joint Consultation Paper, Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 4 March 2015, <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/consultation/consultation.pdf>

5 European Commission and High Representative, Joint communication on the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 18 November 2015 JOIN(2015) 50 final, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf, p. 2

6 See point 6 of the conclusions available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/20-council-conclusions-review-european-neighbourhood-policy/>

7 JOIN(2015) 50 final, op. cit.

to stress that: “the EU proposes to start a new phase of engagement with partners in 2016, consulting on the future nature and focus of the partnership”⁸ and that: “the EU will use the mid-term review of EU external financing instruments in 2017 to look at streamlining administrative procedures and, where required, proposals will be made to amend the underlying legal acts”.⁹ In other words, in principle, no real fundamental change will be introduced before mid-2017 as far as financial cooperation instruments are concerned. As a consequence the “new ENP will seek to deploy the *available instruments and resources* in a more coherent and flexible manner”¹⁰. So the question is: ‘what is really new in this ‘new’ ENP’?

The joint communication is articulated around four points, namely:

- Stabilising the neighbourhood;
- Stronger neighbourhood, stronger partnerships;
- Good governance, democracy Rule of Law, and human rights;
- Proposed joint priorities for cooperation;
- The regional dimension;
- More effective delivery.

It is important to stress that most of the elements referred to in the joint communication are already in place. Most of the proposals are about re-focussing the priorities or improving and enhancing current initiatives. There are however some quite new proposals.

A new focus

According to the joint communication: there will be “a new focus on stepping up work with our partners on security sector reform, conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation policies, in full compliance with international human rights law. (...) Safe and legal mobility and tackling

8 *ibid.* p. 4.

9 *Ibid* p. 20.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 3. Emphasis added.

irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling are also priorities”¹¹. Security and migration were identified among the six priorities areas by the Council in April (see above). The four others (economic development and trade, good governance, energy and human rights) are also tackled throughout the joint communication. So the focus will change as for the revision of 2011 the keywords were: promoting deep democracy in the Mediterranean and ‘deeper political association and economic integration’ with the EU. This remains valid for the partners having the political will to do so. But should be understood is that is that for ‘security’ and ‘migration’, other EU policies, outside the ENP framework, will have to be taken into consideration.

A new methodology?

In terms of methodology, the conditionality, reinforced with new deep democracy criteria in 2014, will be now be more ‘adapted’, at bilateral level, to the engagement of the partners. The joint communication states that: “the incentive-based approach (“More for More”) has been successful in supporting reforms (...) where there is a commitment by partners to such reforms. However, it has not proven a sufficiently strong incentive to create a commitment to reform, where there is not the political will. In these cases, the EU will explore more effective ways to make its case for fundamental reforms with partners, including through engagement with civil, economic and social actors”. More concretely, there “will no longer be a single set of progress reports on all countries simultaneously. Instead the EU will seek to develop a new style of assessment, focusing specifically on meeting the goals agreed with partners”. Moreover, for “those partners who prefer to focus on a more limited number of strategic priorities, the reporting framework will be adjusted to reflect the new focus”¹². This means that the regional regular reports (South-East of the ENP) will “contain the elements required under the (ENI) Regulation” on “fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, gender equality and human rights issues”¹³ but the bilateral evaluations will be differentiated. This could mean a double standard approach: the current ENI deep democracy criteria

11 Ibid., p. 3.

12 Ibid. p. 5.

13 Ibid. p. 5.

for bilateral evaluations for those willing too deepen political association and economic integration with the EU (Moldova, Ukraine Georgia, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan mainly) and a different one, more limited, for countries not willing to do so. This is not in line with the current ENI regulation that would need to be amended.

The neighbours of the EU neighbours

The issue of the neighbours of the EU neighbours (Sahel, Horn of Africa, Gulf and Central Asia) mentioned by the Commission in 2006¹⁴ has been now been taken into consideration a different levels. According to the joint communication: the “new ENP will now seek to involve other regional actors, beyond the neighbourhood, where appropriate, in addressing regional challenges”.¹⁵ This is certainly a good initiative that could be enlarged to other areas of cooperation¹⁶, the trans-national/regional issues (migration, security, energy) being prioritised. Moreover, in this regard, the EU “will use Thematic Frameworks to offer cooperation on regional issues (...) to provide a regular forum to discuss joint policy approaches, programming and investment that reach beyond the neighbourhood”¹⁷, Turkey being mentioned explicitly in this framework.

The security factor

What is striking is the importance given to the security dimension and more especially CFSP. If some bridges between the CFSP and the ENP have been created from the start of the ENP, like the alignment of partners on EU CFSP declarations or the participation of partners to CSDP missions and operation,¹⁸ the joint communication, in the section devoted to security,

14 See Erwan Lannon (2014) op. cit.

15 Ibid. p. 3

16 See: S. Gstohl and E. Lannon (eds), “The European Union’s Broader Neighbourhood: Challenges and opportunities for cooperation beyond the European Neighbourhood Policy”, Routledge, 2015, 348 p.

17 Ibid. p. 18.

18 The Naval operation EUNAVFOR recently renamed ‘Sophia’ by Mrs Mogherini is the current main example in the Mediterranean together with EUBAM Rafah, EUBAM Libya and EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories).

identified seven main areas:

- Security sector reform;
- Tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation;
- Disrupting organised crime;
- Fighting cybercrime;
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Risk Mitigation;
- Common Security and Defence Policy;
- Crisis management and response.

The idea of ensuring a better coherence between the CFSP and the ENP is definitely a good initiative, but it is important to understand that these are two distinct policies that do not involve the same logic, methodology and procedures at decision making level. Therefore there is a need to avoid an excessive strengthening of the intergovernmental approach, which, by definition, would be based on the lowest common denominator and could contaminate and paralyse the ENP.

The migratory factor

The migratory factor is also a key focus. Under the heading: 'migration and mobility', five elements are put forward:

- Develop partnerships based on an integrated approach;
- Promote mutually-beneficial migration and mobility;
- Ensuring protection for those in need;
- Tackling irregular migration;
- Stepping up cooperation on border management.

Here the novelty is mainly to incorporate the latest developments of the refugee crisis, and corresponding EU initiatives and decisions and to develop a more holistic approach including the neighbours of the EU neighbours. Some proposals like: "a platform of dialogue with businesses, trade unions and social partners (...) to better assess labour market needs"; the creation of a "new start-up (Startback) fund to provide capital to promote brain

circulation"¹⁹; the reference to 'circular migration' and the links to be made with 'diaspora communities' must be highlighted.

Some proposals of specific interest

Even if the 'new ENP' means mainly to (re-)focus on some new priorities and to adopt a more flexible approach in certain areas, most of the actions and programmes mentioned in the joint communication are already in place. However, some novelties should be underlined:

- The "Commission and the High Representative will (...) examine the case for a 'flexibility cushion' within the ENI, i.e. to set aside resources until used for urgent programming of unforeseen needs"²⁰;
- The "engagement with young people across the neighbourhood will be stepped up by creating partnerships for youth. These partnerships will promote people to people contacts and networks for young people (...). It should include a substantial increase in exchanges between schools and universities, including the potential for a pilot-project of a European School in the neighbourhood"²¹;
- "The development 'Friends of Europe' clubs and alumni networks" ; "networks of "youth ambassadors"; "creation of fora to enable exchanges between young leaders and future opinion formers from across the EU and its neighbourhood."²²

Conclusion: Towards a more Strategic, Differentiated and Intergovernmental ENP

The near future is very unpredictable given the development of very difficult humanitarian, (geo-)political and socio-economic challenges. In the short term, the EU and its Member States should answer the major challenges posed by the situations in Syria, Iraq and Libya and its humanitarian consequences, including the refugee camps in neighbouring

19 Ibid. p. 16.

20 Ibid. p. 20

21 Ibid p. 21

22 Ibid p. 21.

countries and the issue of foreign fighters. The migratory factor has always been a major issue in Euro-Mediterranean relations. However the progressive externalisation of EU's border controls has generated many questions at the level of human rights protection for example. Now the current crisis is quite unique but must be first of all considered as being a humanitarian crisis. For instance, the potential impact of the 18th May decision of the Council to establish an EU *military* operation - EUNAVFOR Med- to break the business model of smugglers and traffickers of people in the Mediterranean²³ generated strong negative reactions, including an impressive petition of academics.

The recent engagement of Russian forces in Syria is certainly a major event. Washington and Moscow are now directly and officially engaged in "combat over the same country for the first time since World War Two". It is also "the first time Moscow has ordered its forces into combat outside the frontiers of the former Soviet Union" since the 1980s Afghanistan campaign".²⁴ In other words, the strategic situation has changed with the first Russian air and naval strikes. Following the terrorist's attacks in Paris, the 'mutual assistance clause' based on Article 42(7) TEU²⁵ was activated, for the first time, on 17 November 2015 by France and unanimously supported by the EU Member States who expressed their readiness to provide "all the necessary aid and assistance". The High Representative pointed out that: "offers may consist of material assistance and of support in theatres of operation where France is engaged" and underlined that "this is not a CSDP operation, but an activation of aid and assistance"²⁶. At NATO level, the collective defence clause of the article 5 of the Washington Treaty has not been (yet) activated but the UNSR 2249 (2015), adopted

23 See the Council decision at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D0778&qid=1435825940768&from=EN>

24 Reuters, Iran troops to join Syria war, Russia bombs group trained by CIA, 2 October 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/02/us-mideast-crisis-russia-syria-idUSKCN0RV41020151002>

25 Article 42(7) TEU: "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States."

26 Outcome of the 3426th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 16 and 17 November 2015, p. 6.

on 20th November, called UN Member States to “redouble and coordinate their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL (...) and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and other terrorist groups” and to “eradicate the safe haven they have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria”. The members of the UNSC are: “determined to combat by *all means* this unprecedented threat to international peace and security”²⁷. One should also recall that article 4²⁸ of the Washington Treaty has been activated by Poland and Turkey in 2014 and 2015. Turkey, being NATO’s pillar in the region, is definitively on all frontlines.

An appropriate response to the challenges of the democratic transition in Tunisia is a key short-term priority. The EU and its Member States cannot afford to miss the opportunity to support one of the only genuine democratic transitions in the Southern Mediterranean. The EU and its Member States can notably help in key sectors like the reform of judiciary and transitional justice or support the Small and Medium Sized Enterprises. The participation of Tunisia to the EU agencies and programs in order to accompany the DCFTA negotiations is also very important.

In the medium term it will be indispensable to ensure and sometimes restore EU’s credibility. Credibility can only be founded on a consistent approach of the EU and its Member States. A Double standard approach regarding the implementation of conditionality clauses for example will always be damageable in the medium/long-term and fuel the jihadist’s discourse. Thus, it is very important that the EU, its institutions and Member States develop a coherent approach in order to avoid criticism at the level of the implementation of conditionality. More differentiation and flexibility is possible, but any kind of discrimination should be avoided. Also reallocation of funding in case of breach of the conditionality clauses should be the rule and should not depend on the ‘political engagement’ of the partner *vis à vis* the EU.

27 See: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12132.doc.htm>. Emphasis added.

28 Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, states that: “the parties will consult whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties is threatened.”

What is proposed in the 2015 Joint Communication is mainly to deepen differentiation and flexibility within the ENP and to refocus some of its priorities, even if for instance stability, security, prosperity were already, in 2002, the main general objectives. What is obvious is that the ENP is becoming more and more strategic and also more intergovernmental. On the other hand, ownership might be reinforced, as a set of concrete proposals will be discussed in 2016. If rapid action is needed in certain areas (Humanitarian aid, Counter-terrorism), deep and shared impact analyses are indispensable to avoid launching any counter-productive initiative in a very dangerous strategic context.

The Libyan Crisis: Adjusting The Fire

Roberto Aliboni¹

Today, violent conflict and extremism are centered in the Fertile Crescent and Yemen, with instability spilling over to almost everywhere in the region. North Africa, especially the Maghreb, remains somehow apart. In Tunisia there is even a promising trend towards the installation of a democratic regime. The civil war and power vacuum in Libya, however, are opening the way for violent conflict and extremism in the whole of North Africa. Egypt, already significantly affected by both political and economic instability, is particularly threatened by the Libyan crisis.

Thus, the crisis in Libya, a country lying dead centre in North Africa, cannot but be foremost in Western and international concerns and has to be tackled. On the other hand, success in Libya would represent a breakthrough for the entire region and offer international diplomacy a chance to shed its present helplessness. While implausible in Syria, a diplomatic breakthrough is still possible in Libya. Therefore it is worth being pursued.

So what collective action could the D-10 countries undertake in order to prevent the Libyan crisis from affecting all of North Africa and worsening the region-wide trends towards instability?

Collective military action, in the form of counterterrorism and police interventions, is often being proposed internationally as a way to counter the expansion towards and in Libya of ISIS and the criminal organizations that direct illegal migration towards Southern Europe across the Mediterranean Sea.

As the UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya) mediation has not succeeded so far in reaching a political agreement supported internationally (and by the D-10 countries), collective military action has been invoked as a Plan B to solve the crisis. The point of this paper is that, while a political solution in Libya, once enforced, would help solve security spillovers affecting the West and the region, the reverse is not necessarily

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true. Military or police action in the framework of the current state vacuum can only be weak and ineffective, and would inevitably be biased in favor of the internationally-recognized Tobruk faction. This would therefore exacerbate and perpetuate the civil conflict in Libya and open the door even more to extremism.

For these reasons, collective action should be aimed primarily at bringing the UNSMIL mediation to a successful conclusion. This does not exclude the use of military or police instruments. They should be seen, however, only as a component part in the implementation of a political agreement and agreed upon by a national unity government in the framework of international law. This is why this paper looks at paths to pursue for achieving a political solution.

Improving the UNSMIL draft agreement

At the end of April, UNSMIL submitted a draft agreement to the parties. UNSMIL proposed (a) to form a government of independent and/or trusted national figures with a Cabinet composed of a President and two Deputies that decides by consensus; (b) to maintain the House of Representatives (HoR); and (c) to establish a new large consultative body, the State Council, whose members would be selected by the civil society organizations participating in the Libyan Political Dialogue.

The draft was promptly rejected by many representatives of the coalition sitting in Tripoli (the Misratan “revolutionary” elite and Islamist groups). Yet, the moderates recently emerged in Misrata, while rejecting the UN draft, have nevertheless underscored their willingness to continue to negotiate.

What they resent the most is that the HoR, the parliament they do not recognize, would remain. Furthermore, their perception is exacerbated by the possibility that the Constitutional Committee may prove unable to draft a Constitution within the one year the draft agreement gives the government and the HoR, as in this case both of them would be extended by one more year.

Misrata expects and deserves an appropriate signal from UNSMIL aimed at emphasizing/clarifying its role in the government and the State Council (where they would be represented by a strong and qualified civil society)

and toning down the significance and role of the HoR in the new transitional period.

This could be done by underscoring that the UNSMIL proposal provides for a strong government to lead the transition, while de-emphasizing the HoR's powers. It would seem only natural that one of the two Deputies will represent the Misrata coalition in a Cabinet (where the rule of consensus should prevent prevarications). Furthermore, a stricter deadline should be set for the Constitutional Drafting Committee – which has already been at work for a long time - and new legislative elections scheduled alongside the constitutional referendum.

The split in the Misrata coalition offers the only substantive opportunity to change the course of events in Libya. It cannot be missed. For Libya to pull itself out of chaos, the polarization between the two camps of revolutionaries and conservatives resulting from the 2012 elections needs to be turned into a broad national understanding between moderate conservatives and the Misrata moderates, pushing Islamists back into the minority, which they in fact are, and excluding extremists from the national political process. While confrontation is a non-starter, an understanding among moderates for a workable democratic arena is a feasible framework to aim at.

To that purpose, moderation must also win in the Tobruk camp, though, where the trend instead is towards extremism and exclusion. This is based on a narrative in which all opponents are Islamists and all Islamists are terrorists, as well as an inclination towards President Al-Sisi's regime that is so strong that it makes both Misratans and Islamists suspect that another dictatorship is around the corner.

Western biases towards Tobruk: General Hefatar, Islamicist extremism, terrorism

The key factor in Tobruk's lack of moderation is the role assigned to General Hefatar, the main sponsor of the just-mentioned narrative and its regional consequences. The Tobruk institutions, while providing Hefatar and the forces around him with ample legitimacy, have failed to frame this move in any broad reform of the security sector. Can Hefatar and the military forces gathering around him be sidelined? The draft agreement says that the new government would assume the functions of the Supreme

Commander of the Libyan Army - thus relieving Heftar and the generals of their present roles. Furthermore, it would issue a law regulating the military sector within three months of its inception. These provisions are too general to be credible. To reassure Misrata and Libyan citizens, more details on the implementation of a security sector must be included in the draft agreement – openly calling for assistance from the “UN, the Arab League and the international community”.

Amb. Léon has set next Ramadan (at mid-June) as the deadline for endorsement of the draft agreement. Instead, he should launch another round of negotiations and submit a fourth version of the draft introducing the amendments suggested here and elsewhere with a view to correcting perceptions, asking for new efforts and enabling the parties to compromise. Some authoritative observers suggest, however, that the draft is flawed in any case because of a more or less open Western bias in favor of Tobruk.

That the Western countries (those most engaged in supporting UNSMIL mediation) are biased towards Tobruk can hardly be denied - although this bias does not always come from a conscious policy orientation. There is no doubt that, even if Western countries are in good faith, the bias has reverberated through the UNSMIL draft agreement commented above. Western concerns about terrorism in the region and Tobruk’s anti-Islamist and anti-terrorist narrative quite naturally make the West tilt toward it, as do other Western alliances and coalitions in the region, such as the anti-ISIS coalition.

It is certain that whatever Plan B Western countries and the international community may resort to will require that Western biases be attenuated. Correcting them can be attempted by enforcing two kinds of measures: (a) amending the UNSMIL proposal (and accompanying these amendments with the necessary pressure – personal sanctions, freezing of assets, limitations on business – so often devised but never enforced), and (b) reconsidering and redefining the West’s regional policies. Let’s turn to the latter.

Redefining Western regional policies in a Libyan perspective

Until the beginning of 2015, the political struggle in Libya had aligned the conservative Tobruk coalition and the revolutionaries/Islamists with conservative Sunni regimes (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt) and reformist Sunni regimes (Turkey and Qatar), respectively. The shifts in the balance of Misrata’s political forces, on the one hand, and the strengthening of

Tobruk's ties to Egypt, on the other, have changed these alignments and their significance: while Tobruk is more bound than ever to the conservative Sunni regional coalition, Misrata, albeit with important differences within the coalition, is tilting towards the UN and has loosened its links to the reformist regional coalition.

Then again, the regional picture regarding the contest between the two Sunni coalitions has also changed. Turkey looks weakened by its confused and inconclusive policies towards the Fertile Crescent. Its regional approach will be reshaped by the outcome of the June elections, and how remains to be seen. Qatar has been pushed into a corner by its GCC fellows, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It has not abandoned its goals of an independent foreign policy, but is cautiously revising its stance and moves. Most of all, the Saudi succession has brought about a shift in the Kingdom's concerns, from the Muslim Brothers to Iran and the Fertile Crescent.

All these factors impact on Libya. In a recent interview with "Al-Hayat", Tripoli Prime Minister Khalifa Ghwell, in confirming his government's interest in a political solution to the Libyan crisis based on dialogue between the parties, underlined "the positive role played by Saudi Arabia in order to support stability in Arab countries". A delegation from Misrata even visited Riyadh.

All this attests to a deep change in regional perspectives and in the Libyan factions' regional alliances. This change should be brought to bear in working toward a political solution in Libya. On the one hand, Misrata's rapprochement with Riyadh is helping to tip the balance between the two Libyan coalitions. Western countries should encourage Riyadh (and the UAE) to continue in this direction. On the other hand, in the new context, the Western countries' diplomacy should seek to influence and shape links between Tobruk and Cairo.

The West – which has already proven to be very sensitive to Egypt's requests for economic support - must recognize that Cairo's concerns about infiltration of its borders from Libya are fully justified and that it requires help. Egypt must be heartily reassured. The West must offer it full support and cooperation to defend its Libyan border, while making it clear however that this can be done only if Libya exits from its crisis and is led by an effective non-partisan government. The West should ask Cairo for more restraint and less interference with respect to Libya and ensure the military forces and resources to effectively control its border with Libya.

Egypt's natural partners in patrolling the border in the UN framework would, no doubt, be the Arab League and the European Union separately or, even better, in cooperation with one another.

Recommendations

Continuing support for UNSMIL mediation should be ensured by improving the draft agreement, in particular:

- emphasizing/clarifying Misrata's role in the government and the State Council, while toning down the HoR's significance and role in the new transitional period;
- giving the Constitutional Drafting Committee a stricter deadline for presenting the Draft Constitution so as to avoid prolonging the HoR's contested legitimacy;
- providing for new elections immediately after the Constitution is submitted to a referendum or, better yet, holding new elections at the same time as the referendum with a view to restoring Misrata's chances of being more fairly represented;
- including more detailed provisions concerning the broad reform of the security sector in the draft agreement;

The possibilities of success of UNSMIL mediation should be strengthened by redefining Western regional policies, in particular by:

- encouraging Saudi Arabia's new approach toward Libya and promoting that approach as a GCC policy;
- reassuring Egypt by recognizing its concerns with regard to its border with Libya and providing generous economic and military assistance to help the country, in return for Egyptian restraint and non-interference towards Libya; as well as stating Western readiness to support a military mission to enforce border security between Libya and Egypt in the UN framework as soon as Libya has a government of national unity;
- reassuring Libya and its neighbors by confirming Western readiness to send in police and military forces to enforce cease-fires, protect infrastructure and keep order where needed, as soon as Libya has a government of national accord unity.

Presentations at METU Panel “International Relations and Area Studies”

June 17 2015

Introduction to the Panel Discussions

Seyfi Taşhan¹

In this panel we will be studying part of the efforts of the Foreign Policy Institute in the field of area studies. According to US academic circles area studies are a form of translation and particularize seeking through analysis of conditions and developments in the cultures and policies of other countries through a multi-disciplinary lens. Indeed this description of area studies will be quite relevant for the academic and government needs of such globally important countries like the US for developing their policies. In the case of Turkey, there is a different outlook. The need for area studies has changed both according to international conjuncture as they affect Turkey and for foreign policy needs.

During the Cold War years, Turkey was a marginal country in the midst of continents and Turkey's main concern was how to secure its independence and boundaries. While it was threatened by a global power, it succeeded to establish an alliance with Europe and US through memberships in Council of Europe and NATO. During this period academic area studies were not much needed as Turkey's need for development of policy relied on its diplomatic network and alternative sources were looked upon.

However, the end of the Cold War highly increased Turkey's need for knowledge in newly created former Soviet countries and renewed interest in the Middle East and the Balkans. Particularly with regard to new Turkic Republics who looked upon this country for friendship, assistance and guidance, the need for knowledge was highly critical for policy function. All through the Cold War, the Foreign Policy Institute was the unique private think-tank engaged in policy and area studies. Following the end of the Cold War, many new centres became involved in strategic and area studies.

1 President of Foreign Policy Institute

During the Cold War and immediately before, Turkey's main concern was security. Turkey was encircled by hostile group of nations all around. That was the Soviet Bloc that had territorial aims on Turkey and Turkey had sought alliance links to balance the Soviet power and succeeded through cooperation with the U.S. and eventually an alliance with NATO. So, during the Cold War if we look at our immediate neighbourhood we have Greece and Bulgaria in the West. Bulgaria was dominated by Soviet Union and Greece we had problems. In the East we had Iran with which we had correct, serious but not necessarily warm relationship that has come through history. Moreover, developments in its Southern neighborhood also necessitated particular focus on them. Relevant states, Iraq and Syria were dominated by other factors that prevented good relations with Turkey as Baath parties were conducting policies close to the Socialist camp. Baath nationalism was also an obstacle to develop friendly relations with Turkey. On the other hand, the everlasting conflict in Cyprus had negative implications on our relations with Greece. Regional problems when they up now and then, we look them from a regional perspective. We could deal with developments in Greece through contacts within the European security arrangements. Beyond this immediate neighbors we reach Russia itself, and then Moldova, Ukraine and Romania and in the south, to Eastern Mediterranean and certainly to North Africa.

The rest was received within the European context covering mainly 2 groups. One is The Council of Europe when we became members in 1949 it was only 12 members and then the start of Turkey's EU membership process when we signed the Ankara treaty in 1963 there were only 6 members. It was such an area fairly hostile, fairly unknown and we did not know what to focus our studies on. Ambassador Oktay Aksoy will deal with area studies we have conducted at this region. But let me tell you, this neighborhood now numbers 20 which is fairly large for Turkey's capacity to handle the know-how required at the time and what we can study in these areas. And I say from the academic point of view that there practically was no sufficient contact with most of those countries. Academically they were living in another world, we were living in another world. We were more pro-European, our education system was pro-European and our main sources of study originated from Western University and Western think-tanks. Well, under these conditions Turkey relied on knowledge from these sources. Fortunately, we have an excellent diplomatic service. This diplomatic service provided ambassadors such as Mr. Hazar who was

part of this diplomatic service until recently. They both can tell you their experiences much better than I do and this diplomatic service provided the Foreign Ministry and also the policy makers of Turkey with detailed reports about countries, their economies, their policies, their cultures where ever they served, their daily living, their education systems and every area they covered and send reports to Turkey. One regretable situation is that these reports, by nature, were confidential and could not be reached by the academia. Moreover, high government officials did not collaborate with think-tanks, in fact during Cold War years there were practically no think-tanks except the Foreign Policy Institute which started to function in early 1970s and this situation changed after the end of the Cold War. When we look around we see at least 20 countries that were suddenly opened to us. And then opening of our economy to other parts of the world provided need for Turkey to obtain wide ranging area studies.

Central Asia was included in addition to our immediate neighbourhood. Relations with European countries was carried through EU and Council of Europe which increased its membership opening to new countries in the European continent and the Eurasian geography. Later on, we started to look at Africa and even to Latin America and Far East Asia. There are other areas that we will discuss. Ambassador Hazar will speak today on the ECO countries. Now we have think-tanks dealing with Africa, that deal individually with Europe. One regretable thing is that these studies do not rely themselves on the excellent reports of our diplomatic representations in many parts of the world. They study these reports as they interest the Turkish foreign policy. They are not communicating it to the academia, unlike the Americans who cooperate with the think-tanks. In the U.S. I see when we have a round table meeting focused on a certain area, on a certain subject we see a diplomat sitting in those discussions, member of the State Department or Defence Department as the case sitting there explaining what the official point of view is and how they can help the think-tanks organize their studies. Unfortunately, in Turkey it is not habitual to benefit from this valuable source of activity and compilation of information. Well, I do not want to delve into this any further. It is a short introduction to our panel discussions. But all I can say to you is, during the Cold War we have organized seminars over specific area subjects, we have done a lot. I will request Ambassador Aksoy to tell us what the Foreign Policy Institute have been doing.

Area focused activities of Foreign Policy Institute

Oktay Aksoy²

Curiosity is behind the urge to discover new lands, to find out the other peoples and to get hold of the riches others possess. The rulers of empires have sent envoys, encouraged and even financed travellers to other lands. You need to have strategic objectives or ambitions to go beyond your own limited borders. That is how Marco Polo was financed by the Venetian Doge to reach the lands of Kubilai Khan, ruler of the East at that time. That is why countries like Holland, England, France, Russia, Poland and Hungary have established Oriental Studies Centres. That is why King of Sweden was presented by the dragoman at the Swedish Embassy in Constantinople, Mouradgea d'Ohsson (nee Muradcan Tosunian) who later became the Swedish Envoy to the Sublime Court with a two volume book, "Tableau General de l'Empire Othoman" narrating in detail the state of the Ottoman Empire in late 18th century, the habits and social structure of the Turks.

You may call these as early attempts for area studies, even though in some of them it may not be easy to distinguish myth and reality. It has become more of a multidisciplinary research and study effort with the US getting more and more involved with the rest of the world, becoming more of a global power after the Second World War. They must have realized their ignorance of the developments in other regions and other countries. With the establishment of international relations departments in many universities they were also preparing the cadres for their foreign service, for their intelligence institutions, sometimes even for the media trying to feed the hunger of the public in world affairs.

Contrary to this curiosity and strategic ambitions of the Western powers, rulers in the Orient were hardly interested to know what the rest of the world was doing or even to learn more about the vast geography they were ruling. They were content with their possessions envied by the others. Ottomans were no exception. They were interested to learn of the designs of the other rulers threatening their security. But not so much about the other countries beyond their reach. Rare incidents are in

² Ambassador (Ret)

16th and 17th centuries when we see Evliya Çelebi (1611-1682) with his "Seyahatname" (travel book) telling in detail the cities and peoples the Sultan ruled. There was a famous scholar, Katip Çelebi (1609-1659) with his "Cihannuma" (a geographical encyclopedia) writing about the other countries. And of course, Piri Reis (1465-1554) with his "Kitab-ı Bahriye" narrating the many ports and cities he had reached and also drawing a world map including the newly discovered Americas. Rumour is that when he presented this map to the Sultan, the Sultan tore the map into half and kept the part of the map of the lands he was ruling for himself and strangely the other half, including the Americas was discovered in the Topkapı Palace library only in 1929 by a foreign scholar (Paul Kahle). We also have reports of the envoys, "sefaretname", but not sufficient to be called an early area study.

Turks had more or less isolated themselves from the rest of the world until restructuring eventually as a republic. And even then Turkey was more interested with its immediate neighborhood – leading to the Balkan Pact and the Sadabad Pact. Soviet Union was also a main interest and concern.

During the Cold War years Turkish interest beyond its borders were limited. It relied more on the studies made by its allies to whom it depended for its defence and security. After the Second World War choosing the side of the adversary of the Soviet Union for understandable reasons, Turkey felt the comfort of being a NATO member and closely following the general line of politics of the Western Powers during the Cold War years to the extent of spoiling relations with Egypt, lacking understanding of their nationalistic fervor and also not showing sufficient solidarity with the Algerian and Tunisian peoples' struggle for independence from a colonial power.

Some academics and concerned intellectuals (including Mr. Seyfi Taşhan) had been publishing the journal "Dış Politika-Foreign Policy", at first in Turkish and English since 1971 to increase awareness for international developments. But in 1974 the Foreign Policy Institute was established in an attempt to bridging the world of the academia and the policy practitioners in foreign and securities policy and strategic issues.

When established, the need for area studies was not a priority and that would have required enormous funds beyond the Institute's means. The aim was not to start an ambitious area studies programme but more so

to provide information from Turkish perspective to those foreign institutes, politicians and media interested in developments in Turkey. However, over the years it has prepared works on its neighborhood, it has organized round table meetings on specific issues related with Turkish foreign policy and included articles in its journal on countries and regions Turkey needed to focus.

With the Turkish intervention in Cyprus to defend the rights of its ethnic kins and as a result of being confronted with an arms embargo from the US, its chief ally, Turkey realized the urgency to get into closer contact with other countries beyond its alliance partners and explain its differing policy priorities.

Even then, as Mr. Seyfi Taşhan just mentioned, it was not to start programmes to study these countries but to convey the message that Turkey should not be considered on the same line with its allies who had a colonial past and have a role in power politics.

End of the Cold War opened a vast geography for Turkey previously under Soviet rule – the immediate neighborhood to the East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. And the configuration in the global scene provided new vistas for Turkey as its industry had been developing and need to expand its trade was urgently felt.

Therefore, our Institute started to organize new meetings and made publications focusing on Turkey's new interest areas. In the 35 th anniversary issue of our Journal we had a selection of articles we had concentrated over the years. During the Cold War years our relations with the US was most important. Developments within the Atlantic Community, as well as strengthening the political cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance was of priority interest. Also relations with the EEC, developments in the Middle East and as always relations with Greece, particularly with the dispute over the Aegean were highly valued subjects. On Cyprus we had articles by the late Nihat Erim who had been involved in the preparations of the Zürich and London Agreements reminiscing the early efforts to overcome the dispute, by the late Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş presenting his views on the conflict and by Prof. Haluk Ülman narrating the Geneva Conference proceedings after the Turkish intervention in the Island in 1974. During the final years of the Cold War we had articles focusing on the policy of detente and future of the Atlantic Alliance, reflecting on Turkey's international status changing from marginality to centrality and

also proposing a federal solution for Cyprus. Post-Cold War years we see articles on effects of the ending of the Cold War on Turkey's international position, on Turkey's military doctrine, on Turkey's stand on the Gulf crisis, on Iran's nuclear ambitions, on the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as on the effects of the progress in Cyprus-EU relations to the search for a solution. In a more recent period the articles are again on developments of Turkish-US relations, on the beginning of a new conjuncture after September 11, on the impact of globalization on Turkey's security, on Turkey_EU relations, as well as the Middle East and of course Cyprus.

I will just point out at some of our important activities and publications during the last 15 years.

"Turkomans of Iraq as a Factor in Turkish Foreign Policy: Political and Demographic Perspectives" by Tarik Oğuzlu, when published in 2001 it was one of the first studies on our recent discovery of the Turkomans of Iraq. It was published at a time of brewing turmoil in Iraq.

We organized a symposium on March 22-23, 2004 on what should the new Iraqi constitution contain with participants not only from Turkey but also from the US, England and Germany as well as academics from Iraq who undertook the many difficulties reaching Ankara partly by bus! The proceedings of the meeting was published as "Iraq on the way to its new constitution". The Institute was also asked by the Foreign Ministry to prepare a draft constitution, which we did, emphasizing a secular and cantonal structure to avoid dismemberment of the country but the US led politicians in Iraq came out with a religiously based constitution with all its present day deficiencies.

Cyprus has always been of interest for us. One publication was "Cyprus and International Law" in 2002 tackling the conflict from different perspectives of international law and a booklet in Turkish "Cyprus: from Independence to Present Day – with documents" printed in 2010.

"Turkey and the European Union – 2004 and beyond" was a book we published in collaboration with the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies in 2004. Another book published also in 2004 was "The Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and pitfalls".

We had a special issue of our Journal on a EU related Conference we had organized in 2006. Another publication was "Turkey's Neighborhood" we

did in collaboration with the Polish Institute of International Relations in 2008. We focused on Ukraine, Bulgaria, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

“Caspian Energy Diplomacy since the end of the Cold War” by Tuncay Balanlı was printed in 2006. A book on “Transatlantic Relations: A Political Appraisal” by Gökhan Akşemsettinoglu published in 2005 studied this important relationship at a time of crucial changes in international politics.

“Eastern Mediterranean” published in 2009 covering Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Cyprus, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Greece and Turkey’s maritime issues as well as contributions on US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, Europe and the Mediterranean and also Russia and Eastern Mediterranean.

NATO’s new strategic concept was thoroughly tackled in our special issue of 2010. And we had a special anniversary issue for Turkey’s 60 Years in NATO both in English and Turkish.

Lately in our Journal we have had some articles on Turkey’s relations with Africa by different authors as the focus on that continent has increased.

Growing interest of Turkey in ECO region

Numan Hazar³

Turkey has always had a particular interest, throughout the Republican history, in the regional peace and security. The Sadabat Pact signed in 1937 by Turkey, Iran, Irak and Afghanistan is an example of this Turkish approach in its foreign policy. The Sadabat Pact was a treaty of non-aggression. It is meaningful that it was concluded at the time of Atatürk. We observe a continuity in Turkish approach when the Baghdad Pact was concluded in 1955. The Baghdad Pact was formed by Turkey, Iran and Irak due to security concerns at that time in view of a perceived threat from the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom joined the Organization at a later stage. The US did not participate as full member taking into consideration sensitivities of Arab countries in the region. It took its place in the organization, however, with observer status. The Baghdad Pact had its place in the chain of alliances namely NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) created by the West within the context of the containment policy against the Soviet threat.

³ Ambassador (Ret)

The headquarters of the Baghdad Pact was in Irak. Nevertheless, the Republic of Irak was withdrawn from the Pact following a coup in 1958 against the royal régime. In 1959 the Pact changed its name to Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and its headquarters moved to Ankara.

Regional members of the CENTO, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, decided to develop economic and technical relations and cooperation among themselves and they created in 1964 the Organization of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). As a matter of fact, RCD realized some technical, economic and cultural projects. During the Cold War period in the bipolar era, the leaders of these countries believed that historical, cultural, religious and geographical bonds will be enough to realize closer cooperation among the member countries to contribute to their efforts to ensure economic development and to raise their living standards. This plan was supported by the West in general and by the US in particular in order to prevent Soviet influence in a strategically important region.

Nevertheless, in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution in Iran all activities of the Organization were suspended. RCD was dissolved in 1980 and it ceased to exist as an international organization.

The member states of the RCD which have been aware of the significance of the organization taking into account great potentialities already existing in a number of areas, decided to reactivate it. Thus, in 1985 the Organization was renamed as Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) when the Treaty of Izmir was concluded. In 1992 the Organization was expanded to include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.⁴ Since that time ECO has become an international organization with 10 member states and acquired international recognition and prestige.⁵

It is meaningful that Afghanistan and the new independent states joined the organization following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

After this historical introduction we can explain why the ECO is an important grouping by referring to various advantages the Organization

4 Economic Cooperation Organization, ECO at a Glance, ECO Secretariat, Tehran, 2012 p.5

5 Elaheh Koolaei and Hormoz Dawarpanah, The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Achievements and Prospects, University of Tehran, Tehran, 2010, pp.2-8.

has possessed.⁶ We can summarize advantages of the ECO as a significant organization with great potentialities and particular characteristics as follows:⁷

- The ECO comprises an area of 8 million square kilometers with a population of 450 million people. It is geographically vast and also a contiguous territory.
- In addition to human resources, it is a region rich in natural resources, for example the existing oil and natural gas reserves.
- The ECO region is situated centrally among three continents of the Old World -Europe,Asia and Africa (collectively known as Afro-Eurasia)- and thus it has great strategic value, as put forth by the well known theorist of strategy Sir Halfort MacKINDER, within the context of his view to dominate the world through the domination of pivotal area. As a matter of fact, it was an area of competition for big powers throughout history.
- The ECO also symbolizes a region functioning like a bridge between the East and the West: Asia and Europe.
- The possibility of having access to the Indian Ocean,the Persian Gulf,the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea exists.
- Another significance of ECO is the proximity to big powers such as the European Union, Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.
- There are highways, maritime routes and railways linking one country to another.
- More important than all these factors, there is a historical and cultural affinity among member states.

As regards the cultural and historical particularity of the ECO member states as a whole, it is possible to compare it with the European Union. This particular character of ECO has even drawn the attention of Samuel P.Huntington who put forth the thesis of the clash of civilizations.When he explained that countries with similar cultures were choosing the option of economic integration, he mentioned also the ECO as an example.

6 Numan Hazar, The Future of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), ECO will have a bright future when it gains dynamism, visibility and efficiency, Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM), Report No. 108, February 2012, Ankara, pp. 8-10.

7 Numan Hazar, "ECO: a significant regional organization for economic development and integration", Today's Zaman, 27.01.2013.

Huntington refers to regional economic organizations as an indicator of civilizations' strengthening against nation-state and claims that precondition of economic integration is cultural affinity. He underlines the fact that "the success of these efforts has depended overwhelmingly on the cultural homogeneity of states involved."⁸

Together with the cultural affinity and close cultural interaction among member states, historical ties are also significant. In the ECO region there exists thousands of common words even with those which are linguistically different. As Professor Halil İnalçık, the dean of living Turkish historians indicates, historical researches confirm the fact that cultural affinity between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan is much closer and stronger than cultural affinity of Turks with Arabs.⁹ Obviously, when we take into consideration all member states of ECO this fact becomes more apparent. On the other hand, prominent Turkish historian Professor İlber Ortaylı underlines the influence of Iranian civilization on Turkey and Turks.¹⁰

After the recognition that ECO represents an organization based on cultural affinity, we must also underline that all these elements are indicative of an Organization which has a significant infrastructure and important potential to deliver a successful performance.

At this point, however, I would like to emphasize that the ECO is a technical organization. In this respect it is different from the European Union. As is known, the EU had the purpose to reach political union at the final stage through economic integration at the beginning. Nevertheless, this particularity of the ECO does not constitute an obstacle for an exchange of views on actual political and global affairs during summit meetings or meetings of the Council of Ministers. On the contrary, an opportunity is always created for such consultations.

Before entering into details of what ECO has been doing, I would like to provide some information about its organizational structure:

8 Samuel P.Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the New World*, Simon&Schuster UK Ltd, London, 1996, p.351.

9 Halil İnalçık, *Rönesans Avrupası Türkiye'nin Batı Medeniyeti ile Özdeşleşme Süreci Renaissance Europe and the Process of Identification of Turkey with Western Civilization*, Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011, p. 351.

10 İlber Ortaylı, *Türklerin Tarihi (History of Turks)*, TİMAŞ Yayınları İstanbul, 2015, pp. 91-97.

- Summit meetings which are held every two years (Heads of state or government). These meetings give opportunity for consultations and general guidelines at highest level.
- Council of Ministers is the highest policy and decision making body at the level of Foreign Ministers,
- Council of Permanent Representatives which is composed of diplomatic representatives of member states accredited in Tehran, headquarters of the Organization. It is responsible to carry out policies and to implement decisions of the Council of Ministers.
- Regional Planning Council which comprises heads of the Planning Organizations. It evolves programmes of action along with a review of past programmes and evaluations of results achieved to be submitted to the Council of Ministers.
- Secretariat which is headed by the Secretary General and his staff.
- Specialized Agencies and Regional Institutions in specific fields of cooperation. The number, nature and objectives of the agencies and institutions are determined by the Council of Ministers such as Cultural Institute, Science Foundation, Educational Institute, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Trade and Development Bank, Reinsurance Company, Consultancy and Engineering Company etc.
- ECO also have expert committees in a host of areas: Economy and Trade, Agriculture, Transport and Communications, Science, Culture and Education etc. They submit reports to Regional Planning Council.

On the other hand ECO realized various agreements to promote economic cooperation and integration. ECO Trade Agreement is aimed at reducing tariffs among member states. Member states also concluded a Transit Transport Framework Agreement. There are also various agreements formulated by the ECO such as Encouraging and Protecting Investments, Cooperation among Cooperative Sectors, Establishment of ECO Smuggling and Customs Offences Data Bank etc.

Before trying to make an evaluation of ECO's performance, we should go back to RCD, its predecessor. Despite the fact that RCD carried out some important projects, it is stated as root of its failure in general "unwillingness of the member states to comprise their own individual interests as one of

the requirements of the development of regional cooperation. This was the main obstacle for the implementation of RCD plans".¹¹

As far as ECO is concerned it is observed that it could not deliver a successful performance, despite already existing potentialities. There have always been painstaking efforts and various positive initiatives. Nevertheless, the Organization could not produce good results as compared to expectations.

In order to give an example, it could be indicated that there has always been an ambition to increase trade between the member states. In 2005, intra-trade was 6 per cent of all trade and in 2010 it increased to 7 per cent. This state of affairs could be characterized as a failure. As a matter of fact, in the ECO Vision 2015 document prepared by independent experts of the member countries, the goal of internal trade for the year 2015 was indicated 20 per cent of all trade. When we take into consideration that the internal trade of the European Union is 65 per cent of all trade, we can see a low performance from the point of view of the ECO's success. Undoubtedly, it will be useful to eliminate all existing obstacles in this area. Nevertheless, principally, it is important that all member countries first sign the ECO Trade Agreement and implement it.

There are also several structural or institutional difficulties which prevent the ECO to become a well-functioning international organization.

Turkey has always attached particular importance to a well-functioning, efficient and dynamic ECO. In the eyes of Turkey, a successful and more active ECO would best serve interests of all member states.

In light of this evaluation, during the Summit Meeting held in Istanbul in 2010 where Turkey assumed the task of Chairman in Office of the Organization, the then President of the Republic of Turkey, Abdullah Gül proposed the establishment of an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to provide recommendations to enhance the dynamism, efficiency and visibility of the Organization. This proposal, approved by Heads of State or Government, was included in the Final Declaration of the Summit Meeting.¹²

11 Elaheh Koolaee and Hormoz Dawarpanah, *The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Achievements and Prospects*, pp. 10-11.

12 Numan Hazar, *Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and Eminent Persons Group (EPG)*, *Uluslararası Ekonomik Sorunlar Dergisi (Review of International Economic Issues-an unofficial publication of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)*, July 2012 Year 12, No.44, Ankara, pp.11-20.

The Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was established in-mid 2011 and it started its works towards the end of the year. The EPG was composed of ten independent experts from each member states. It was assisted in their works by the Secretary General and his staff.

This EPG was the third EPG created up to now by the ECO, The Second EPG prepared "2015 Vision Document for the ECO" and proposed a host of measures in this context. This Document was approved by the Council of Ministers in 2005. In this Document Foreign Ministers declared that they wish to adopt a vision of ECO taking into account opportunities and challenges of the globalization process, the rapid social, economic, political and technological developments in the world and prospects in the decades ahead which need to be addressed adequately through a common and collective approach. With these aims, Foreign Ministers agreed on many commitments for a better functioning organization.¹³

The Third EPG carried out intensively its works in 2012. According to its **terms of reference**, the EPG, was given the task to examine all documents and the 2015 Vision Document in order to propose amendments to basic agreements, to interview the staff of the Secretariat, Specialized Agencies and Regional Institutions in order to submit its recommendations contained in a Report to the Council of Ministers. It was decided that the EPG would remain, if need be, in contact with the Council of Permanent Representatives (CPR) composed of Ambassadors of member countries in Tehran. The Secretariat would be providing facilities and services for EPG meetings for its well functioning.¹⁴

The EPG accomplished its mission in 2012 and the Chairman of the EPG presented the Report of the EPG to the Council of Ministers on the occasion of the ECO Summit Meeting held in October 2012 in Baku, Azerbaijan.

The EPG Report which contained in detail several recommendations including the strengthening of the Secretariat, selection of the staff on the basis of merit, increase in the budget, amendment in the decision-making

13 Economic Cooperation Organization Treaty of Izmir ECO Vision 2015, Tehran 2009, pp. 21-32.

14 Numan Hazar, Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and Reform Process, Uluslararası Ekonomik Sorunlar Dergisi (Review of International Economic Issues-an unofficial publication of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), August 2014 Year 14, No.47, Ankara, pp.25-32..

mechanism which created some difficulties in the past for well functioning of the Organization.

Turkey did not only propose the establishment of the EPG, but also provided the necessary financing.

The submission of the EPG Report has a particular significance, due to the fact that in 2015 ECO Vision Document prepared by the Second EPG should be revised and a new Vision Document for the next Decade 2016-2025 is to be worked out. In this regard, the EPG Report is very much timely as a guide. The results of the works of EPG, as of 2013, would furnish basic elements of a new Vision Document. This new document was also expected to be prepared by the EPG .

As it is referred above, according to the decisions of the 20th Council of Ministers's Meeting held in Baku in 2012, the Ministers, asked the Secretary General to prepare a roadmap for the implementation of the EPG Report, and to submit it to the Council of Permanent Representatives. The Paragraph, in the decisions of the Council of Ministers, related to the EPG's Report is as follows:

" (20) The Council appreciated the Report of the 3rd Eminent Persons Group (EPG), established pursuant to the Istanbul Declaration 2010 (Istanbul, 23 December 2010) and the decisions of the 19th Council of Ministers Meeting (Istanbul, 22 December 2010) to study and review the work of the Organization including the ECO Vision 2015, and asked the Secretary General to prepare a roadmap for implementation of the recommendations of the EPG and submit to CPR for consideration. The Council also authorized the CPR to take action on behalf of the COM in this regard. "

Right after the Meeting of the Council of Ministers the Final Communiqué of the Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government held on 16 October 2012 included the following Paragraph on the EPG Report:

"31. **Appreciated** the work done by the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) established on the initiative of the Republic of Turkey, which undertook performance appraisal of the Organization, identified major challenges and recommended ways to improve ECO's efficiency, dynamism and visibility."

The EPG, proposed in its Report, the organization of national conferences in each member state with the participation of government and

private sectors representatives, members of the media, think tanks and academicians. In these conferences, views, assessments and expectations of the member countries would be presented . The results of these conferences would be reviewed in a meeting of the EPG and at the end its evaluation will be considered in the preparation of the new ECO Vision Document for 2016-2025.

As unequivocally indicated by the instructions of the Council of Ministers, some of the recommendations of the EPG are to be implemented by the Council of Permanent Representatives on behalf of the Council of Ministers. It means that these recommendations do not need the approval of the Council of Ministers. Some others, by their very nature require the approval of the Council of Ministers. Certain recommendations can be implemented in short term. Some others have inevitably a long term perspective.

As identified by the EPG Report main impediments and shortcomings are as follows:

- Lack of efficient decision-making mechanism,
- Minimal participation by Member States in the activities of the Organization.
- Non-implementation of the decisions adopted by the decision-making bodies.
- Lack of financial resources and insufficient budget.
- Inadequate capacity of the Secretariat due to existing recruitment measures.

Turkey, supported all recommendations made by the EPG to overcome these impediments.

On the other hand, the Communiqué of the Tehran Ministerial Council held in November 2013 referred to the reform process of the ECO on the basis of EPG's Report in the following terms:

“(Foreign Ministers and Heads of Delegations) Building on the two decades of experience, decided to take forward the reform process of ECO on the basis of recommendations of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and instructed the ECO Secretary General to arrange, in cooperation with the Member States, the timely conclusion of the said process for enhancing

the dynamism, efficiency and visibility of the Organization. The Council instructed the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) to finalize and approve the roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of the EPG by August 2014 with a view to its earliest implementation. "

They also agreed that the reform process shall address, inter alia, the regulatory, institutional, budgetary and other requirements of the organization putting in place a reliable and durable cooperation framework for ECO region.

Despite the fact that three years already passed, the Organization has not yet unfortunately been able to realize the implementation of some recommendations. It is now three years that the Third EPG completed its works. As a matter of fact, Third EPG's Report containing recommendations aimed at enhancing dynamism, efficiency and visibility of the Organization was presented to the Council of Ministers in 2012.

As explained above, the Council of Ministers gave instructions to the Committee of Permanent Representatives to take action on its behalf concerning the recommendations of the EPG. The Summit Meeting, the highest body of the Organization has approved the decision of the Ministers. Nevertheless, works of the Committee of Permanent Representatives for the implementation of the EPG's recommendations, have not yet been completed.

On the other hand, interestingly, a new rhetoric started to the effect that the Organization needed a more comprehensive reform process. Apparently, it may be an effort aimed at diluting EPG's recommendations.

At this point, we must also once again draw the attention to the fact that every effort made to enhance the dynamism, efficiency and visibility of the Organization will only serve best interests of all member states.

The Secretary General and the Secretariat of ECO are making sincere and painstaking efforts in order to start the process for the implementation of the EPG's recommendations. Within this context an in-depth analysis of the EPG's recommendations has already been realized by the Secretariat.

The Council of Permanent Representatives of the ECO is also involved in expediting the finalization of efforts aimed at the implementation of the EPG's Report.

It is hoped that a substantial progress concerning the implementation of EPG's Report could be made before the next Meeting of the Committee of Ministers as well as the Summit Meeting.

The EPG Report underlined that all member states should have a high level political will in order to adopt necessary dispositions aimed at ensuring the ECO to become a well functioning international organization. It seems, at present, a strong political will is still needed to have a well functioning ECO.

In the Millenium Goals of the World Summit held in 2005, a special importance was attached to regional organizations. This is something that may encourage all member countries to demonstrate the necessary political will aimed at realizing a well functioning ECO.

Documents

Meeting of Heads of State or Government - EU-Turkey Summit Statement,

29/11/2015

1. Today the Leaders of the European Union met in Brussels with their Turkish counterpart. Turkey has been a candidate since 1999 and negotiating for accession since 2005.
2. Turkey and the EU discussed the importance of overcoming the common challenges ahead. In line with the conclusions of the European Council of 15 October, they agreed that the accession process needs to be re-energized. They are committed to carry further their existing ties and solidarity and adopt result-oriented action to prepare their common future. They are determined to confront and surmount the existing risks and threats in a concerted manner to reinforce the European Project. Recalling the final declaration of the last G20 in Antalya, as well as the 2249 UNSC resolution, Turkey and the EU reaffirm that the fight against terrorism remains a priority.
3. For this purpose it was agreed that a structured and more frequent high-level dialogue is essential to explore the vast potential of Turkey-EU relations, which has not been realised fully yet. In this framework, both sides agreed to have regular Summits twice a year, in an appropriate format. Regular summits will provide a platform to assess the development of Turkey-EU relations and discuss international issues. Regular discussions and cooperation on foreign and security policy should be enhanced including on counter-terrorism against the background of serious security challenges notably the rising threat of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. In this context, the two sides agreed to have comprehensive regular political dialogue meetings at Ministerial/High Representative/Commissioner level. These will be in addition to the regular Association Council meetings. High level dialogues should also be conducted on key thematic issues.
4. Both sides welcomed the announcement to hold the Intergovernmental Conference on 14 December 2015 for opening of chapter 17.

Furthermore, they noted the European Commission's commitment to complete, in the first quarter of 2016, the preparatory work for the opening of a number of chapters without prejudice to the position of Member States. Preparatory work could subsequently begin also on further chapters.

5. The EU welcomed the commitment by Turkey to accelerate the fulfilment of the Visa Roadmap benchmarks vis-à-vis all participating Member States. The European Commission will present the second progress report on the implementation by Turkey of the visa liberalisation roadmap by early March 2016. Both sides agree that the EU-Turkey readmission agreement will become fully applicable from June 2016 in order for the Commission to be able to present its third progress report in autumn 2016 with a view to completing the visa liberalisation process i.e. the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens in the Schengen zone by October 2016 once the requirements of the Roadmap are met.
6. The EU will provide immediate and continuous humanitarian assistance in Turkey. It will also expand significantly its overall financial support. A Refugee Facility for Turkey was established by the Commission to coordinate and streamline actions financed in order to deliver efficient and complementary support to Syrians under temporary protection and host communities in Turkey. The EU is committed to provide an initial 3 billion euro of additional resources. The need for and nature of this funding will be reviewed in the light of the developing situation. As Turkey hosts more than 2.2 million Syrians and as it has spent 8 billion US Dollars, the EU thus underlined the importance of burden-sharing within the framework of Turkey-EU cooperation. In this context, they underlined the contribution by Member State and existing EU resettlement schemes and programmes.
7. Turkey and the EU have decided to activate the Joint Action Plan that had been agreed until now ad referenda on 15 October 2015, to step up their cooperation for support of Syrians under temporary protection and migration management to address the crisis created by the situation in Syria. Results must be achieved in particular in stemming the influx of irregular migrants. The EU and Turkey agreed to implement the Joint Action Plan which will bring order into migratory flows and help to stem irregular migration. As a consequence, both sides will, as

agreed and with immediate effect, step up their active cooperation on migrants who are not in need of international protection, preventing travel to Turkey and the EU, ensuring the application of the established bilateral readmission provisions and swiftly returning migrants who are not in need of international protection to their countries of origin. Equally, they welcomed the intention of Turkey to adopt immediately measures to further improve the socio-economic situation of the Syrians under temporary protection. Both sides underlined their shared commitment to take decisive and swift action to enhance the fight against criminal smuggling networks.

8. As stipulated in the European Council Conclusions on Enlargement of December 2014, Turkey and the EU have been working on the establishment of a High Level Economic Dialogue Mechanism which will contribute to further enhancement of economic relations and create a business platform to bring business circles together. They agreed to launch it in the first quarter of 2016.
9. They welcomed the establishment of a High Level Energy Dialogue and Strategic Energy Cooperation, which had been launched in Ankara on 16 March 2015. A regular exchange of information on energy cooperation at the global and regional level serves to the benefit of both sides. They agreed to hold the second meeting of this kind in the first quarter of 2016.
10. They took note of the launching of preparatory steps for upgrading the Customs Union. After completion of this preparatory work by both sides, formal negotiations could be launched towards the end of 2016.
11. All these elements will have to be taken forward in parallel and monitored closely. Turkey and the EU are determined to advance together the widespread spectrum of their actual agenda to ensure that this fresh impetus yields concrete results.

G20 Leaders' Communiqué Antalya Summit, 15-16 November 2015

Introduction

1. We, the Leaders of the G20, met in Antalya on 15-16 November 2015 to determine further collective actions towards achieving strong, sustainable and balanced growth to raise the prosperity of our people. We are firm in our resolve to ensure growth is robust and inclusive, and delivers more and better quality jobs. We recognize that advancing inclusive growth and entrenching confidence require the use of all policy tools and strong engagement with all stakeholders.
2. In pursuing our objectives, we have adopted a comprehensive agenda this year around the three pillars of decisive *implementation* of our past commitments to deliver on our promises, boosting *investments* as a powerful driver of growth and promoting *inclusiveness* in our actions so that the benefits of growth are shared by all. We have also enhanced our dialogue with low income developing countries as part of our implementation of this agenda.

Strengthening the Recovery and Lifting the Potential

3. Global economic growth is uneven and continues to fall short of our expectations, despite the positive outlook in some major economies. Risks and uncertainties in financial markets remain, and geopolitical challenges are increasingly becoming a global concern. In addition, a shortfall in global demand and structural problems continue to weigh on actual and potential growth.
4. We will continue to implement sound macroeconomic policies in a cooperative manner to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth. Our monetary authorities will continue to ensure price stability and support economic activity, consistent with their mandates. We reiterate our commitment to implement fiscal policies flexibly to take into account near-term economic conditions, so as to support

growth and job creation, while putting debt as a share of GDP on a sustainable path. We will also consider the composition of our budget expenditures and revenues to support productivity, inclusiveness and growth. We remain committed to promote global rebalancing. We will carefully calibrate and clearly communicate our actions, especially against the backdrop of major monetary and other policy decisions, to mitigate uncertainty, minimize negative spillovers and promote transparency. Against the background of risks arising from large and volatile capital flows, we will promote financial stability through appropriate frameworks, including by ensuring an adequate global financial safety net, while reaping the benefits of financial globalization. We reaffirm our previous exchange rate commitments and will resist all forms of protectionism.

5. We remain committed to achieving our ambition to lift collective G20 GDP by an additional 2 percent by 2018 as announced in Brisbane last year. Our top priority is timely and effective implementation of our growth strategies that include measures to support demand and structural reforms to lift actual and potential growth, create jobs, promote inclusiveness and reduce inequalities. We have made significant progress towards fulfilling our commitments since last year, implementing half of our multi-year commitments. Analysis by the IMF, OECD and World Bank Group indicates that our implementation so far represents more than one third of our collective growth ambition. Yet we also acknowledge that more needs to be done. We will strive more and take prompt action to expedite implementation of our remaining commitments. Going forward, we will continue to closely monitor the implementation of our commitments through the robust framework we developed this year. We will also continue reviewing and adjusting our growth strategies to ensure that they remain relevant to evolving economic conditions, policy priorities and structural challenges, in particular slow productivity growth, and that they remain consistent with our collective growth ambition. The Antalya Action Plan, comprising our adjusted growth strategies and implementation schedules for key commitments, reflects our determination to overcome global economic challenges.
6. We are committed to ensure that growth is inclusive, job-rich and benefits all segments of our societies. Rising inequalities in many

countries may pose risks to social cohesion and the well-being of our citizens and can also have negative economic impact and hinder our objective to lift growth. A comprehensive and balanced set of economic, financial, labour, education and social policies will contribute to reducing inequalities. We endorse the Declaration of our Labour and Employment Ministers and commit to implementing its priorities to make labour markets more inclusive as outlined by the G20 Policy Priorities on Labour Income Share and Inequalities. We ask our Finance, and Labour and Employment Ministers to review our growth strategies and employment plans to strengthen our action against inequality and in support of inclusive growth. Recognizing that social dialogue is essential to advance our goals, we welcome the B20 and L20 joint statement on jobs, growth and decent work.

7. Unemployment, underemployment and informal jobs are significant sources of inequality in many countries and can undermine the future growth prospects of our economies. We are focused on promoting more and better quality jobs in line with our G20 Framework on Promoting Quality Jobs and on improving and investing in skills through our G20 Skills Strategy. We are determined to support the better integration of our young people into the labour market including through the promotion of entrepreneurship. Building on our previous commitments and taking into account our national circumstances, we agree to the G20 goal of reducing the share of young people who are most at risk of being permanently left behind in the labour market by 15% by 2025 in G20 countries. We ask the OECD and the ILO to assist us in monitoring progress in achieving this goal. We will continue monitoring the implementation of our Employment Plans as well as our goals to reduce gender participation gap and to foster safer and healthier workplaces also within sustainable global supply chains.
8. We will address current opportunities and challenges brought into the labour markets through such issues as international labour mobility and the ageing of populations. Domestic labour mobility is an important labour market issue in some G20 countries. We recognize and will further explore the potential of a flourishing silver economy. We further ask our Labour and Employment Ministers to report to us on progress made in 2016.

9. To provide a strong impetus to boost investment, particularly through private sector participation, we have developed ambitious country-specific investment strategies, which bring together concrete policies and actions to improve the investment ecosystem, foster efficient and quality infrastructure, including by the public sector, support small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and enhance knowledge sharing. Analysis by the OECD indicates that these strategies would contribute to lifting the aggregate G20 investment to GDP ratio, by an estimated 1 percentage point by 2018.
10. To improve our investment preparation, prioritization and execution processes, we have developed guidelines and best practices for public-private-partnership (PPP) models. We also considered alternative financing structures, including asset-based financing, and simple and transparent securitization to facilitate better intermediation for SMEs and infrastructure investment. Going forward, we call on our Ministers to continue their work to improve the investment ecosystem, promote long-term financing, foster institutional investors' involvement, support the development of alternative capital market instruments and asset-based financing models, and encourage Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to mobilize their resources, optimize their balance sheets, and catalyze private sector funding. We are advancing efforts and developing toolkits to unlock the ways and means for countries to better prepare, prioritize and finance infrastructure projects. We expect the Global Infrastructure Hub to make a significant contribution towards these endeavors. To help ensure a strong corporate governance framework that will support private investment, we endorse the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. We have placed a special focus on promoting long-term financing for SMEs, and we welcome the Joint Action Plan on SME Financing, the G20/OECD High-Level Principles on SME Financing as guidance, and the establishment of the private sector-led World SME Forum, a new initiative that will serve as a global body to facilitate the contributions of SMEs to growth and employment.
11. Global trade and investment continue to be important engines of economic growth and development, generating employment and contributing to welfare and inclusive growth. We note that global trade growth remains below pre-crisis levels. This is a result of both cyclical

and structural factors. We therefore reaffirm our strong commitment to better coordinate our efforts to reinforce trade and investment, including through our Adjusted Growth Strategies. Inclusive Global Value Chains (GVCs) are important drivers of world trade. We support policies that allow firms of all sizes, particularly SMEs, in countries at all levels of economic development to participate in and take full advantage of GVCs and encourage greater participation and value addition by developing countries. We further reaffirm our longstanding commitment to standstill and rollback on protectionist measures and will remain vigilant by monitoring our progress. For this, we ask the WTO, OECD and UNCTAD to continue their reporting on trade and investment restrictive measures. We ask our Trade Ministers to meet on a regular basis and we agree on a supporting working group.

12. The WTO is the backbone of the multilateral trading system and should continue to play a central role in promoting economic growth and development. We remain committed to a strong and efficient multilateral trading system and we reiterate our determination to work together to improve its functioning. We are committed to working together for a successful Nairobi Ministerial Meeting that has a balanced set of outcomes, including on the Doha Development Agenda, and provides clear guidance to post-Nairobi work. We will also need to increase our efforts to implement all the elements of the Bali Package, including those on agriculture, development, public stock holding as well as the prompt ratification and implementation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. We will continue our efforts to ensure that our bilateral, regional and plurilateral trade agreements complement one another, are transparent and inclusive, are consistent with and contribute to a stronger multilateral trade system under WTO rules. We emphasize the important role of trade in global development efforts and will continue to support mechanisms such as aid for trade in developing countries in need of capacity building assistance.

Enhancing resilience

13. Strengthening the resilience of financial institutions and enhancing stability of the financial system are crucial to sustaining growth and development. To enhance the resilience of the global financial system,

we have completed further core elements of the financial reform agenda. In particular, as a key step towards ending too-big-to-fail, we have finalized the common international standard on total-loss-absorbing-capacity (TLAC) for global systemically important banks. We also agreed to the first version of higher loss absorbency requirements for global systemically important insurers.

14. Critical work remains to build a stronger and more resilient financial system. In particular, we look forward to further work on central counterparty resilience, recovery planning and resolvability and ask the FSB to report back to us by our next meeting. We will continue to monitor and, if necessary, address emerging risks and vulnerabilities in the financial system, many of which may arise outside the banking sector. In this regard, we will further strengthen oversight and regulation of shadow banking to ensure resilience of market-based finance, in a manner appropriate to the systemic risks posed. We look forward to further progress in assessing and addressing, as appropriate, the decline in correspondent banking services. We will expedite our efforts to make further progress in implementing the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives' reforms, including by encouraging jurisdictions to defer to each other, when it is justified in line with the St. Petersburg Declaration. Going forward, we are committed to full and consistent implementation of the global financial regulatory framework in line with the agreed timelines, and will continue to monitor and address uneven implementation across jurisdictions. We welcome the FSB's first annual report on the implementation of reforms and their effects. We will continue to review the robustness of the global regulatory framework and to monitor and assess the implementation and effects of reforms and their continued consistency with our overall objectives, including by addressing any material unintended consequences, particularly for emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs).
15. To reach a globally fair and modern international tax system, we endorse the package of measures developed under the ambitious G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. Widespread and consistent implementation will be critical in the effectiveness of the project, in particular as regards the exchange of information on cross-border tax rulings. We, therefore, strongly urge the timely

implementation of the project and encourage all countries and jurisdictions, including developing ones, to participate. To monitor the implementation of the BEPS project globally, we call on the OECD to develop an inclusive framework by early 2016 with the involvement of interested non-G20 countries and jurisdictions which commit to implement the BEPS project, including developing economies, on an equal footing. We welcome the efforts by the IMF, OECD, UN and WBG to provide appropriate technical assistance to interested developing economies in tackling the domestic resource mobilization challenges they face, including from BEPS. We acknowledge that interested non-G20 developing countries' timing of implementation may differ from other countries and expect the OECD and other international organizations to ensure that their circumstances are appropriately addressed in the framework. We are progressing towards enhancing the transparency of our tax systems and we reaffirm our previous commitments to information exchange on-request as well as to automatic exchange of information by 2017 or end-2018. We invite other jurisdictions to join us. We support the efforts for strengthening developing economies' engagement in the international tax agenda.

16. In support of our growth and resilience agenda, we remain committed to building a global culture of intolerance towards corruption through effectively implementing the 2015-2016 G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan. We endorse the G20 High-Level Principles on Integrity and Transparency in the Private Sector which will help our companies comply with global standards on ethics and anti-corruption. Ensuring the integrity and transparency of our public sectors is essential. In this regard, we endorse the G20 Anti-Corruption Open Data Principles and the G20 Principles for Promoting Integrity in Public Procurement, and we welcome the ongoing work on asset disclosure frameworks. We will further work to strengthen international cooperation, including where appropriate and consistent with domestic legal systems, on civil and administrative procedures, as an important tool to effectively combat bribery and to support asset recovery and the denial of safe haven to corrupt officials and those who corrupt them. We welcome the publication of our Implementation Plans on beneficial ownership transparency and will continue our efforts in this regard.

17. We remain deeply disappointed with the continued delay in implementing the IMF quota and governance reforms agreed in 2010. The 2010 reforms remain our highest priority for the IMF and we urge the United States to ratify these reforms as soon as possible. Mindful of the aims of the 2010 reforms, we ask the IMF to complete its work on an interim solution that will meaningfully converge quota shares as soon as and to the extent possible to the levels agreed under the 14th General Review of Quotas. The 14th Review should be used as a basis for work on the 15th Review, including a new quota formula. We reaffirm our commitment to maintaining a strong, quota-based and adequately resourced IMF. We reaffirm our agreement that the heads and senior leadership of all international financial institutions should be appointed through an open, transparent and merit-based process and we reiterate the importance of enhancing staff diversity in these organizations. We reaffirm that the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket composition should continue to reflect the role of currencies in the global trading and financial system and look forward to the completion of the review of the method of valuation of the SDR.
18. We welcome the progress achieved on the implementation of strengthened collective action and *pari passu* clauses in international sovereign bond contracts, which will contribute to the orderliness and predictability of sovereign debt restructuring processes. We ask the IMF, in consultation with other parties, to continue promoting the use of such clauses and to further explore market-based ways to speed up their incorporation in the outstanding stock of international sovereign debt. We look forward to the upcoming review of the IMF-WB Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries. We acknowledge the existing initiatives aimed at improving sustainable financing practices, as stressed in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. We also take note of the Paris Forum initiative, which contributes to further the inclusiveness by fostering dialogue between sovereign debtors and creditors.

Buttressing Sustainability

19. 2015 is a crucial year for sustainable development and we remain committed to ensuring our actions contribute to inclusive and sustainable growth, including in low income developing countries.

The 2030 Agenda, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, sets a transformative, universal and ambitious framework for global development efforts. We are strongly committed to implementing its outcomes to ensure that no-one is left behind in our efforts to eradicate poverty and build an inclusive and sustainable future for all. We adopt the G20 and Low Income Developing Countries Framework to strengthen our dialogue and engagement on development. We will develop an action plan in 2016 to further align our work with the 2030 Agenda.

20. Our work this year supports key areas for sustainable development such as energy access, food security and nutrition, human resource development, quality infrastructure, financial inclusion and domestic resource mobilization. We endorse the G20 Action Plan on Food Security and Sustainable Food Systems, which underlines our commitment to improve global food security and nutrition and ensure the way we produce, consume and sell food is economically, socially and environmentally sustainable. We remain focused on promoting responsible investment in agriculture and food systems, improving market transparency, increasing incomes and quality jobs, and fostering sustainable productivity growth. We will pay particular attention to the needs of smallholder and family farmers, rural women and youth. We also commit to reducing food loss and waste globally. We welcome Expo Milano with the theme "Feeding the Planet - Energy for Life". We also welcome our Agriculture Ministers' decision to establish a new platform to improve the way we and other countries can measure and reduce food loss and waste.
21. The private sector has a strong role to play in development and poverty eradication. Through our G20 Call on Inclusive Business we stress the need of all stakeholders to work together in order to promote opportunities for low income people and communities to participate in markets as buyers, suppliers and consumers. Our G20 National Remittance Plans developed this year include concrete actions towards our commitment to reduce the global average cost of transferring remittances to five percent with a view to align with the SDGs and Addis Ababa Action Agenda. We are promoting financial inclusion by helping to open up access to payments, savings, credit

- and other services. We welcome the continued work on financial inclusion within the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI).
22. We remain focused on the G20 Principles on Energy Collaboration and welcome our Energy Ministers' first meeting ever. Recognizing that globally over 1.1 billion people lack access to electricity and 2.9 billion rely on the traditional use of biomass for cooking, we endorse the G20 Energy Access Action Plan: Voluntary Collaboration on Energy Access, the first phase of which focuses on enhancing electricity access in Sub-Saharan Africa where the problem is most acute. The Plan aims to strengthen G20 coordination and establishes a long-term voluntary cooperation framework that can be applied to other regions over time, recognising that energy access is a critical factor to foster development. In this first phase, we will cooperate and collaborate with African countries and relevant regional and international organizations on policy and regulatory environments, technology development and deployment, investment and finance, capacity building, regional integration and cooperation, taking into consideration national needs and contexts.
 23. We recognize that actions on energy, including improving energy efficiency, increasing investments in clean energy technologies and supporting related research and development activities will be important in tackling climate change and its effects. We endorse the G20 Toolkit of Voluntary Options for Renewable Energy Deployment. We also highlight the progress made this year by participating countries in taking forward our collaboration on energy efficiency and agree to further support on a voluntary basis the 2015 outcomes of existing work streams on efficiency and emissions performance of vehicles, particularly heavy duty vehicles, networked devices, buildings, industrial processes and electricity generation, as well as financing for energy efficiency. We will continue to promote transparent, competitive and well-functioning energy markets, including gas markets. We stress the importance of diversification of energy sources and continued investments for increased energy security. We reaffirm our commitment to rationalise and phase-out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, over the medium term, recognising the need to support the poor. We will endeavour

to make enhanced progress in moving forward this commitment. We ask our Energy Ministers to report back on energy collaboration again in 2016 on the continued implementation of the G20 Principles on Energy Collaboration.

24. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. We recognize that 2015 is a critical year that requires effective, strong and collective action on climate change and its effects. We reaffirm the below 2⁰C goal as stated in the Lima Call for Action. We affirm our determination to adopt a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC that is applicable to all Parties. Our actions will support growth and sustainable development. We affirm that the Paris agreement should be fair, balanced, ambitious, durable and dynamic. We underscore our commitment to reaching an ambitious agreement in Paris that reflects the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances. We reaffirm that UNFCCC is the primary international intergovernmental body for negotiating climate change. We welcome that over 160 Parties including all G20 countries have submitted their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to the UNFCCC, and encourage others to do so in advance of the Paris Conference. We are prepared to implement our INDCs. We will instruct our negotiators to engage constructively and flexibly in the coming days to discuss key issues, among other things, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer and transparency in order to arrive at Paris with a way forward. We commit to work together for a successful outcome of the COP21.
25. The scale of the ongoing refugee crisis is a global concern with major humanitarian, political, social and economic consequences. There is a need for a coordinated and comprehensive response to tackle this crisis, as well as its long term consequences. We commit to continue further strengthening our support for all efforts to provide protection and assistance and to find durable solutions for the unprecedented numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons in various parts of the world. We call upon all states to contribute to responding to this crisis, and share in the burdens associated with it, including through refugee resettlement, other forms of humanitarian admission, humanitarian aid and efforts to ensure that refugees can access

services, education and livelihood opportunities. We underline the need to address the root causes of displacement. We highlight, in this regard, the importance of political solutions to conflicts and increased cooperation for development. We also recognize the importance of creating conditions to enable refugees and internally displaced persons to safely and voluntarily return to their homes. We will work with other states to strengthen our long term preparedness and capacity to manage migration and refugee flows. We invite all states according to their individual capacities to scale up their assistance to relevant international organizations in order to enhance their capabilities to assist affected countries in dealing with this crisis. We encourage the private sector and individuals to also join in the international efforts to respond to the refugee crisis.

26. We are living in an age of Internet economy that brings both opportunities and challenges to global growth. We acknowledge that threats to the security of and in the use of ICTs, risk undermining our collective ability to use the Internet to bolster economic growth and development around the world. We commit ourselves to bridge the digital divide. In the ICT environment, just as elsewhere, states have a special responsibility to promote security, stability, and economic ties with other nations. In support of that objective, we affirm that no country should conduct or support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors. All states in ensuring the secure use of ICTs, should respect and protect the principles of freedom from unlawful and arbitrary interference of privacy, including in the context of digital communications. We also note the key role played by the United Nations in developing norms and in this context we welcome the 2015 report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, affirm that international law, and in particular the UN Charter, is applicable to state conduct in the use of ICTs and commit ourselves to the view that all states should abide by norms of responsible state behaviour in the use of ICTs in accordance with UN resolution A/C.1/70/L.45. We are committed to help ensure an environment in which all actors are able to enjoy the benefits of secure use of ICTs.

Conclusion

27. We remain resolute to continue our collective action to lift actual and potential growth of our economies, support job creation, strengthen resilience, promote development and enhance inclusiveness of our policies. We thank Turkey for its G20 Presidency and hosting a successful Antalya Summit this year. We look forward to our next meeting in Hangzhou in September 2016 under the Chinese Presidency. We also look forward to meeting in Germany in 2017.

